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Conflict Prevention and the Role of the Media 
Mariano Aguirre, Francisco Ferrándiz and 
José Manuel Pureza
A series of wars over the last decade have produced complex
emergencies that have led to various combinations of genocide, famine,
destruction of infrastructure, enforced displacement of populations
and regional destabilisation. There are now violent situations in around
30 countries, which produce over a thousand victims per year in battles
over political power or territory. The leading actors in these conflicts are
very often corrupt and repressive States and non-state armed groups.
These wars are part of, and instrumental to, illegal economies based on
resources such as diamonds, oil, timber, and on illicit trades of weapons
and drugs. 
There is an ever-stronger connection between violent groups such
as drug traffickers, paramilitary organisations and mercenaries. These
conflicts usually have a strong regional impact, which manifests itself in
refugee flows, illegal arms sales and environmental destruction. In the last
20 years academics, political actors and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) have been exploring the roots and characteristics of these
conflicts. And the Media has increasingly focused its attention on
them.
Most of the knowledge that we have about these conflicts, their
victims and their characteristics is obtained through the media. With
the exception of political actors and NGOs with relevant activity in the
field or academics that conduct research in these countries, international
society constructs its knowledge about modern peace and war based on
the messages that the media offer every day. This fact gives journalists
and the media great power over the life and death of millions of
people. If television shows the dramatic situation of some social group,
and if influential mainstream newspapers lobby in favour of «doing
something», then the victims have more chance of being protected by
the international community. On the other hand, if the media doesn’t
play a critical role, certain Governments can prepare the scenario for an
unjust war or simply do nothing. In the field of conflict prevention, the
media can play an important role by providing reliable and credible
information, and alerting society and decision makers about dangerous
situations.
Present-day armed conflicts tend to break out within States that are
fragile and lack legitimate, structured institutions. The difference between
the civil population and military forces is unclear, and State and non-
State protagonists wage war with no regard for humanitarian law.
From the Balkans to Colombia, via Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, the former
Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and
East Timor, the phenomenon of armed conflicts in fragile states is one
of the twenty-first century’s crucial problems. Foreign reaction varies
according to the protagonists involved —states, multilateral organisations
and NGOs— and their standing in the international system. 
The powerful states with global interests have wavered between
empowering the United Nations to manage these conflicts, and directly
tackling them themselves, either unilaterally or together with other
states that share common interests. 
During the 1990’s, multilateral organisations have fought for
political space (that should be delegated by powerful states), economic
support and even for the military power of coercion. The proposal by
the former UN General Secretary UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to create
a standby peace force which can act for prevention has not been
adopted by states because it would grant the Secretary-General power
over them and enable him to act coercively. During the last 14 years
the position of the United States and the European states changed from
a cautious delegation of power to the UN for universal interventions to
a reinforcement of selected interventions lead by regional powers or by
NATO. 
For their part, NGOs have the prestige, social support and the political
and economic backing from societies, States and institutions such as the
European Union (EU) that support them to manage the most dramatic
consequences of humanitarian crises. But currently, NGOs face two
problems. First, some complex emergencies are beyond their capacities
and they are not getting enough support from States and multilateral
organisations. Second, some States are using them as secondary actors
after they have fought their wars, as in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
These three groups, together with academics, peace and security
research institutions and journalists, have debated the response to
wars, violations of human rights and complex emergencies. The debate
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lies in the tension between the Realist concept based on the singular
interest of the nation-state, and the cooperative ideal which seeks the
common good of international society, furthered by the so-called Liberal
school of thought. This tension will be crucial for the current century. A
possible solution lies in a cosmopolitan approach to the victims and the
responses: it means to consider that massive violations of human rights
and the massive exclusion of millions of people are issues that must be
addressed by the international community of States. Human rights,
their implementation, and conflict prevention policies are common
goods and there is a responsibility to protect them. 
The concept of conflict prevention
Modern wars have their origins in different internal causes. As they
tend to take place in countries on the periphery of the global system,
there is a strong link between the economic policies directed at them
and their domestic reality. Rapid modernisation, for example, linked with
integration into the global market can increase inequalities and social
tensions. Therefore decisions taken in central countries or international
financial institutions on prices of raw materials, arms sales or credit policies
affect these countries owing to their dependency and weakness. This
weakness can be a trump card in conflict prevention.
Conflict prevention aims to stop tensions from escalating into
violence by means of short-, medium- and long-term. Theoretically, the
more effective the preventive action the less tension there will be and
the greater the distancing of violence. No single measure excludes the
others. Prevention can include coercive diplomacy (e.g. arms embargos);
institutional incentives (e.g. aid in exchange for peace); co-operative
management (e.g. easing mediation); and systematic transformations
(e.g. constructing a legal system). The wider the perspective, the more
dynamic the response will be. 
Just as there is no mechanical relationship between factors that
generate conflicts, there cannot be a mathematical summation of
action that will halt violent escalation. Conflicts are in the hands of people
and the results are always unpredictable. Furthermore, prevention should
be carried out cautiously (in order to avoid producing the opposite effect)
but without trusting in its results.
Lund says that prevention should signify immediate diplomatic or
military interventions so as to bring about an immediate halt to violence
and towards political and socio-economic structural changes, which
improve people’s standard of living. Therefore prevention includes:
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1) Actions, policies or institutions which are used in order to avoid
a significant and constant escalation of violence; internal or
international disputes at times or places which are particularly
vulnerable («vertical escalation»);
2) The promotion of activities that bring about non-violent
reconciliation of the interests in dispute;
3) This reconciliation includes helping to prevent the conflict from
starting up again once attention is turned to avoiding other
conflicts («horizontal escalation»). 
The Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflicts
studied the question for three years and has come up with an important
final study. Its definition is based on avoiding vertical and horizontal
escalation and preventing a renewed breakout of violence in conflicts that
have ended. The strategies for prevention are set down in three principles:
a) Act rapidly on the earliest signs of the problem (this implies
possessing prior knowledge of the ethnic, linguistic and socio-
economic, national and religious roots of conflict);
b) Act from the outside using political, economic, social and
military measures to relieve the pressure that has sparked the
violence;
c) Activate policies that resolve the underlying problems lying at
the roots of the violence.
The Commission groups the strategies for prevention under
operational prevention and structural prevention. In the former, an external
protagonist (state, multilateral organisations, a prestigious personality)
sets in motion a political-military and humanitarian strategy aimed at
halting the escalation of violence and restoring the internal politics of
the state affected. Operational prevention includes having the capacity
to anticipate and analyse potential conflicts (early warning), acting on
opportunities that arise unexpectedly, putting the problem in the hands
of the UN Security Council and the relevant regional organisations, and
encouraging preventive diplomacy, both public and secret. It also involves
using economic measures such as sanctions, the exchange of specific
measures for commercial profits, and making aid and investment
conditional.
The degree of force employed has to be in proportion with the
goals to be achieved and should be utilised within the framework of
the UN Charter. It is interesting to note that, according to this Charter,
force is not merely to be used as a last resort. Governments who commit
genocide should realise that certain behaviour is unacceptable to the
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international community, and force can also be applied for preventive
deployment (such as in Macedonia since 1992). The application of inter-
national law and mechanisms to resolve disputes, as well as strategies to
satisfy the economic, social, political, cultural and humanitarian needs of
those affected by conflicts and post-war reconstruction are included to
prevent the outbreak of conflict. The Carnegie Commission believes that
no matter the type of society, the pillars of peace are security, social welfare
and justice. 
With regard to security, the Commission includes the non-proliferation
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the control of con-
ventional ones, with attention to the small arms that are most often
used in today’s wars. Another dimension is the security within a state
that comes from having laws, a legitimate police force and impartial
judicial and penal systems. Welfare implies access to basic personal
needs: drinking water, health service, education, home and equal
employment opportunities. To reach these goals a redefinition of the
concept of development is required, together with aid and foreign
investment that favour sustainable development, as well as a revaluation
of the role of the state, which must be run openly and efficiently. In
addition, the OECD emphasises long-term development and sees a single
continuous process of conflict prevention, humanitarian emergency
operations, institutionalisation and reconciliation in peace processes. 
Also in recent years, the European Commission and the Parliament
have produced several documents and debates over conflict prevention.
Initially the Commission was reluctant to commit itself to a structural
concept of conflict prevention and chose to work on the development of
Early Warning. However, in later documents the approach has changed
and the Commission is planning to use different instruments, including: 
a. Promoting regional integration and trade links; 
b. Introducing the concept of conflict prevention in its development
programmes;
c. Supporting democracy, the rule of law and civil society
d. Reforming the security sector;
e. Post-conflict demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration
programmes;
f. Addressing issues as drug trafficking, small arms, scarcity of natural
resources; and migration;
g. Use the Community’s instruments, such as diplomacy, the Rapid
Reaction Mechanism, sanctions, crisis-management machinery; 
h. Cooperation with other international organizations, such as the
United Nations and the World Bank.
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A positive role for the media? 
As Cecilia Bruhn explains in her chapter, the relation between conflict
prevention and the media is still an unexplored issue. We know that
bad journalism can promote violence, but we do not know how good
journalism may have an positive influence and impact on the prevention
of armed conflicts. There is a need also to explore how the domestic
and the international media operate in some particular cases, and the
interfaces with international institutions and Governments. In Rwanda
in 1994, some domestic media openly promoted genocide, while
international media mostly ignored the situation. At the same time,
some Belgium military officials alerted the UN and the Western
Governments of a dangerous situation that was going to erupt at any
given moment, but the US, some European Governments and the
bureaucratic machine of the UN did not react at all.
In his chapter, José Manuel Pureza proposes the creation of a new
journalistic paradigm, one that efficiently contributes to the human
combat against genocidal culture. In fact, as some of the papers in this
volume suggest, the very idea and practice of conflict prevention can
be the main axis for the articulation of new forms of journalism. For
Jean-Paul Marthoz, to develop this conflict prevention journalism, or
early warning journalism, media needs to show a renewed flexibility to
cope with shifting situations, developing new information-gathering and
dissemination strategies that avoid the short-circuits of conventional
reporting. Expressions such as “empathy exhaustion”, “outrage fatigue”
or “catastrophe excess” were frequently heard in the working sessions
at the Coimbra conference, and point to the saturation of the main
patterns in which information on Human Rights, war and disaster have
been managed in recent decades. To be of any use, the new preventive
journalism has to be able to do away with this emerging feeling of
powerlessness and find imaginative ways to reconnect with audiences
at all levels. Suggestions such as the training of local, national and
international media staff in a “conflict prevention culture”, or the search
for ways to make conflict prevention newsworthy in all media formats
were raised in the debates. How to go about it should be permanently
open to debate, and the different contributions in this book offer some
suggestions in this direction. 
One important issue to start with is to analyse and deconstruct the
ways in which the media liberally assume ready-to-use plots to
represent the different parties in conflict situations. Instead of creating
narratives that portray the ‘other’ as a threat, as fanatical and irrational,
which is a too common feature of mainstream reporting, the media
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could contribute to constructing a fair representation of different countries,
cultures and people. For example, Robert Hudson analyses in his
chapter how the people of the Balkans have been misrepresented by
some famous academics and journalists, such as Robert Kaplan, who
with emphasized historical essentialisms that added little to peace
building. We have more recent examples of this process in Afghanistan
or Irak, where the massive construction of a dangerous “enemy” of the
West and the world, to which the mainstream media was a privileged
accomplice, erased all possible avenues for conflict prevention. These
essentialisms contribute more to gross misinterpretations than to a
nuanced, preventive analysis that cuts across stereotypes and provides
more realistic portrayals of the situation on the ground. 
Beyond the avoidance of simplifying and, often stigmatizing plots,
the media can also play a positive role in many of the prevention activities
described. Journalists can provide information for the implementation
of early warning policies, and can contribute knowledge and indications
about situations, actors and their aims, and can also help to promote
those actors that are active in peace policies. On the other hand, the
media can contribute to hate or ignorance. Frivolous, bad and unethical
journalism could generate more harm than bias journalism. Unfortunately,
the rules of high tech and fast information promote a type of reporting
and analysis (or lack thereof) that provide a very superficial and very
often erroneous perspective of conflicts, their roots and their actors. 
Journalists can also help to explain the international context of
conflicts, and the way in which these fragile States are linked to legal
and illegal networks, and the multinational corporations and international
financial institutions toward them. The media also has the power to
explain the links between two apparently different areas: development
and conflicts. Through their reports some journalists present examples
of how poverty, inequality and exploitation are at the roots of social
and armed conflicts. 
According to Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen, development co-
operation should be a “process of opening up real freedoms that the
people can enjoy”. Development as a process of freedom depends upon a
series of factors such as social agreements for education, access to
healthcare and recognised political and civil rights. Sen supports a concept
of development that links freedom, democracy and information in order
to increase the quality of life of people and to help promote more stable
societies. The Media could be a tool for the construction of freedom,
social agreements, participation and recognition and protection of rights. 
Conflict prevention policies are finding many difficulties. Since 11
September 2001, most cooperation policies have passed to the
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backstage. Force is replacing negotiations. Unilateralism is displacing
multilateralism. The war against global terrorism is occupying the place
of development and humanitarian policies. The US government is
manipulating even the concept of prevention by using the idea of pre-
emptive war —something that has been accepted by Javier Solana,
head of European Security and Foreign Policy. 
Conflict prevention policies confront a situation in which there are
several trends: 
a) The pre-eminence of the national interests of global and
regional powers over common interests. Multilateralism is losing
ground and the idea of regional hegemonic leaders is returning;
b) The global economy is based on low-risk investment with high
gains in the short term. Structural prevention implies investment,
which carries a risk with a possible indirect gain in the long term.
Analysis is needed which investigates if it is more profitable to
prevent than manage crises and collaborate in reconstruction; 
c) Immediate prevention can be capitalised on politically by those
governments or institutions that propose it (if it proves efficient).
But public opinion and the media comprehend better a war or a
breakdown in negotiations than the process that avoids it. The
media have a responsibility to give sufficient coverage to the
preventive and diplomatic processes.
The modern international system is a mix of State and non-State
actors, of State-centric and multi-centric approaches, and non-territorial
networks. On the on hand, these changes must be understood by
International Law. But on the other, the media must try to reflect and
understand the different aspects and trends of this complex world. To
develop this task the media should work on the reconceptualisation of
concepts such as security and Human Rights as well as the importance
of multilateralism. The social practice of journalism must be redefined as
a contributor to conflict prevention and conflict resolution. 
Multilateralism is a crucial factor for conflict prevention policies.
And an open perspective that would include State and Non State
actors is a necessity. To tackle problems such as poverty or war there is
a need to coordinate policies among States, the EU, UN, the G-8 and
civil societies from inside and outside the affected States. The work
should be done at different levels: development, humanitarian action,
human rights, world trade, among others. The responsible media should
work from and inside the approach of the needs of the people (human
security) and the needs of the international system (multilateralism).
Those two concepts should be their guidelines. 
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Conflict prevention is a concept to be developed. It is also a concept
to be protected from being pre-empted by spurious interests that
might transform it into just another empty buzz-word. It receives its
nourishment from human rights, international law, economic develop-
ment, theories of the State and democracy, and the verification that
modern armed conflicts carry consequences to be avoided because, in
the end, prevention can be simpler, cheaper and less brutal than cure. 
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To Give Sense to Solidarity We Need to Give Meaning 
to Reality
Jean-Paul Marthoz
The first mandate of human rights organizations is not to prevent
conflict; it is to prevent abuses against human rights. History shows
that sometimes conflicts, popular rebellions or military-humanitarian
interventions have helped to topple brutal regimes and improve the
situation of human rights. Increasingly, writes Ken Roth, executive director
of Human Rights Watch, “the human rights movement recognizes that
military force can not only be good for human rights, but, in fact, is an
essential component of the protection of human rights”1. The call for a
military intervention to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 came to
epitomize the relationship of human rights organizations to the issue
of armed intervention to stop the commission of the most serious
crimes.
However, human rights organizations don’t close their eyes to the
issue of preventing violent conflicts, since most of these erupt because
of blatant abuses of human rights and often lead to an increase in
brutal violations of both human rights law and the “laws of war”.
Indeed, the new “nasty little wars” of the last decade have changed
the face and soul of human rights reporting. The ethnic cleansing in
the former Yugoslavia, the genocide in Rwanda, the wars in Kosovo
and Chechnya, the brutal confrontation in Israel/Palestine have given a
new sense of urgency to the documentation and dissemination of
human rights abuses and have changed the way human rights organiz-
ations have traditionally looked at violent conflicts. Unlike the “urgent
actions” of the 1960s and ’70s which were meant to save a prisoner of
conscience threatened by an abusive regime, today’s “calls for action” 
1 See Human Rights.
launched by human rights organizations confronted with mass murder
cover entire populations and groups in danger. The new trends in
warfare and the scope of human rights abuses have raised essential
questions related to both the understanding of these evolutions and
the efficiency of the proposed remedies.
A new context
The challenge is made more difficult by the increased role of the
media in international affairs. The horrendous brutalities and political
manipulation of imagined ethnic identities have merged with the
immediacy of live television coverage and on-line news to exacerbate
either the need “to do something” or the temptation to zap away from
these distant horrors. If the new media scene has increased the capacity
to denounce and to mobilize, it has also put immense pressure on human
rights organizations and even distorted carefully planned priorities.
There is a dark side to journalism. If we ponder the role of the media
in the most atrocious crimes of the past decade (former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda), some media have been guilty of fanning the flames of ethnic
hatred and even of coordinating the dirty work of the ethnic cleansers
and the génocidaires. If we study the “banality of evil” (ethnic violence
in Nigeria, communal violence in Indonesia, religious clashes in India),
the media or at least many of them have been guilty of resorting to
damaging clichés and stereotypes of the “other”, of recklessly simplifying
complex issues and just looking for drama, blood and violence.
There is a bright side too. Although badly criticized for their “bang-
bang” coverage of the new conflicts and their proclivity to being used
by the new “spin doctors” of global politics, the media, and certainly
the best of them, have also played a distinguished role in disseminating
information on human rights and violations of international humanitarian
law. Over the last ten years the media have been sharply increasing
their coverage of human rights violations and conflicts. Key indicators are
the increasing number of human-rights-related stories, the appointment
of human-rights editors in a few media, and also the increasing
knowledge and expertise in international human rights and humanitarian
law.
On the bright side also, in countries of the South, the so-called
“hate media” that are usually characterized by their dependence on the
state or on influential economic or group actors have been challenged
by a growing corps of daring independent journalists who have striven
to contradict and debunk the false assertions circulated by dependent
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media. Indeed the quality of the media, their ethical approach, and
their adherence to the highest standards of the profession are key
criteria in their capacity to defuse tensions. It was best illustrated in the
April-May 1989 conflict between Mauritania and Senegal when Sud
Hebdo and Wal Fadjri both played an important pacifying role in
refusing to get engulfed in the jingoistic campaign2.
Reporting “live”
The reality, however, is also that in recent years the “foreign beat”
has taken a beating in many news organizations, especially in the US.
This “downsizing” of foreign news has taken place while the face of
war was itself changing. Despite all the talk of “live TV” coverage and
the globalization of information, more and more conflicts have become
invisible, either because they take place in areas that are too dangerous
to cover or because armies seal off the battleground and only allow
well-controlled expeditions into previously sanitized areas. The military
seem to have learnt the lessons of Vietnam where free-riding journalists
were allowed to the battle scenes and to report freely back home. Now
strict control of the media corps is the rule, from the Gulf War to the
War in Iraq and the Israeli incursions into the Occupied Territories. 
In years past, human rights organizations had tended to come late,
after the fact, and to act as recorders of history. However, they have
become aware that their pace is too slow for the whirlwind of human
rights emergencies. Human Rights Watch has taken stock of this and
realized the need to take a different approach in order to stop human
rights abuses NOW. Our investigators have been forced to fill in the news
media gaps, acting no longer as historians painstakingly digging up the
evidence for later reports, but also as proxy war correspondents reporting
“live” from the lawless corners of the world. This was done mostly in
Kosovo, before and during the NATO intervention, from Ingushetia during
the second Chechnya war, in the warlord-ruled rural areas of Afghanistan
and in Iraq before, during and after the American-led offensive. 
Human Rights Watch therefore has had to develop new methods
of gathering and distributing information to respond to this sense of
urgency. It has had to develop a new brand of investigators, the “emerg-
ency researchers” trained to blend the skills of high-paced journalism
and slow-lane human rights investigations. HRW has had to equip itself 
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2 See Moussa, Boubakar, 1994.
with new technological capacities and to create new communications
systems in order to provide as quickly as possible an accurate description
of the situation on the ground. It has had to rely on careful interviews
of traumatized refugees arriving en masse across the borders to try to
reconstitute the cases of human rights violations. 
CNNization and the “right to intervene”
Human rights organizations have entered warily into this CNNization
of human rights reporting. Although most of the information collected
through refugees’ interviews has been proven right by researchers
finally being allowed access to the killing fields, we know the risks
involved in terms of accuracy, impartiality and vulnerability to manipulation
when our researchers have to go into the “fog of war”: Reporting “live”
introduces deadline pressures; posting an investigator in a specific
location —a decision often linked to the lack of access to the war zones—
has its inevitable consequences in terms of what kind of abuses are
being reported, and by whom.
Human rights monitoring is therefore thrown into the middle of
the unfolding drama and its denunciations increasingly become an
integral part of the decision-making process and of the governments’
determination to act, or to pretend to act. In a world where the denunci-
ation of egregious crimes can lead to economic sanctions, military
intervention and war crimes trials, human rights investigators on the
ground have become key actors on the international political scene.
Their information will be used for good or bad, it will be manipulated,
quoted out of context, brandished as justification for actions that might
look humanitarian but are essentially political. Their information will be
brushed aside, deconstructed, accused of irrelevance or immaturity, when
realpolitik, from Chechnya to Afghanistan, justifies waltzing with the
mass killers and the “dirty warriors”.
Human rights documentation is also taking a new turn thanks to
landmark victories in the field of international justice. The arrest of
Augusto Pinochet in London in October 1999 was “a wake-up call for
tyrants” as much as the transfer of Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague.
Indeed, from now on, leaders commanding gangs of rapists and mass
murderers know that the information collected on their crimes may lead
them to the dock. This increases the risks of physical aggression for
both human rights investigators and for journalists and the recourse to
“no-access” or “free-fire” zones.
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Framing the agenda
The centrality of the theme of human rights in new complex crises
has produced an increased risk of “instrumentalization” which in turn
has acutely put to the test the impartiality of international human rights
monitoring. In this new context, human rights organizations, as established
in most Codes of Journalistic Practices, are pledged not only to be impartial
but also to avoid the appearance of being partial. “A false idea is a
fact”, as French philosopher Raymond Aron used to say. Perceptions have
become paramount: gaps in country monitoring, most often attributable
to issues of staffing turnover and resource constraints, imbalances in the
number and targets of press releases, threaten to be seen or denounced
as deliberate decisions and a sign of taking sides.
Impartiality means applying the same human rights standards to all
actors in a conflict, to official armed forces and guerrilla groups, to our
supposed friends and our declared enemies. However it does not mean
neutrality in the face of evil. Human rights organizations practise indeed
a form of committed journalism, based on the three ethical pillars of the
profession: truth-seeking, independence and minimizing harm. Impartiality
is tested in the investigation methodology as well in the NGOs’ readiness
to denounce human rights abusers from all sides, even if one side seems
to provide most of the civilian victims. It is also demonstrated in their
determination to keep distance from the “breaking news” and big
powers’ agendas as well as in their commitment to cover human rights
violations far away from media frenzies and diplomatic priorities. Human
rights investigators must report “live” but they must also be where
journalists are not, they must speak up when everyone keeps silent,
they must stay when journalists pack up, they must come back when
the soldiers have decamped. 
This is where human rights reporting joins conflict prevention. Our
objective at HRW is to promote some form of “preventive” or “early
warning journalism” knowing that a story in a leading paper or a major
TV news programme has often more chance to raise political leaders’
attention than a memo sent by an intelligence service or an embassy. By
investigating countries that are not at the top of the news cycle, human
rights organizations can be part of an early warning system. The violation
of human rights is indeed a key indicator in the road towards conflict.
Abusive governments stifle the expression of plurality, exclude or
discriminate against members of other ethnic, religious, linguistic groups,
therefore radicalizing the most active members of these groups and
feeding their claims that violent protests are inevitable and necessary.
This kind of work has been done by HRW researchers on many
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communal conflicts, on the Montagnards in Vietnam or in countries of
Central Asia, years before they were suddenly thrown into the arc of
crisis. This “early warning” work is complemented by doing follow-up
research in countries that have been the scene of major human rights
disasters and suddenly fade away from the news agenda. 
NGOs, and particularly development and medical groups, are par-
ticularly well equipped to assume that work. Like missionary outposts a
century ago their coverage of the world is often much more extensive
than the correspondents’ network of the biggest global news organiz-
ations. There are also often the only ones present in a zone of emerging
conflict and the only ones to stay after the first wave of “bang bang”
journalists has left. Besides, the availability of instant communications
has increased the autonomy and information power of NGO’s vis-à-vis
both journalists and decision-makers. And many have learned to go
beyond communication and public relations to provide factually
accurate and urgent information to the media.
“Outrage fatigue” 
Human rights organizations have scored major gains in the last
decade, pushing through a treaty banning landmines, forcing sceptical
diplomats to sign a treaty establishing an International Criminal Court,
sending tens of war-crimes indictees to national and international courts,
and reopening cases of murder and disappearance in Latin America.
The new “dirty little wars” have also demonstrated the NGOs’ capacity
to document and publicize abuses but they have also bitterly tested
their capacity to influence the international community and force it to
take meaningful actions to stop the killing. In Croatia, Bosnia, Rwanda,
Chechnya, they have proved themselves able to quickly document and
denounce the true nature of what was happening but they have failed
to convince or shame the world to intervene.
Why? Was the world not supposedly ruled by the CNN effect? Did it
not suffice to show the shocking images of wounded or dead civilians to
trigger compassion and action? The human rights movement has
generally overestimated the power of the image and confused the public
opinion’s positive and generous reaction to the depiction of suffering with
its readiness to stomach decisive and sometimes bloody intervention. 
As French political scientist Samy Cohen has shown in his study of
public opinion and war3, there is a distance between interest and 
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mobilization. If the media can easily trigger humanitarian responses,
they are a lot less influential in leading governments to take tough
political decisions. The Rwandan genocide is certainly the most blatant
example of this dual track. Despite precise information on the preparation
and the execution of the genocide, journalists were unable to move
either international public opinion or democratic governments to send
troops and stop the killing. A few months later, however, images of
hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees mixed with génocidaires
fleeing the victorious Tutsi army and flocking into the camps of Goma
triggered a swelling wave of humanitarian emotions and financial
generosity.
The avalanche of horror pictures and grisly descriptions of unlimited
human suffering and brutality has confronted human rights organizations
with “outrage fatigue”, changing moral disgust and emotional revulsion
into a sense of powerlessness and even, at the end, into indifference.
More fundamentally, this focus on images and emotion has left the field
wide open for new interpretations of the world that to a large extent
have been providing a rationale for cynicism and passivity. “The TV spec-
tacle of corpses encourages a retreat from the attempt to understand,”
writes Canadian pundit Michael Ignatief. “...It is a fallacy to suppose
that global media automatically create these narratives of engagement.
Our engagement depends critically on what narrative is provided for us
by the mediators —the writers, journalists, politicians, eyewitnesses—
who make the horror of the world available to us”4.
Interpreting the world
To a large extent the human rights movement has failed, not unlike
many other progressive groups, to provide a “meaning” to a senseless
world, leaving the space wide open for theoreticians of doom and for
the concept of The New Barbarism developed in best selling books like
The Coming Anarchy (Robert Kaplan) or The Empire and the New
Barbarians (Jean-Christophe Rufin). Percolating in thousands of press
articles and TV reports, these interpretations have debunked the trust
that many had placed in the mobilizing power of moral outrage and
they have provided an intellectual framework for a New Realist school
in international politics, which has no real patience for an activist
human rights policy. 
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This is where the conventional way of reporting human rights
abuses appears insufficient and in some cases even becomes counter-
productive. Therefore human rights organizations have to work on two
intellectual fronts: 
1) They have to demonstrate beyond the moral arguments that
human rights are not a contingent and subsidiary element of
international politics but one of its essential dimensions: that
there is a realpolitik of human rights.
2) They have to go beyond the strict documentation of human
rights abuses and provide the wider context and linkages that
will show that these “dirty little wars” have a meaning and an
impact close to home and therefore that citizens can be
engaged in the rolling-back of the “New Barbarism”.
The proclaimed “ancestral” brutality and apparent irrationality of
post-modern civil wars beg a more forceful effort at explanation and
interpretation. The mass murder with machetes of hundreds of thousands
of Tutsis in Rwanda, the large-scale mutilations in Sierra Leone, appear
literally incomprehensible. The reflex therefore is to simplify and to
evoke tribal hatreds and historical analogies —the “heart of darkness”—
that further blur the vision under the pretence of enlightening it.
Reporting complexity
In its book Slaughter among Neighbors, published in 1995, Human
Rights Watch already emphasized the need to identify the “facts behind
the facts”: “The international community’s ability to respond effectively to
communal violence —violence among ethnic, religious and racial groups—
is hindered by a failure to understand its causes.” All too often, age-old
hatreds are blamed. Yet the origins of many of these conflicts lie less in
abiding animosities than in contemporary politics, for communal violence
frequently occurs when a government is losing popularity or legitimacy
and finds it convenient to wrap itself in a cloak of ethnic, racist, or religious
rhetoric. Slaughter among Neighbors aims to foster an understanding of
contemporary causes of conflict and build the foundation on which to
construct sound strategies to prevent or contain the violence”5.
The reporting of complexity has to take the lead on the reporting
of outrage: what can we do in the face of “centuries of hatred” as many
presented the genocide in Rwanda, except close the door, pull down 
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the shutters and barricade ourselves far from the maddened and
murderous/murdered masses? Whereas we can do something if this
hatred is described for what it really is: a programmed murder machine
in the hands of a government under siege. Whereas we can do something
if the violence in Sierra Leone or Angola or RDC is linked to new trends
in the extractive and arms industries and to the criminalization of the
world economy.
“The images presented of African conflicts as primitive and backward
reinforce existing prejudices and limit further examination of their
causes and impact,” writes Philippa Atkinson. “Conclusions are drawn,
based on this imperfect analysis, that the West can play no positive role to
help Africans with their local and historical conflicts, with disengagement
seen as the only sensible strategy and that perhaps humanitarian aid
can be offered through the non-committal channel of NGOs”.6
Exposing the worldwide “circle of abuse” 
To be relevant human rights organizations have to open the scope
of their investigations and better contextualize violations. That means
going beyond the “primary actors”. “Conflicts, writes International
Alert, are often camouflaged: only the primary parties, the antagonists,
are visible (through media coverage, military actions, making statements,
signing agreements) while secondary parties may play an important
role behind the scenes (providing the money, weapons and other
infrastructures for the conflict)7. Limiting the documentation of human
rights abuses to the primary actors —the victims’ testimonies and their
accusations against abusers— can be counter-productive. The accumu-
lation of images and denunciations of sheer and “senseless” atrocities
can “turn off” both journalists and the public. 
We experienced such reactions towards many African conflicts when
our reports fell on deaf ears and did not trigger a strong outrage. We
had to go beyond the mere description of human rights abuses and find
out how to reconnect these abuses with other, closer, issues and actors.
That’s why HRW has developed other research projects to give a
meaning to the information on abuses, to find the “chain of command”
in these abuses, to describe the full context. We have investigated arms
trafficking, minerals smuggling, the role of the oil industry, etc. 
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The “qualification” of a conflict, its definition, is not gratuitous. It
induces the form of the response. “Barbarism” justifies disengagement
while the contextualization, the deep interpretation of causes, the
identification of the local and transnational networks of interests and
responsibilities, brush aside pretexts for inaction and lead to a rational
discussion of policy options. The priority for human rights organizations
is to give a meaning to the senseless whirl of the world in wild places
of mayhem and furore. To give meaning to solidarity, we need to give
meaning to reality.
Harnessing academic power
The academic community could provide the “missing link” in this
urgent need of context. Studies that integrate all factors of a conflict
and try to provide a wider interpretation than just the legal and
human-rights approach would prove particularly useful not only in
understanding the context but also in drafting relevant and realistic
recommendations that not only talk to policy-makers or international
actors but also make sense at the grassroots level, by taking into account
complex cultural and historical factors. 
Universities and research centres could also orient their media studies
to understanding the role that the media and journalists play or do not
play in conflicts. Two pitfalls have to be avoided. First, “media bashing”: as
the discussion on the Gulf or the Iraq wars have shown, media criticism
tends to be heavily tainted by ideological agendas that undermine the
rigor of the research. Second, academic mistrust of “chaotic” journalistic
practices: understanding the pressures journalists are under, how decisions
are made, the complexity of news flows, would require more cooperative
research between academics, NGOs information officers and journalists.
Little is known for instance of the interplay between local and inter-
national media or the interaction between global TV, international radio
stations, diaspora media and more informal modes of communication,
from the pre-modern traders’ networks to the post-modern Internet.
There is another field of cooperation: the schools of journalism.
Introducing human rights reporting in the curriculum of schools of
journalism, teaching international journalism in a way that emphasizes
contextualization and “glocalisation”, i.e. the links between local and
global events, is certainly an area of huge potential. 
Human rights organizations have another responsibility in helping
to define the extent and the limits of freedom of speech. Although
international standards, like the famous Article 19 of the UN Declaration
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of Human Rights, are well-known and clear, the reality is that a leading
media power, the United States, and many US-based organizations,
adhere to another free speech tradition, the First Amendment, that
allows hate speech quite generously. The balance between freedom of
speech and the right to non-discrimination, the definition of “hate
speech”, “hate crimes”, and of the concept of “incitement” should be
key research assignments for the international human rights and
conflict prevention communities.
Understanding journalism
Finally, human rights organizations have to accept the autonomy of
journalism and understand that the role of journalism is neither human
rights promotion nor conflict prevention. It is about reporting the facts,
analysing them and putting them into a context that makes them
relevant and understandable. The role of the media is also to present a
real diversity of opinions that covers the full spectrum of voices.
In this context, can we oppose war journalism to peace journalism?
I would rather say that the dividing line is between good and bad
journalism. Peace activists tend to label as war journalism a kind of
journalism that works in slogans, indulges in stereotypes, seeks drama
and chases shocking pictures, that is, a journalism that would be
considered faulty by most journalism schools. If we define peace media
as “presenting issues fairly, offering alternative sources of information
and broadcast nullifying or mitigating the messages of hate media”8, it
sounds just like another name for good journalism.
A distinction however can be made between news-oriented journalism
and “conflict-resolution/prevention” media that aim concretely to
contribute to the solution of a crisis. This latter form involves a lengthy,
pedagogical and cautious process that goes beyond straight news
reporting and tries to solve conflicts by making available space or airtime
for the expression of grievances, by empowering people that have
been voiceless. They deserve the respect of the more “rugged old
hacks” that tend to see the practitioners of this form of journalism as
“do-gooders” too ready to compromise the hard facts on the altar of
peace-building and community-bridging. 
News-oriented journalism works at another level. If it requires a
strong mastering of professional practises and a healthy distance from 
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all actors, even the well-intentioned ones, it has also to understand the
many ethical dilemmas that might arise during a conflict. As the key
duties of journalism are the search for truth, independence and the
need to minimize harm, the “ethical triangle” is particularly difficult to
establish in many conflicts and journalists should prepare themselves
for the kind of predicament when they will be confronted, for instance,
with the decision to release, or not, a story that might be inflammatory,
or to testify as a witness in an international criminal court.
Journalism’s main imperative is its commitment to the truth, its role
in finding and validating information. This duty is particularly crucial in
the “fog of war” atmosphere where propaganda, intimidation, appeals
to patriotism or solidarity with the victims, are a constant pressure on
journalists’ professionalism and integrity. 
It is by carrying out this mission without fear or favour that
journalists can really play their role and converge with human rights
organizations.
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The Media, New Wars and New Challenges 
for the Twenty-First Century
Pedro Caldeira Rodrigues
On 29 March 2002, one day after the beginning of the Israeli Defence
Forces’ massive military offensive against the autonomous territories of
the Palestinian Authority, CNN journalist Chistiane Amanpour was able
to get into contact with Yasser Arafat by phone. The Palestinian leader
was surrounded by over 70 tanks at his headquarters which lay in ruins.
Amanpour asked him whether he “could do more in order to stop the
violence”, in an obvious reference to the Palestinian suicide bombing
attacks. Arafat got angry, accused her of concealing the “crimes of Israelis”
with that question, and that was the end of the conversation. “What a
great journalist you turned out to be, you should have more respect for
your profession…”, said Arafat to the astonished Amanpour.
Previously, in 1998, during the Kosovo conflict, about one year
before the beginning of the NATO attacks, a CNN team also led by
Amanpour went into Pristina for just two or three days. With amazing
technical support, the sole objective of the large team was to interview
a leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the Albanian armed group
fighting the Serb forces. The report was made. A few days later, the
then US Special Representative Richard Holbrooke visited the region and
also had a meeting with the KLA’s leadership, which translated into the
movement’s legitimisation by the US. The negotiated solution gave
place to the military solution. 
These two examples disclosure a specific and persistent way of doing
journalism, where a tendency towards simplification and Manichaeanism
is revealed: the tendency to blame, almost exclusively, one of the sides in a
conflict for the worsening of the situation, and to juggle the information
on the possibilities of negotiable solutions. 
These are examples that keep on repeating themselves, as in the
Middle East. In early April, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), a
US observatory on the media, released, a study on the use of the word
“retaliation”, and its derivations, on ABC, CBS and NBS’s main nightly
news between the beginning of the second Intifada, in September
2000, until 17 March 2002.
The study concluded that 79 percent of those references were related
to Israeli “retaliation” against the Palestinians. Only 9 percent referred
to Palestinian “retaliation” against Israeli. With both parts justifying their
attacks as retaliation for past actions, US’s main TV channels chose to
characterise Israel’s violence as “retaliation”, far more often than it did
violent Palestinian actions. 
Why this example? Because the term “retaliation” suggests a defens-
ive attitude, a response to a specific aggression. It also implicitly places
responsibility for the cycle of violence on the side that is suffering retali-
ation; notwithstanding the fact that the number of Palestinian civilian
casualties was always higher than those of the Israelis. 
As such, FAIR concluded that the disproportionate use of the word
“retaliation” —79 percent against 9 percent— reveals a tendency to
define Israel’s action as defensive, and the Palestinian one as aggressive.
Once more, the main US broadcast media were able to “simplify” a
rather complex conflict. 
In the face of a very radicalised situation, where both parts have
several propaganda weapons, the media, mainly the US televisions,
rarely broadcast information on how to solve the long-time contentions
in the Middle East area. Peace proposals or plans that were, or still are,
under discussion are omitted, and the consquential is privileged by
comparison with the essential. To make things worse, the media are
deliberately excluded, often through violence, from areas where
human rights abuses occur. 
In this scenario, it’s not surprising that an “invisible war” has been
settled in the editorial offices.
In the US, as revealed by several media observatories, signs of
conflict radicalisation were never explained, which makes it possible to
easily manipulate people and reach simplistic conclusions, such that
Israel wants peace and Arafat doesn’t. Or the other way around.
The most balanced opinions are disregarded, and the entire story is
focused on the main actors. The “peace field” is marginalised and almost
reduced to silence, in the same way as were the voices criticising the
specificity of the “war against terrorism”, declared after 11 September
2001 by the Bush administration, in an overall atmosphere of “reinforced
national security”. 
In fact, very few critical voices had access to television time, including
in the debates. And many media, by allowing governments to be the
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ones to define what is in stake, have promoted the worst possible
scenarios. When people don’t know what the alternatives are, they
don’t fight for them. Mainly, because they are not revealed. 
On the media’s usefulness
Ever since 11 September 2001 the media have had to seriously
examine their role, their usefulness. This, despite fact that the events in
Timisoara, Romania, in 1989, on the eve of the collapse of Nicolae
Ceausescu’s regime, or the Gulf War, had already called the function of
journalism into question. 
But in this new international scenario following the devastating
attacks on New York and Washington and therise of the so-called
“new threats”, did the media really reflect about the “past lessons” and
undertake a more cautious role, equidistant from the several powers,
pledging themselves to conflict prevention, instead of its proliferation?
Is it possible to understand how the world we live in works, based
on the information provided to us by the mass media? Or is it that the
dissimulated language, the omissions, after all characterise an illusion
called the ‘media era’, while power continues to have its own agenda:
an unalterable power, which serves to protect its own interests, no
matter what?
The media and the war in Afghanistan
According to several experts on the media phenomenon, the covering
of the so-called “war against terrorism” declared by President George
W. Bush altered the traditional relationship between the media and the
military. Contrary to what happened, for example, during the Vietnam
War, the intense criticism of the past was abandoned and the media
became the vanguard of publicising military successes. 
US political and military leaders conveyed a clear message: the war in
Afghanistan was merely the prelude for other military actions, while even
in Afghan territory itself, conflict was far from over. By contrast, the media,
mainly American, did not hide their exuberance over the war’s progress. 
Reporting this war means a new era of American “war journalism”.
In the Second World War, in Korea, in Vietnam, military public affairs
departments had orders to expose the most positive scenario possible.
Among the myths of the Second World War is the idea that the media
were far more positive in their work than they were in Vietnam. In part
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that was so, because the media were engaged with the strategic aims
of the war, as were the military. In Vietnam, the media ended up
becoming critical of the war itself. 
Especially in the US, the media and the military leaders seem to
have now completely different tasks. The cautious tone is ignored, and
the obsession with Afghanistan led the media to focus their attention
in that field and to interpret the events as a “magnificent victory” for
the US. It was a victory indeed, but far from being a definite one.
In general terms, the media reported the Taliban’s withdrawal from
the power structures and the cities as the end of the Taliban, and the end
of the war —in contrast to military leaders, who continued to emphasize
the limits to that victory. Roles were reversed, and it was the media
that started to draw a picture full of victories and successes. The media
were once more unable to understand the war, and approached the
conflict a kind of a “personal issue”. 
The “why” continued to be much less important than what was
happening, and the media kept on seeing victories where the military
saw “battles in progress”, with inevitable consequences for public
perception of the war. 
In a way, the media now did the opposite of what was done in the
Vietnam War, but they could potentially create an identical situation:
people expect a swift end to the war, and start to get anxious when
this doesn’t happen. 
The attacks on New York and Washington and the declaration of
the “war against terrorism” also meant the beginning of tremendous
pressure on the media, so that US actions and politics were presented
in the most convenient way for the administration. Numerous cases of
censorship, and even more self-censorship, occurred, and many
independent initiatives were mistaken for “absence of patriotism”. 
The Anthrax Scare
But another problem is that the obsession with terrorism might make
the media accomplices of terrorism, when they appoint themselves as
“messengers of terror”. In this aspect, the case of anthrax is exemplary.
Worldwide hysteria about anthrax, disseminated by the media, made
people believe that it was a scourge that could attack anyone. 
And yet, there were only a few dozen people infected, some of
whom died. The coverage was absolutely disproportional to the real
threat. And other threats, other much more serious diseases, other
deadlier phenomena, were consigned to the back pages. 
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Then other alarms showed up: terrorist attacks on the San Francisco
bridges, possible attacks during Easter, in a spiral of mistrusts, fears,
suspicions: by now every threat seemed probable. In this sense, the
media proved not to be very provident as they propagated exaggerated
fears which may eventually turn insignificant terrorist actions into major
public phenomenon. 
The Pentagon and the war
Despite changes in the relationship between the media and the
military, the Pentagon’s propaganda machine improved, with the col-
laboration of several departments. Restrictive policies were reinforced
and last February, Washington Post reporter Doug Struck said that the
American soldiers in Afghanistan threatened to fire against him if he
kept trying to investigate a place where civilians had been killed. “Why
doesn’t the Pentagon allow journalists access to investigate what is
going on in Afghanistan?” he asked. Israeli soldiers showed the same
attitude a few months later towards the journalists that tried to cover
“forbidden military areas”.
In fact, democracy stops working if the public doesn’t have access
to complete and reliable information on government activities. In the
Afghanistan war, journalists and humanitarian organisations in the field
had restricted access to many areas, and the main US TV channels
almost never questioned the legality of decisions that involved
attacking civilians.
Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch have shown their
concern over the loss of civilian lives in Afghanistan and have appealed
for a moratorium against the use of cluster bombs, but ABC, CBS or
NBC have made no reference to this question. Some media even justified
attacks against civilians. And when civilian deaths were being reported,
like in Tora Bora, where the number of victims rose to 100, a CBS reporter
considered that “so far few Afghans object to the civilians killed by US
air strikes”.
Independent reports once more became the exception, and reports
on civilian deaths were often blamed on “Taliban propaganda”. Defence
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warned that “telling stories of civilians
apparently killed by American bombs makes it more difficult to hunt
terrorists”. 
The person most highlighted in the propaganda perspective was
Jim Miklaszewski, NBC’s Pentagon correspondent, who several times
characterised the issue of Afghan victims as an “offence” to the US, or
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that the Pentagon “was acting defensively” due to the fact that Taliban
propaganda led occidental journalists to places allegedly destroyed by
aviation.
Another study made by FAIR on the “New York Times” and the
“Washington Post” dailies revealed that in the weeks following the
September attacks, the space granted to the supporters of a military
response was overwhelming, whilst opinions standing up for a
diplomatic approach and respect for international law, as an alternative
to military action, were practically non-existent. 
But even if the polls revealed that the majority of the population
defended a military answer, the media’s duty should be to remain
independent, and to listen to the greatest possible number of opinions.
The most respected, and most influent, newspapers should have the
task of providing readers with a wide range of opinions on how to
approach terrorism, its causes and solutions. But if the aim was to
promote a serious and critical debate, then both American dailies
failed.
Furthermore, as a White House spokesperson admitted, a need to
“demand a suspension of freedoms and rights in a way never seen up
to the present, at least since the Second World War” began to be
theorised.
Monopoly questioned
However, the Qatar-based Arab television channel Al-Jazira threw
new dice, confirmed by recent events in the Middle East, where Arab
satellite channels growingly impose themselves on CNN conflict coverage. 
The answer to this new phenomenon revealed a lot of nervousness.
Washington admitted to having directly chalenged Qatar’s emir on
what was called Al-Jazira’s “incendiary rhetoric”.
Beyond the intense pressures on this Arab TV channel, the Bush
administration decided to severely limit “sensitive information” on
Afghanistan’s military operations, at the same time as the main
televisions revised their alignments.
Whist the media were preparing for the war, some distinguished
American journalists were suggesting military strategies that violated
the laws of war and almost reflected terrorist strategies. For example,
Billy O’Reilly, a Fox News Channel journalist, said in a programme that
if the Afghan government did not give Bin Laden up “the US should
bomb Afghan’s infrastructure to the limit —the airport, power stations,
reservoirs and roads”. And he carried on: “The Germans were responsible
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for Hitler. The Afghans are responsible for the Taliban. If they don’t rise
against a criminal government, they’ll suffer hunger, full stop”. 
In this way, the context of the crisis, the circumstances that led to
Taliban’s seizure of power, the complicity of international powers in this
process, all were concealed. 
On 10 October 2001, the executive directors of ABC, CBS, NBC,
Fox and CNN gathered with National Security secretary Condoleeza
Rice, and accepted the suggestion that future declarations of Bin Laden’s
Al Qaeda group would be condensed and “inflammatory language”
would be suppressed. A bad example, in which the government tells
the journalists how they should transmit information. To Rice, and
according to what was revealed, the main fear consisted in Bin Laden
“being a charismatic speaker who could propagate the anti-American
feeling to spread hate and incite his followers to kill Americans if he
had 20 minutes on TV”.
The point here is not that Bin Laden or Al Qaeda were entitled to
“equal time” in the broadcast media, but the government’s disturbing
attitude to shaping or influencing the content of information. This in a
climate of massive radicalisation, exacerbated patriotism, rising intolerance
and attacks on civic and individual freedoms. 
Support and criticism
Instead of keeping its distance, the media started to “support”
government. However, there has been a rise of American media criticism
towards the Pentagon, which tended to consider several newspapers
or television channels as its exclusive spokesmen. 
It was the growing number of incidents in the Afghan war, contrary
to the official version, which gave birth to this small insurrection. Last
March, the Washington Post dared to write “the explanations of [US
Secretary of Defence] Rumsfeld and his commanders on the deaths of
innocents caused by American attacks are filled with contradictions”.
The main factor leading to the exchange of bitter words between
the media and the US government was the International Press Institute’s
accusation of the Pentagon’s engagement with the Office of Strategic
Influence, an organ with the task of producing worldwide disinformation
in name of western interests, and particularly American ones.
But this decrease in the nationalist-patriotism fervour that was
installed in the media right after 11 September 2001, did not prevent
Time magazine (online) in early March from electing General Tommy
Franks, chief of military operations in Afghanistan, as “figure of the
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week for his work in waging a war that became more and more difficult”,
even considering him a “war hero”.
Thus, room for dissidents against the “military line” became very
reduced. For some media, civilian casualties were simply not news. And
the well-known journalism technique of “burning the lead” was revealed:
the story begins with what everyone knows, while the real news, the
surprising and significant, is “pulled” down, where there is less chance
of its being read and commented on. 
Lessons from the Gulf 
In 1991, in the Gulf War, the fact that the public opinion was
cudgelled with the “miraculously small number of casualties” on the
great coalition side, surely motivated by the triumph of recent technology,
and with the 250 thousand or more Iraqis annihilated, greatly contributed
to the recurrence of new situations, such as in the Balkan wars, in
particular the Yugoslavia bombings. 
When it was decided to attack Saddam Hussein’s regime in 1991,
the now US vice-president, Dick Cheney, was Secretary of Defence. A
strategy was delineated to “face the media”, in collaboration with the
then General Chief of Staff of the US Armed Forces, Colin Powell, now
responsible for the Department of State. Information would only be
released if it favoured the operation’s political aims. Military censors vetted
newspaper articles and reporters were confined to the pool systems,
always under escort. At that time, Powell justified these restrictions to
prevent “security failures”.
Newspaper directors were now called to the Defence Ministers’
offices to receive “suggestions” and instructions. In the Gulf, or in the
so-called “Kosovo war”, BBC and ITV field journalists were invited to
behave in the same way. The Economist then considered that “the truth
about the Gulf war must wait for the end of the conflict”. And when
some journalists announced some of the terrible “collateral effects”,
their patriotism was immediately questioned, and their reports were
considered a “disgrace for their country”.
In Kosovo, the ghosts of Second World War, the Nazis and the
Holocaust were even invoked by the media to describe the situation in
the field and to justify the attack against Milosevic’s Yugoslavia. And one
must remember the way the media reported the decisive Rambouillet
conference, a negotiation initiative meant to attempt to halt the conflict,
which sank due to the general media-fed belief in the inevitability of
the attack on Yugoslavia. 
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One must also emphasize that during the Bosnian war, which exclus-
ively grabbed media attention, news in Rwanda emerged, suggesting
the beginning of a large-scale genocide. For weeks, the media kept
silent, though they knew what was happening.
Still Afghanistan
As Noam Chomsky highlighted, in the two decisive months prior to
the beginning of the Gulf War, the tendency amongst the most powerful
American media was practically to ignore the diplomatic initiatives trying
to avoid the conflict, placing an emphasis rather on the inevitability of
the military action. Journalism definitely wore a military uniform.
Simplification instead of analysis, omission instead of information:
the crisis in research journalism also determined the parameters in
which the media work, and the perfection or imperfection of what they
transmit, of the “truth” they transmit.
In the Gulf War, in the former Yugoslavia conflicts and especially in
the Afghan war, a substantial change in “patterns of conformity”
occurred. As the journalist and writer Baptista-Bastos warned in a recent
article, the concept of “truth” conveyed by the main, respected political
leaders becomes a “unilateral truth”, seen as total. In this aspect, the
anti-terrorist pretext allows for a “dramatic mental simulation”, which
recognises any other armed intervention as legitimate, anywhere in the
world, whenever there is suspicion of “terrorism”. 
The field reporters would not have been able to perceive the
problem’s specificity due to several deficiencies. But they served an
“ideology”, in a logic of metaphorical reasoning that accepts as right
and just what is seen as “retaliation”. The power system outlined after
11 September 2001 wasn’t determined by the information transmitted
by the media. And so, the “information consumer” is unable to build
formulae for personal reflection and analysis, and is more vulnerable to
the “inevitable” scenarios. 
In the case of the war in Afghanistan, the key Portuguese media
also lined up with the “war against terrorism” slogan, pushed by the
London and Washington governments. But El Mundo (Spain) called it an
“offensive”, and The Guardian (Britain) an “attack on Afghanistan”.
But in general, the most powerful media showed little concern in
approaching the roots of conflict, their nature, the characteristics of
the regimes involved, the various diplomatic initiatives. 
It is important in this context to recall the impact of the Vietnam
War on the American public opinion, mainly due to the presence of
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reporters at the frontline, which brought to perplexed citizens images of
increasing defeat, loss of American lives, discontent and demoralization,
leading to pressure for the end of the conflict. 
In contrast, the Gulf War meant the beginning of the “clean,
controlled” war, without images or with staged ones —a war without
casualties, without blood, at least on the “right side”: a tendency that
continued to increase and to become more sophisticated.
The end of an era?
One may ask, as information professionals do, where are the brilliant
international reporters of decades ago? Can we speak about the
decadence of a noble cause, as the word “moral” continues to prevail,
in an attempt to “win the hearts and souls”?
The Australian journalist John Pilger recalls that during the First
World War, the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George told C. P. Scott,
editor of the Manchester Guardian, “If people really knew the truth,
the war would end tomorrow. But of course they don’t know and
cannot know”. At the same time the impartial correspondent of The
Times, Sir Philip Gibbs, swore “truth had been told, beyond the hard
realism of horrors and casualties, and of facts and criticisms…”
Robert Miller, United Press correspondent during the Korea War in
1952, revealed himself as less subtle. He said: “There are certain ‘facts’
and stories on Korea published by editors and directors that were
simply made up … Many of us who sent stories knew they were false,
but we had to write them because they were official communications
from headquarters and they were sent for publishing even if those
responsible knew they were false”.
But there are other stories. William Howard Russell, The Times
envoy to the Crimean War, a conflict that happened over 150 years
ago, says in his diaries that the articles he sent by horse and steamboat
to his London newspaper, took over a week to reach the editorial office.
“Should I say these things or should I restrain my words?”, asked Russell
of his editor. And he would reply: “continue to say as many truthful
things as possible”. They were both accused of treason, until Russell’s
brave reports forced the Government to resign. 
So, all journalists must be confronted with the challenge of
examining their work in war promotion, propaganda and its myths, in the
pressures used by several organisms, including media administrations,
which like to claim for themselves the monopoly on morality and
credibility. 
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These references remind the young Swedish journalist and writer
Stig Dagerman who, in occupied Germany during the “German Autumn”
after the Second World War, sent great reports about real-life conditions
and the humiliations to which the German population was subjected
by the victorious Allies, relating, after all, some hidden truths. But no
matter how unpopular or disturbing reality is, the rest isn’t journalism. 
Many of these testimonies could indeed be applied to today’s wars,
such as the 1991 Gulf War, NATO’s bombings of Yugoslavia in 1999,
the war in Afghanistan of 2001-02, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When
an American radio station systematically omits the number of Palestinian
deaths and emphasises the Israeli victims, what is it doing? Trying to
prevent conflict, suggesting that there is a possible negotiable way out,
or justifying the Israelite army’s military attacks in the name of the
“fight against terrorism”?
Propaganda journalism, serving power, has hardly been
importunated by the huge technological advances in the media. The
media, the “fifth element” as Ignacio Ramonet calls it, still has a short
memory, and the same “truth recipe” is still pursued without many
obstacles. And a kind of insensible, undetectable and unrecognisable
censorship seems to prevail, often hidden behind false principles of
objectivity, with the aim of minimising or denying responsibility of the
world’s great powers for their extremely violent actions. Or the supremacy
of a more or less conscious self-censorship, fed by disinterest, that
predominates in so many editorial offices. 
The media and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003
The successful Anglo-American military attack against Iraq, begun
in March 20, 2003 and ended one month later with the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein’s regime, has determined a new and hitherto unknown
relationship between the media and political-military power, whose
main feature until now has been tension.
As a result of the selective invitation made to several media, mainly
British and North American, to join the military units that invaded Iraq,
the concept of the embedded journalist has arisen. 
This phenomenon, by which the media were able to accompany
the military in a new version of “live war”, seemed to be the proof of a
new “friendship and approximation” policy of the military towards the
media, notwithstanding the several questions that immediately arose
regarding the limits of journalists’ performance and their freedom to
inform.
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According to the expression used by Professor Mário Mesquita, the
condition of “integrated” or “embedded correspondent”, forced to
comply with certain rules of conduct, did not however prevent some
journalists from escaping the censorship of the commander of the military
unit where they were working and of reporting some of the war’s horrors. 
Despite the continuation of the Al-Jazira phenomenon, the “creation
machine” of the great media spectacle has only improved and adapted
itself to the new realities. The innovation of “embedded” journalists
doesn’t appear to have implied any noteworthy change in the possibility
of a better understanding regarding this war.
However, as underlined by Professor Telmo Gonçalves in an article
published by the Portuguese daily “Público” in early April 2003, and
beyond the restrictions imposed on journalists, the Pentagon’s promised
“war without censorship” did not translate into more than an adaptation
of media rules to the new televised dynamics.
Initially, the rules forced on journalists by the Pentagon received
particular criticisms. Hundreds of journalists from all over the world
entering Kuwait were obliged to sign a two-page, fifty-article document,
drawn up by the Pentagon as an effort to allow the media access to
the battlefield unprecedented since the Vietnam War. But suspicions
remained high.
In Telmo Gonçalve’s opinion, while the invasion’s outcome remained
uncertain, the long expectations war in previous months had created a
climate of anxiety in audiences and the media, which would inevitably
lead to excessive media coverage of the conflict.
When the “end of military operations” was announced, the
Pentagon ended up by making a positive evaluation of the work of the
“embedded” journalists, meaning that this new “friendship policy”
towards the media might continue and develop.
Paradoxical situations 
In the specific case of the United States, media control by huge
corporations and the problem with patriotism as a result of the 11
September attacks is once again conditioning journalist activity. It was
considered that the objective of the “integrated reporters” system, within
the so-called “Rumsfeld doctrine”, was to produce war reports with
three characteristics: proud, positive and patriotic. 
On the other hand, surely most American and British soldiers sent
to military operations in Iraq were not informed on the political and
financial support provided to Saddam by their governments during the
darkest moments of his regime.
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As in previous conflicts (like Afghanistan), the North American
observatory FAIR noted that most American media ignored the bombing
of Iraqi civilians, while several well-known journalists were once again
under huge pressures due to their critical stances on the war.
NBC, Disney, News Corporation, AOL-Time-Warner, MGM and
Universal Studios are some of the 13 North American companies that
control the global communications network. Many of them have very
close relationships with the Bush administration, which was translated
into an almost total alignment with official stances regarding their
approach to the conflict. News Corporation’s “Fox News” was a particular
example of this situation.
However, and when it came to written press, there was a somewhat
paradoxical situation in Portugal. Unlike in most European countries,
and despite the majority of the population’s opposition to the war, the
two major dailies in Portugal (Público and Diário de Notícias) and the
main weekly one (Expresso) took a pro-conflict stance in their editorials.
In the case of Público, this position was mainly expressed in the director’s
articles. And these stances were by no means shared by most of the
respective staff of these papers.
Nevertheless, in the US, and for the first time in recent history, there
was no enthusiastic adherence by most of the national newspapers,
and only one third of the editorialists were clearly aligned with the
administration. Newspapers with the tradition of non-signed editorials,
such as the “New York Times”, “Washington Post” or “Los Angeles
Times”, took an “officially” critical stand towards the White House’s
policy.
Real and virtual
Notwithstanding this, the majority of American public opinion was
supportive of Washington’s policies towards Iraq. An influent conservative
newspaper, the “Wall Street Journal”, was even actively supporting
George Bush’s policy, inviting several European leaders to subscribe to a
manifesto favourable to his stance, which justified the need for a
military attack based on the danger placed by the Iraqi “weapons of
mass destruction”. Weapons that were never found, probably because
they did not in fact exist.
A “New York Times” and CBS/News study revealed that 42 % of
the American people believed that Saddam Hussein was directly
responsible for the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, whilst an
ABC opinion poll found that 55 % believed that the Iraqi leader directly
supported Al-Qaeda.
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Faced with the imposition of a belligerent logic that flew in the
face of international legitimacy and led to an unprecedented division in
the United Nations, NATO and even the European Union1, several analysts
came back to the same question: what can media professionals in the
field do, within a logic of peace journalism, that is, journalism that is
meant to prevent or, as in this case, to transform conflicts? The answer:
develop a good capacity of judgement, report events with honesty and
admit to their audience the limitations of their work. 
This is not what happened in the Jessica Lynch case. Private Jessica
Lynch was a North American soldier who, according to the main western
broadcast media, was injured and captured in an ambush, to be
afterwards heroically rescued by her unit. 
In a BBC investigation made public in May, reporter John Kampner
uncovered the true story, sustaining that Lynch’s rescue operation was
nothing more than a huge media performance. The testimonies of
Nassiriyah hospital’s doctors, from where Lynch was rescued, revealed that
there were no longer Iraqi soldiers there when US Special Forces entered
the building. Private Lynch had been well looked after and the doctors
had already unsuccessfully attempted to hand her in to the Americans
a couple of days before.
Broadcast media primacy
This disclosure is extremely significant and revealing of the media’s
current state. With the so-called “aesthetics of politics”, as defended
by several analysts and researchers, there is a tendency for information
to disappear beyond mere images. In the era of media, the media create
their own truth in a context of crisis —a crisis that affects mainly the
written press and radio, not simply due to the “image dictatorship”
but also related to the drastic reduction of advertising income.
In this way, broadcast media reinforced their position as a privileged
means of channelling information. And investment in this sector remains
a priority. In the end of April 2003, the United States government finally
launched its satellite television station in Arabic for Muslim Iraq. It was
produced in the Grace Digital Media (GDM) studio, controlled by fun-
damentalist and clearly pro-Israeli Christians. 
GDM, as stated by Russel Mokhiber and Rober Weissman, is
controlled by the fundamentalist Christian millionaire Cheryl Reagan,
who assumed control from the Federal News Service last year and 
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1 In Europe, the public opinion of a large majority of countries, including Eastern
European ones, was against the war.
whose role is to “transmit evidence of God’s presence in today’s
world”.
This new “media offensive” coincided with the attacks on non-
embedded journalists covering the war that caused three dead and four
wounded, which according to FAIR seem to have been “deliberate”. In
one of the incidents of 8 April 2003, on the eve of the famous over-
throwing of Saddam Hussein’s statue with the marines’ help, a North
American tank opened fire on the Palestine Hotel, where most of the
“non-embedded” journalists were. In total, thirteen journalists died
during the three weeks of war, until the military of the Anglo-American
coalition entered Baghdad.
Soon before, American forces had started two separate, but almost
simultaneous, attacks on the Arabic television stations Al-Jazira and
Abu Dhabi’s offices in Baghdad. These two television stations spared
no efforts in showing the huge human costs of this war. Both of them
had informed the Pentagon of their exact location, but similarly to the
incident at the hotel, Pentagon authorities stated that their troops
were attacked from those buildings. The journalists in question
immediately rejected these accusations.
These incidents may translate in the future into a continued fragile
situation for all the media and journalists that choose not to accept the
authorities’ invitation to “incorporation”. The lack of respect for the
protection granted to journalists by the Geneva Convention is a new and
extremely disturbing sign, because unbiased reports are fundamental to
understanding all the realities of a war.
What to do?
Then what can be done, as was recently asked by Danny Schechter,
MediaChannel’s editor? At least, suggest a different proposal, give voice
to other voices, to other alternatives, project independent analysts, and
leaders of conflicting communities that affirm themselves as a credible
alternative to the dominant, militarist and radical speech, that only
fuels the conflict. 
A decisive question can lie in an attempt to explain what is at stake,
in the way the conflict’s motives are assimilated by the readers and the
hearers. Although this approach depends of “subjective” factors, such
as media’s direction availability to choose this way, or the journalists’
own choice in the field. 
But, in practical terms, peace initiatives are usually ignored by
journalists that rather seem to choose a “way ahead”. Do journalists
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unavoidably contribute to perpetuating the circle of violence, or is it
possible to do more, to help readers or viewers to understand the need
to find fair and balanced solutions? These are questions that will remain
in the frontline of our concern.
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The Role of the Media in Conflict Situations: 
The Media as Multinational Corporations
María A. Siemens
Many conflicts producing refugees and forced population movements,
could be avoided if public opinion and governments, alerted by the media,
would intervene well before the outbreak of an internal or international
crisis. The advantages of investing in preventive measures seem to be
well understood, as the argument of socio-economic development makes
sense. Much is being written and discussed on this theme —but in practice
the majority of situations involving humanitarian crises nowadays reveal
that international cooperation follows the electoral agenda of donor
states; that is, actual investment in prevention does not fully consider
the long-term efforts and the complex planning required to build up
peaceful societies.
Sustainable development in the form of investments in infrastructure
and services, which is a tangible form of cooperation, is very much
welcomed by governments, but —more often than not— present the
time-limitations mentioned above. On their part, International Organ-
isations also rely on governmental funding on an annual basis, and have
to comply with political preferences or “earmarking”. This means that
many deserving proposals remain under-funded or are abandoned. 
In today’s world, this practice may become, in the long term, cost-
ineffective and have a boomerang effect on our own societies. There
are many examples of disruption of peace and development processes,
destruction and self-destruction affecting societies where basic human
rights, particularly social, cultural and economic rights are non-existent
or extremely precarious —societies which basically lack the opportunity
to develop a peace culture. 
In this context, information is a resource that should be used (in our
developed societies) to strengthen and promote conflict prevention. The
same can be said about “post-conflict” reconstruction and rehabilitation
of war-torn societies. 
Information should aim at creating public opinion support for the
establishment of long-term projects to ensure peace and stability for
human beings without distinction. And we should find the arguments
to promote this idea in the same way as environmentalists have managed
to put the preservation of environment high on the political agendas.
In these somewhat invisible processes, the public-awareness role of the
media is crucial.
From the perspective of the media, however, war, violence and
bloodshed are stories worthwhile telling, as they attract the interest of
audiences, while peace building —whether as prevention or as
reconstruction— do not attract the same interest.
In the context of refugee situations, information has proved to be a
most important tool for protection. In certain crises, good information
leading to a reaction by the international community may prevent
persecution and human displacement. If exodus and displacement
nevertheless take place, media attention and a good information policy
may contribute to stopping persecution or other human rights abuses and
even to finding solutions to the crisis through an international response.
Ideally, the media could have different roles depending on their
scope of influence:
—International media ought to influence politicians and civil
society in donor countries or relevant institutions like the EU,
prompting preventive responses wherever needed;
—National and local media in conflict areas ought to promote
peace and reconciliation efforts. In most precarious situations,
local media should be provided with the necessary tools, skills
and training to support peacekeeping. Perhaps in an effort to
respect media’s independence, the “international community”
has not paid enough attention to their potential in this field.
In the present world scenario, however, our perception of the role
of the media is necessarily changing in view of the most recent
developments.
The globalisation of communications over the past decade has meant
that the media are assuming an increasing influential role in social and
political processes. This increased power also expands their responsibility
in denouncing situations of instability leading to conflict. The media
could also be urged to deal with victims with fairness, as human beings
without discrimination. This is not what we are seeing or what we are
reading today, particularly after the events of 11 September 2001. 
The so called “CNN effect”, much criticised during the nineties, where
the media only showed successive wars and crises without an explanation
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of the background or any follow-up, has become over a short period of
time just one aspect of a wider problem which involves the serious
distortion of information. 
For peacemakers, NGOs, and human-rights advocates, the situation
has become dramatically worse in recent months. The media are not
accomplices of humanitarian efforts. Beyond the level of individual
sympathetic journalists, decision —and policy— makers behave as the
Chief Executive Officers of any Transnational Corporation. It is an illusion
to believe that the media are committed to the values of a human
rights culture.
—First, they are led by economic indicators: they have to meet the
desires and preferences of consumers to keep or raise their
audience rates;
—Second, the various media groups compete with each other for
those audiences: the concerns of CEOs are not about substance
but about sales and shares. 
—Third and most important, they have become, very visibly,
politically biased.
In this context, if the media report on humanitarian issues, it is just
because there is a “market” demanding such type of information.
However, beneath an appearance of objectivity, we often find manipu-
lation. The presentation of certain news as “reality shows” makes it
impossible to deal with the information in a broader context. In certain
cases, it is very clear that news is presented in a way that promotes and
encourages a certain type of emotional response which matches the
political interests of a certain state, group of states, lobbies or interest
groups behind the media corporation.
Just to put an example, we are witnessing the systematic non-
compliance by states with a system of international human rights and
humanitarian law, which has been developed with enormous efforts over
five decades and was —and still is— very fragile. Op-eds, reports and
interviews critical to this situation are definitely published and broadcast by
the media; however their repercussion is marginal as compared to the many
reports containing the underlying message that violence is justified and
justifiable. Realpolitik is winning an important battle with public opinion, to
the detriment of rights, leaving many victims behind and also seriously
damaging the important heritage of an emerging human rights culture.
The Internet, an alternative way of disseminating information,
provides us with new information sources and elements for critical
reflection and reaction. However, at this stage it does not have the
power and repercussions, for example, of radio and television. 
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When the Secretary-General of the United Nations launched the
“global compact” in 1999, he addressed multinational corporations to
encourage them to comply with certain human rights standards, which are
at the core of traditional “corporate misbehaviour”. Provisions concerning
the right and duty to provide and receive objective, transparent and
responsible information are, however, not included in the Global Compact.
Therefore the media, as transnational corporations, are not bound by
any covenant or code of conduct. This means that nobody can be held
accountable for the consequences of undesirable events occurred with
tangible or intangible media support, including unilateral declarations
of war outside the boundaries of international law. This is of growing
concern, especially in the international scenario, as we are witnessing
how political decisions are made under the apparent legitimacy of
opinion polls provided by media groups. 
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The Tools and Concepts of the Scale 
of Conflict Management
Gulnur Aybet
The concepts associated with conflict management and what its scale
entails have undergone a considerable change since the end of the Cold
War. This is because of the changing nature of institutionalised intervention,
collective security, humanitarian intervention and the roles played out by
the military in peacekeeping operations. Although these changes have
come about through practice, particularly when we look at institutionalised
intervention in the Balkans from 1991 to the present, this has also affected
the mainstream international relations literature in conflict management,
which up till now generally focused on mediation techniques derived from
quantitative methods and data analysis. In this sense, traditional conflict
management literature remained largely theoretical.
The widening of the scope of conflict management and collective
security since 1991 grew in parallel to the emphasis placed on institutional
burden-sharing, creating a framework of ‘interlocking institutions’ with
varying functions but forming an overarching structure for the implemen-
tation of collective security and conflict management.
One of the new concepts that have emerged in the literature is that
of Collective Conflict Management. This is put forward in a study edited
by Joseph Lepgold and Thomas Weiss. Collective Conflict Management
not only incorporates traditional tasks of collective security such as
peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but also other tasks such as
monitoring a potentially explosive region, monitoring of elections, and
establishing democratic regimes. Collective conflict management,
according to Lepgold and Weiss, is also quite distinct from the Wilsonian
twist of idealism in traditional collective security; in this sense, collective
conflict management has also got a bite of reality in comparison to
traditional collective security in that it takes into account the self-
interests of states, and does not need to be regulated by an international
organisation or a charter. This brings us to the question as to what
incentive and regulator could induce states to cooperate in collective
conflict management tasks? The emerging answer seems to be, norms
in the international system. This leads us to further questions as to
what those norms are, what they ought to be, and whether they can
be created by certain states or whether they evolve naturally in the
international system. Furthermore another question that arises from
this is whether international institutions can convey norms from one
region to another, especially in the task of collective post-conflict peace
building. Finally, this leads to the question over the legitimacy of
international institutions in carrying out these tasks and the legitimacy
of the norms they represent. In their study, Lepgold and Weiss do not
go far enough in defining these norms. Norms are an issue that keeps
coming up in relation to this topic and I shall return to them —particularly
to the role of international institutions as regulators and implementers
of norms and whether norms can acquire legitimacy in the international
system with or without institutions.
The pre-conflict - latent crisis stage
If one were to attempt to place the tools currently at the disposal
of the international community on a scale of conflict management, the
starting point would be when a crisis is still latent or when there is a
pre-conflict stage. At this stage the function to be undertaken by third
parties could constitute monitoring. The tools that can be utilized can
range from preventative diplomacy —this can include special diplomatic
missions, early warning mechanisms, CSBMs (Confidence and security
building measures), preventive civilian and military deployments, fact
finding missions, presence of international institutions in the field, and
data collection, which involves not only obtaining correct information
but also accurate analysis— to the threat to use military force, which
can also be a tool of conflict management, albeit, unsuccessfully used
by the Holbrooke mission to Milosevic before the commencement of
NATO’s air strikes against Yugoslavia.
One of the key factors determining the success of a mission at the
pre-conflict stage is whether the mission is structural or preventive
operational conflict prevention. Structural conflict prevention addresses
the root causes of the conflict whereas Operational Conflict Prevention is
undertaken when violence appears imminent. Unfortunately, in practice,
conflict prevention in the post-cold-war era has been an example of
the latter rather than the former. Addressing the root causes of the
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conflict requires monitoring, data collection and analysis over a long
period of time. The underlying factors that have to be monitored include
political institutions, socio-economic factors, historical legacies, conditions
which can lead to the emergence of a security dilemma, and a lack of
information or distortion of information by local media and institutions.
Among the key challenges facing interveners1 in the pre-conflict
stage are, firstly, the early-warning problem, which is usually attributed
to a failure of intelligence; and secondly, the warning-response gap
which is usually attributed to the failure to use intelligence. Even if these
two obstacles were overcome, the final hurdle at the pre-conflict stage is
the required political will to act. At the pre-conflict stage, unless the crisis
is imminent and has a direct bearing on the national interests of states,
there may be less of a case to act, because there is no crisis in sight. In
this, the role of the media is crucial in the pre-conflict stage, firstly by
drawing attention to the imminent crisis, and secondly by influencing
public opinion. The hurdle of political will to act is also influenced by the
degree to which the sustenance of norms in the international system
matters to states and the international institutions to which they belong.
Again, the degree to which states value the norms they adhere to
become the main inducement to act in conflict prevention. This is a
neo-realist perspective on conflict prevention to which the author
adheres.
Another factor that affects the success of conflict prevention is the
leverage of the interveners. According study undertaken by the Carnegie
Commission for the Prevention of Deadly Conflict there are three types of
leverage. Subjective leverage occurs when the intervener is able to alter
the parties’ perceptions of an issue or of each other. Objective leverage
occurs when the intervener is able to alter the objective environment of
the conflict. This can be done for example by providing peacekeepers,
economic aid, and military or political retaliation against what the
Carnegie study calls the ‘spoilers’. ‘Spoilers’ refer to extremists within each
party to the conflict who will never be amenable to conditions that may
be ‘ripe’ for negotiating a peace. Normative leverage occurs when the
intervener has the power to confer legitimacy on a party not included in
negotiations or illegitimacy on a party that was included.2
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of tasks across the scale of conflict management.
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In the pre-conflict/latent-crisis stage, the alteration of the perceptions
of the parties (subjective leverage) is the key to successful conflict
prevention. The key to have successful subjective leverage is accurate
information about the desires, motivations and perceptions of each party,
but also an accurate analysis of this information to make it usable in
selecting strategies for altering perceptions.
Also, the use of objective leverage, the deployment of a peacekeeping
force, or a preventative deployment can also be very valuable at this
stage. However, it is seldom that at this stage a third party intervener will
have any legitimacy to control the normative environment (i.e. to
decide who to deal with and who not to deal with). This is because no
party can be excluded if conflict is about to erupt. In this case, the
‘spoiler’ mentality has to be taken account of and accommodated. This
is one of the key challenges facing interveners at the pre-conflict stage.
All of the above tools used in the pre-conflict stage of conflict
management fall under the concept of Collective Conflict Manage-
ment put forward by Lepgold and Weiss. Also at the pre-conflict stage
there is another concept that is used and is associated with other tools
of conflict management. This is the concept of Cooperative Security,
which, unlike Collective Conflict Management, has been around for a
while, actually ever since the birth of the CSCE. Cooperative security is
not concerned with deterring war, as both collective security and
collective defence are, but rather with preventing the emergence of
conditions that make war likely. This is sought through the practice of
building a community between states in political, economic, and
cultural affairs, and the practice of arms control measures, including
Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and increased
military transparency. Under cooperative security, these mechanisms are
also used in peaceful settlement of disputes and early warning of crisis
situations. As can be seen, these measures constitute the traditional
tasks of the CSCE ever since its inception in 1975. Therefore, the OSCE
is essentially a cooperative security organisation.3 But one of the key
concepts behind cooperative security is the building of a ‘security
community’.
58 GULNUR AYBET
3 However, since its Helsinki summit of 1992, it has also been accorded with certain
collective security functions, such as mandating peacekeeping missions (which, so far it
has never done) and also initiating the ‘consensus-minus-one’ mechanism, i.e. the
singling out of a ‘wayward’ state. On the other hand, NATO, which is a traditional
collective defence organisation, has also embarked on cooperative security ventures
such as the NACC, now replaced with the EAPC and the PEP. This is an example of how
the traditional tasks of security institutions in Europe have become blurred since the end
of the cold war.
The concept of Security Community was first put forward by Karl
Deutsch4 who, in 1957, proposed increasing communication and social
links between NATO member states so that over time the transatlantic
relationship between the US and western Europe would become a
‘pluralistic security community’ whereby there would exist long term
expectations of ‘peaceful change’ amongst its members. In other words,
war between these states should be unthinkable but they should also
share common values and norms, therefore giving a social meaning to
the underlying security interests that brought these countries together.
Recently, the concept has enjoyed a revival with Emanuel Adler’s edited
volume on Security Communities. This study looks at the various
theoretical approaches to explaining the absence of war amongst
states and contends that constructivism comes closest to what Deutsch
envisaged, as it accounts for social factors in the international system.
It provides a geographic, historical and conceptual study of security
community in the post-Cold War era by looking at different regions
and different time periods.
Therefore, at the pre-conflict stage of a crisis, apart from traditional
tools of early warning and preventive diplomacy and deployments, the
building of security communities can also be a tool for conflict manage-
ment. However, while the more traditional tools of conflict prevention
such as preventive diplomacy constitute operational conflict management,
the building of security communities under the concept of cooperative
security constitutes structural conflict management, because these are
long term interventions seeking to erase the root causes of a conflict,
rather than intervening as a stop gap measure when things start to go
wrong. The tools currently at the disposal of the international community
to undertake tasks of cooperative security and building of security
communities in the pre-conflict stage include regional economic aid
and integration programmes (EU, Phare, Tacis, Stability Pact), Joint
Peacekeeping exercises (NATO training exercises), and confidence-
building measures (OSCE).
Crisis Evident Stage: the tools of Conflict Resolution
The next stage across the scale of conflict management is the stage
when the crisis is evident. This is the early stage of the conflict,
somewhere in between full-scale armed conflict and the pre-conflict 
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stage. The tools utilised for conflict management at this stage are
mediation, negotiation, ‘good offices’ and institutionalised conferences
such as the ICFY (International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia).
These tasks can either by carried out by institutions such as the EU troika
missions to Yugoslavia in the early stages of the conflict. They can also
be carried out by ad-hoc issue-based state groups, such as the Contact
Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina, or by special envoys appointed as
part of the unilateral shuttle diplomacy of states, such as the Holbrooke
mission to Yugoslavia over the Kosovo crisis.
For the tools of shuttle diplomacy, negotiation, mediation and good
offices to work, first there have to be certain qualities that the intervener
has to possess. These are trust, accurate information, and moral leverage
over the parties. Second, the intervener must have at its disposal the
following strategies: coercion, inducements and reassurances. Particularly
in the last strategy, the intervener must have the power to give reassurance
to erode the security dilemma between the parties to the conflict. For
this to work successfully, information about intentions and capabilities of
each side is vital. The reliance on local sources for this kind of information
means that most of the time information available to interveners will be
distorted, which makes their task of eroding the unrealities of the security
dilemma more difficult.
The type of mediation undertaken determines the qualities and
strategies of the intervener. There are three types of mediation. The first
is the passive technical host in which the intervener provides a neutral
setting and disengages himself from the proceedings. (e.g. Switzerland’s
sponsorship of technical negotiations in Geneva, such as during the
Cold War superpower summits). The second is the interested
mediator: this is where the intervener is involved in the negotiations
and is strategically interested in the negotiators’ substantive positions.
The intervener does not seek subjective leverage, meaning that it does
not seek to alter the perceptions of the negotiators. The ICFY would
again be a good example of this kind of negotiation. The third is the
active mediator, in which the intervener provides a neutral setting but
also ensures that parties develop personal and respectful relations with
each other. The intervener also acts as a ‘go-between’ during breaks in
negotiations. A good example would be the Norwegian foreign ministry
and the Norwegian independent think-tank FAFO (Institute for Applied
Social Science) during the Oslo back channel negotiations between the
PLO and the Israel, which resulted in the Declaration of Principles,
signed in September 1993.
The active mediator has to convince the parties that they are nego-
tiating only for each party’s interests. The active mediator does not have
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a third party interest in the conflict. Active mediation also allows the parties
to vent their frustrations to the third party rather than at each other.
This also increases the moral leverage of the negotiator —convincing
the sides to return to the negotiations for his sake rather than each
other’s, therefore gaining legitimacy amongst the parties to the
conflict. Legitimacy as an intervener can only be acquired with moral
leverage, and that can only be built with active mediation as opposed
to interested mediation. Therefore the most effective tool of conflict
management at the crisis-evident stage of a conflict is active mediation.
Conflict stage: Peacekeeping and peace enforcement
The next stage on the scale of conflict management is the point
when negotiations break down and full scale armed conflict breaks out.
At the armed conflict stage, the first task of the intervener is to establish
a cease-fire or a break in the conflict to create the conditions that will
allow negotiations to resume. The tools utilised at this stage of conflict
management are the traditional tasks of collective security, which are
peacekeeping and peace enforcement. However, even here, in the post
Cold War era, the traditional roles and definitions of peacekeeping have
also changed. This is a question addressed by three prominent authors
in the field of conflict analysis: Paul Diehl, Daniel Druckman and James
Wall. They point out that the size and functions of peacekeeping
operations has changed dramatically and offer a taxonomy of different
definitions of peacekeeping and some prescriptions for policy makers on
how to train peacekeepers to accommodate and carry out new
functions that they never performed before. For example, a typical
peacekeeping operation during the Cold War could be around 10,000
troops, whereas a peacekeeping mission in the Balkans ranges between
30,000 and 60,000. The traditional function of peacekeeping was
deployment after a ceasefire to monitor it or before a conflict started to
prevent it; in either case the classical ‘buffer zone’ was the traditional
place of peacekeepers. Nowadays peacekeeping forces have to deal
with war crimes, election supervision and nation building, all of which
are tasks the military have not traditionally been trained for. Also
another factor has been the militarisation of conflict management.
Traditional peacekeepers monitored ceasefires while the negotiators
negotiated. Now the military is involved in a much wider spectrum of
activities: these include actual negotiation, meditation, communication,
and the deployment of military personnel as peacemakers and peace
builders, all of which require new skills.
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Peace enforcement as a tool of conflict management has also come
under new definitions in the post-Cold War era. Through practice two
standards have emerged: a heavy reliance on air power and the
reinterpretation of international law. The standard of utilising air power
for peace enforcement has been witnessed with Operation Deliberate
Force over Bosnia and Operation Allied Force over Kosovo. The reinterpret-
ation of international law is particularly significant with Operation
Allied Force, which was undertaken without a UN Security Council
mandate but was technically a chapter VII peace enforcement operation.
On the one hand, the completion of the operation paved the way for
the fulfilment of prior Security Council resolutions over Kosovo; this
was the basis of the argument over the operation’s legitimacy. On the
other hand, the absence of a legal mandate meant that the operation
was illegal. In this sense a gap was presented in terms of legitimacy and
legality for humanitarian crises in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, at
the conflict stage of a crisis, the traditional tools of collective security
have also undergone a transformation. It also implies a blurring of the
various stages of conflict management. One of the concepts associated
with successful mediation is the one put forward by William Zartman,
called the concept of ‘ripeness’. This is when both parties to the conflict
have reached a “mutually damaging stalemate”, at which point the
parties are most amenable to negotiation. Ripeness does not happen
just once in a conflict —it can happen many times and is a ‘window of
opportunity’ to be seized by the negotiators. Peace enforcement in the
post cold war era has also given a new interpretation to this concept.
For example, NATO air strikes in Bosnia can be seen as a way of forcing
‘ripeness’, by creating —albeit through force— the conditions for a
peace treaty to be negotiated and signed.
Post-conflict: Peace building stage
Finally, the last stage on the scale of conflict management, has
reached a new level of prominence that it did not have before. This is
because the practice of post-conflict peace building in southeast
Europe has become a unique example worth studying in itself. Today
there exists an unprecedented, sophisticated framework of ‘interlocking
institutions’ at work in this region carrying out the various overlapping
tasks of post-conflict peace building. What is also unique about this
stage of a conflict is that it entails the use of many tools across the whole
spectrum of conflict management, including monitoring, to make sure
conflict does not break out again; peacekeeping, to ensure disarmament
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and enforcement of peace; and creation of stability regimes or security
communities to build democratic institutions, human rights and free
market economies to foster regional stability. Whether the institutional
infrastructure carrying out these tasks in southeast Europe are setting
an exemplar model for the future remains questionable. After all, the
inter-institutional cooperation between IGOs and NGOs in post-war
reconstruction, peacekeeping, peace building, repairing damaged
infrastructures and building of regional civil society is a very new practice
conceptually, for academics as well as policy makers. This is true
particularly for the last task, the building of civil society, which has a
direct bearing on the legitimacy of institutions as interveners at this
stage of a conflict. Legitimacy in this sense refers to the degree to
which these institutions are accepted by regional civil societies as
legitimate peace builders and implementers of international norms at a
regional level. This is more difficult to assess when regional civil societies
are as yet dysfunctional in a post conflict setting. The case of southeast
Europe (Bosnia and Kosovo) is also questionable in terms of institutional
legitimacy in post-conflict peace building, because the enforcement of a
peace with military presence and the building of damaged infrastructures
can be undertaken with a steady flow of donor aid and the presence of
military enforcement. However, this tells us nothing about the legitimacy
of external institutions as actors within a region with the goal of fostering
cooperation amongst regional actors. In other words, can institutions
convey norms and build regional security communities on the ‘western’
model as envisaged by Karl Deutsch?
In terms of post-conflict peace building, there is a discrepancy
between theory and practice. In practice peace building has become
the enforcement of a peace treaty after a conflict is brought to a close.
The more theoretical definition of the concept is the building of
sustainable peaceful relations that address the structural root causes of
the conflict. This concept has been forward by John Paul Lederach.
According to Lederach, classic conflict management focuses on the
resolution of issues, while peace building should focus on the restoration
and rebuilding of relationships. Therefore the focus of peace building
should be on social restructuring rather than issues. The problem with
this proposition is that each region or state will have its own dynamics
for social restructuring and one model will not suffice.
Another concept associated with peace building is the concept of
negative peace and positive peace. Negative peace refers to the
cessation of violence —probably what we see today in southeast Europe
through institutional intervention and military enforcement. Whereas
positive peace is the removal of ‘structural’ and ‘cultural’ violence—
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this is a more long-term task. Ideally, post settlement peace building
should be a combination of negative and positive peace. It is questionable
whether positive peace has been achieved at all in the case of southeast
Europe.
Negative peace is usually used to refer to preventing a relapse into
war. A relapse into violence is the main challenge facing implementers
of post-conflict peace building, due to its stopgap function in bringing
an immediate cessation to violence, since it does not address the long
term structural causes of the conflict. On how to overcome this Roy
Licklader suggests the following strategies:
1. Persuading all parties that their interests are better served by
peace rather than continuation of conflict.
2. Change of internal political actors —replacement of ‘war
constituencies’ with ‘peace constituencies’.
3. Arms control —military balance of power so that ‘mutually
hurting stalemate’ endures.
4. ‘Terms of the settlement’ need to ensure all above points.
5. Third-party activities to help sustain all parties through the
uncertain period of post-settlement.
Although the task of ensuring that a relapse to violence does not
occur is far from straightforward, the next step of peace building, which is
positive peace —that is, addressing the structural causes of a conflict—, is
far more difficult to achieve. Long-term sustainability of peace involves
constitutional and institutional reform; social reconstruction; reconciliation
and the rebuilding of economic, social and political infrastructures. Of all
of these tasks, psychological factors and reconciliation are the hardest of
all to achieve.
This leads us to series of questions: Are democratic institutions and
a liberal market economy the key to post settlement peace building? If
so, what if ‘extremists’ or ‘spoilers’ are major players and have no desire
to participate in democratic pathways to governance? In such cases
Roland Paris suggests that force ought to be used in implementing a
peace treaty. This leads to the next question: Can long-term sustainable
peace be built by enforcement? And can ‘security communities’ be
externally enforced?
This brings us back to the definition of ‘security community’ and
how this fits into the scale of conflict management. Karl Deutsch’s
original study consisted of measured transactions between member
states of NATO and how a ‘sense of community’ could be developed
through an increased transaction in social links. The envisaged end result
was supposed to be a ‘pluralistic security community’ among its members,
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where there exist long-term expectations of ‘peaceful change’. Deutsch
maintains that in such a community there has to be a ‘belief in a limited
number of common propositions.’ This can be interchanged with what
we understand today as ‘norms’.
While Deutsch measured transactions, Emmanuel Adler’s constructivist
version of security communities focuses on the indigenous development
of security communities on three tiers:
i) Precipitating factors: which encourage states to orient themselves
in each other’s direction and to coordinate their policies.
ii) Process elements: transactions; international organisations and
social learning. Structural elements: power and ideas.
iii) Development of trust and formation of collective identity.
In the case of exporting and imposing a ‘western security community’
model through institutional enforcement in southeast Europe, none of
these tiers are indigenous to the region itself. Precipitating factors are
brought from outside: i.e. economic aid, promise of membership in
institutions, etc. The process elements are brought from outside:
international institutions. The structural elements are too, the norms,
ideas and beliefs of an essentially ‘western security community’, which
are democracy, free markets and human rights. The same can be said for
power, which is also external with institutional enforcement. It is only
through transactions and learning processes that one can see an intrinsic
regional input into the process of building a security community.
For a greater input by regional actors in the process of building
security communities, Lederach’s suggestion of building an interaction
between political elites, mid-level actors (journalists, educators,
bureaucrats) and grassroots (NGOs, local civil society) could be useful.
This more theoretical concept has at least found some substance in the
active planning of policy makers. The evidence for this can be seen in
the policy planning process in IGOs such as NATO, which have been
involved so far in the institutionally enforced ‘negative’ peace in Bosnia
and Kosovo. There are signs of a conscious policy process to incorporate
elements of a ‘positive’ peace including the building of local civil society
in the programmes of international organizations like NATO.
This also proves that institutions are also socially contingent. As
external institutions like NATO socially interact with local civil societies
in the process of regional security community building, they (the external
institutions) will also be affected by this interaction, which can shape
their institutional identities. A very good example is NATO’s recent South
East Europe Initiative (SEEI). Initially NATO as a traditional collective defence
organisation carved a role for itself in post-Cold War conflict management
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by ‘hiring out’ its integrated military structure for peacekeeping and peace
enforcement operations. It also took on tasks like transferring its military
‘know-how’ to regional states through joint exercises, training and civil-
military relations. NATO made great headway in this process for some
time, until its involvement in post conflict security community building
in Bosnia and Kosovo. NATO officials then realised that it lacked the
skills as an organisation in the task of transformation of societies. NATO
then developed the SEEI complementary to the EU’s Stability Pact, which
are initiatives that focus on the transformation of societies. This is a
function which NATO never had or intended to have before —therefore
its social interaction with regional civil societies has shaped its
institutional identity— therefore institutions are also socially contingent
like civil society —they are mutually interactive.
Therefore, can regional security communities be built through
institutional enforcement? Do the examples of SFOR, KFOR, EUAM and
UNMIK serve as successful models of institutionally enforced peace? This
needs to be addressed in terms of legitimacy of institutions and the norms
they represent. The starting point for peace building can be a conscious
policy-driven process, but the end result can be twofold, when values
and norms are exported to another region and become accepted by
the civil societies who see the institutions as legitimate overseers of those
norms which they have embraced: then it can be said that external
interveners have acquired legitimacy.
This kind of legitimacy is a concept derived from Antonio Gramsci’s
theory of hegemony and civil society. Hegemony in traditional realism is
the prevalence of one state or a group of states over others. However,
according to Gramsci, hegemony produces this legitimacy by forging
alliances with the various forces in civil society, which include cultural
and ideological forces. By integrating these forces, hegemony, in
Gramscian terms, rules through domination and consent by bridging
civil society with political institutions, and acquires a state of legitimacy.5
The conveying of norms from one region to another is at the heart
of building regional security communities through external institutional
enforcement. It is the acceptance of these norms by civil society that
gives legitimacy to the intervening institutions. According to Peter
Katzenstein norms are communicated in three ways:
i) spontaneously evolving as social practice
ii) consciously promoted as political strategies to further specific
interests.
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iii) deliberately negotiated as a mechanism for conflict manage-
ment6.
In the case of conveying ‘norms’ from the Western Europe and
North America to southeast Europe, there is a mixture of the second
and third ways.
Overall, the scale of conflict management and the tools used by the
international community in implementing conflict management at each
stage of a crisis have undergone a considerable transformation in the
post cold war era. This has been a mutually interactive process, which
has impacted policy planning as well as the academic literature in the
field. Therefore the gap between academics and practitioners is now
closing at a much faster pace than it ever did before, in the field of
conflict management. One of the interesting factors affecting this is the
socially contingent nature of international organisations. Just as concepts
associated with conflict management are undergoing a transformation,
so are the policy tools; from new roles for the military in peace keeping
to post war peace building and interaction with civil societies. Other
trends that need to be examined are the growing role of the media
especially the way it can impact the ‘warning-response gap’ in the pre-
conflict stage, and the over-reliance on air power as a tool of peace
enforcement in the conflict stage. In the post conflict stage, the case of
southeast Europe does provide an example of exporting models of
security communities from one region to another through institutional
enforcement. But the longer-term implications of positive peace are
difficult to achieve without spontaneously evolving regional norms,
although institutional enforcement can be an encouragement for
regional security communities to grow.
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The Rule Of Law as a Precondition for Post-Conflict
Rehabilitation and the Freedom of the Media
Hans-Joachim Heintze
One feature typical of states in crisis is the lack of an independent
judiciary. The absence of a functioning legal system is a typical expression
of State failure. States of this kind must be seen as in collapse: they
lack the core element of the functioning State, which Max Weber
(1966, p. 27) saw in its monopoly of power. Police, the judiciary and
other regulative systems are in such cases no longer functional, and
general anarchy prevails.
The modern worldview based on international law goes back to
what is known as the Westphalian Order, a system made up of
sovereign States. Proceeding from this system, States were gradually
consolidated as territorial power structures (Hobbes), subsequently
developing into liberal States governed by the rule of law (Locke) and,
finally, performance-oriented social States. Still, this conceptual view
has coincided more or less with political reality only in certain periods
—for instance, in the creation of the United Nations. More recently, it
has been cast in doubt by unmistakable tendencies toward a breakdown
of the classic nation-State in many regions of the world. The response
of the international community has generally been to support —albeit
with different degrees of intensity— the restitution of State functions,
i.e. a return to the Westphalian Order. An independent judiciary has a
key role in this process. The field of politics has coined a rather vague
catchphrase for this challenge: human security. In international law the
term is derived from a concept familiar from its prominence in the
UN Charter: international security, which originally denoted security of
States. Now that, seen in terms of the protection of human rights
anchored in international law, the individual has, at least in part, become
a subject of international law, we are faced with the question of the
extent to which the claim to State security is at the same time also
applicable to the individual. This issue is all the more important as in
situations marked by State failure the problem of national (external)
security can, in many cases, hardly be said to exist.
This situation, though, entails risks all the more drastic for individuals
since in such cases the State is no longer able to comply with its duty
to protect its citizens. In short, the politically coloured —and legally
undefined— concept of «human security» is seen by its proponents as
meaning that the individual must be safeguarded against infringements
of his basic rights as well as against threats to his security and his life
(Kirn 2000, p. 29). It is self-evident that this can only be ensured by an
independent judiciary.
The framework under international law
Modern international law increasingly obliges States to abide by
democratic and constitutionally defined rules in their dealings with
their populations (Heintze 1998a, p. 76). This remarkable progress was
achieved within a period of only two decades. When it was adopted in
1945, the UN Charter contained no such provision. The UN Charter
limited UN membership to «peace-loving States,» remaining silent
about their internal constitution. It was in regional organisations that
the turn of international law towards democracy and the rule of law
was first instituted; and the Council of Europe, founded in 1949 and
defining itself as a community based on certain shared values, took the
lead here. Democracy and human rights were seen as constituting its
underlying values. In 1989, in its Copenhagen Document, the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) took up this idea,
demanding that its Member States abide by democratic constitutional
principles. Finally, in 2000, this development reached the UN as well,
which, in its Millennium Declaration, expressly stated in the name of all
its Member States: «We will spare no effort to promote democracy and
strengthen the rule of law…» (Resolution 55/2). One other element of
this same Millennium Declaration is «respect for the rule of law in
international as in national affairs.»
The binding legal force of this last-mentioned document, adopted
within a global framework, must, however, be seen as rather low. We
must therefore examine whether there are other —legal— obligations
that bind States to respect the independence of the judiciary. Protection
of human rights is the chief issue relevant here. This contractual right is
reflected in Article 9 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), which contains provisions on personal liberty. It
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states that «No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedure as are established by law»; and that
«anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought
promptly before a judge.» (Nowak 1993, p. 158). This obligation has
been repeatedly underlined, most recently, and urgently, at the 1993
Vienna World Conference on Human Rights (UN-Doc. A/CONF.157/23,
para. 27). The matter is of great importance because this conference
also expressly upheld the principle of the universality of human rights.
In the end, this means that all cultures are obliged to respect a certain
basic number of human rights. These include, incontrovertibly, the
independence of the judiciary (van Hoof 1995, p. 4).
Safeguarding the rule of law in cases of State failure
Human rights entail an obligation under international law to
establish and maintain an independent judiciary. This obligation is binding
above on all the signatories of the Vienna Human Rights Convention.
Apart from this, however, the international community also sees in the
safeguarding of an independent judiciary a universal imperative stemming
from the democratically legitimised State monopoly of power. This is
why numerous programmes of nearly all pertinent nongovernmental
organisations (NGOs) and international organisations centre on the rule
of law (cf. list in Mani 1998, p. 2).
In cases of State failure, the challenge is to use national means and
methods, including an independent judiciary, to restore government
functions. What is meant here above all is a successive (re)building of the
State from the bottom up, through the self-constitution of a people in the
framework of civil society (Cohen/Arato 1992, p. 10 et seq.). It is in this
way possible to create focal points of public awareness and the national
will. By building local administrations and institutions of public and private
infrastructure, it is possible to mobilise the will to make a new start. Such
fragmented subsystems can provide the impulses needed to create a
public space that can, in the long run, bring about the legitimacy required
for the task (Thürer 1995, p. 40). Elections play an important role here.
However, by itself, the holding of elections can be no more than a
superficial and limited measure if the process does not succeed in creating
«bottom-up» democratic structures. It is for this reason that in Cambodia
and Somalia the UN has instituted numerous information programmes for
the population geared to forming local human rights groups. In Somalia
new regional councils have been created to compensate for the inability
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of fragmented groups to come to an agreement at national level
(Hufnagel 1996, p. 328). Development of democratic structures by the
population itself is wholly in line with the international legal norms on the
right of the self-determination of peoples. This at times entails merely the
obligation to create grass-roots democratic structures, since otherwise the
only alternative would be to call in the parties to a civil war, which are as a
rule not particularly representative.
And it is only in this way that it appears possible to ensure the
independence of the judiciary. For only a judiciary that is accepted by
the populace can be truly independent. In such cases an independent
judiciary is called upon to heal the wounds inflicted in times of arbitrary
rule. The example of Kosovo unambiguously illustrates the challenges
involved here. When the UN assumed governmental power in Kosovo
in the early summer of 1999, it was faced with the question of what legal
system was to apply there. The answer found was that the Yugoslavian
law valid in this territory prior to the abrogation of autonomy in 1989
was to be seen as applicable in this case (Büllesbach 2001, p. 83). The
Albanian population was however unwilling to accept this law, which it
regarded as Serbian. The judiciary therefore decided to apply the old
law, i.e. not to alter it, but to add to it the formula «in the KFOR version.»
The consequence was growing public acceptance of this legal system.
The existence of an independent judiciary need not imply that courts
alone are in a position to deal effectively with past events. Experiences
gained in the recent past point to other possibilities such as roundtables
and truth commissions, which can, in specific situations, contribute to the
formation of social consensus and a reconciliation of offenders and
victims (Schulz 2000, 52 et seq.). Still, measures of this kind can prove
successful only against the background of an independent judiciary. If
such attempts at reconciliation are not accepted by individuals, there must
be a possibility to seek judicial redress (Bronkhorst 2000, p. 40).
Creation of the rule of law by external intervention
External intervention used to restore governmental functions gives
rise to a situation even more complicated than that involved in recourse
to national means. The parties to the relevant human rights conventions
are mutually bound to one another by a legal relationship. They have
committed themselves to safeguarding an independent judiciary at
home. If they fail to do so, such States are guilty of a violation of
international law. Other parties can demand that the State in question
comply with the law and restore the independence of the judiciary. The
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monitoring bodies established by the relevant individual conventions are
also authorised to lodge complaints: the UN Human Rights Commission,
for instance, in cases of violations of the UN Human Rights Convention.
Under certain circumstances, Member States can also lodge national
complaints concerning non-compliance with treaty obligations, though
this implies no further-reaching competences such as a right to intervene.
Theoretically, an intervention would be unlikely to pose problems,
since in cases of State failure there is no reason to assume the existence
of a State. Still, practical experience shows that even in such cases the
international community continues to abide by the fiction of sovereignty.
The most impressive example in this case is Somalia. In 1992, this
«State» was already largely deprived of its effectiveness, and yet the
UN Security Council took action only when requested to by the Somali
ambassador to the UN —even though she no longer represented a
functioning government (Herbst 1999, p. 240). This stance of the
international community appears to indicate an unwillingness to create
precedents (Heintze 1998, p. 170).
The search for local partners
International peace missions have as a rule been most successful
when the parties to a civil war have assented to such a mission. In the
literature there are many sources that point out that international
assistance measures are bound to fail if they are not supported by local
forces, which mainly means securing the support of NGOs (Thune 2000,
p. 207). However, any such cooperation presupposes coordination and
harmonisation between various national and international NGOs.
Numerous overlaps have been observed precisely for rule-of-law
programmes. Many initiatives are weakened by duplications and
conceptual contradictions in the measures taken, as has been noted for
the cases of Rwanda, Congo/Zaire, and El Salvador (Mani 1998, p. 3
et seq.).
Yet the assent of parties to a conflict can play a positive role only if
the groups concerned are clearly defined and stable ones that are
representative of certain segments of the population. This is most clearly
the case when a group has been recognised as a conflict party or has
already created a stabilised de facto regime (Epping 1999, p. 89). The
situation is far more complicated when the players are a number of small
splinter groups and it is not clear whether and to what extent such
groups in fact represent forces of society. Often such heterogeneous players
in fact prove unable to implement obligations either inside or outside their
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own group. In situations of this kind, international assistance must be
directed, via local authorities, to the population itself. Another important
consideration in situations involving civil war is to bring the most important
groups to a negotiation table as a means of providing for the legitimacy
needed to rebuild the State in question. 
Independent judiciary and international courts
Solutions from the outside geared to an independent judiciary and
imposed without the assent of the local population are highly problematic.
This is demonstrated by the practice of the Tribunal on the former
Yugoslavia. This ad-hoc criminal court —a peacekeeping measure, yet at
the same time one with a coercive mandate— was created by the
UN Security Council (Resolution 827, 1995) under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter, in other words, without the assent of the parties to the
conflict. From the very beginning, the international community has
been accused of acquiescing in this measure simply in order to «do
something because something obviously had to be done» (Heintschel
von Heinegg 1999, p. 86). The court’s legality is thus entirely open to
question.
This legal problem was very soon to become the grounds for an appeal
in the Tadic case (Case No IT-94-1-AR72). Pointing to the European
Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the petitioner claimed that the Yugoslavia Tribunal
was not a «law-based court.» What was needed to create such a court,
the argument went, was a legislative act, i.e. a democratically controlled
legal norm, and not merely an executive measure.
The Appeals Chamber rejected this view, pointing instead to the
fact that UN organs cannot be classified in terms of national categories
and noting that for this reason the principle of the separation of powers
was not applicable in this case. Consequently, the Chamber went on, the
«law-based» principle was applicable only within States, not, however,
under international law. It further noted that as long as the UN Security
Council remained within the scope of the powers defined by the
UN Charter, it was also entitled to establish courts. The decision further
stated, however, that such courts were then obliged to act in conformity
with the rule of law, which meant that the rights of the accused had to
be ensured by means of adequate procedural and court rules. In legal
terms, the Chamber’s line of argument raises a number of questions,
though the establishment of the Tribunal must be seen as correct in
political and practical terms (Uertz-Retzlaff 1999, p. 89).
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The example of the Yugoslavia Tribunal clearly illustrates the difficulty
involved in actually complying with the stringent standards implied by
the rule of law and the principle of an independent judiciary in cases of
armed conflict. If even an organisation like the UN, endowed as it is
with considerable powers, reached the limits of the principle of the rule of
law in creating the criminal court, it is easy to understand how complicated
it is for small States with unconsolidated structures to respect the
principles associated with the rule of law.
Another important factor is that even an international criminal
court cannot function without local support. The first point here is the
extradition of accused persons, as we saw in the tug-of-war surrounding
the handing-over of Milosevic to the Hague Tribunal. The successor
States of the former Yugoslavia are also expected to provide help in
securing evidence, protecting witnesses, etc. Since the Yugoslavia
Tribunal was established as a coercive measure as per Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, all States are required to cooperate with it. The behaviour
of Croatia and Serbia for many years has shown that it is nevertheless
possible to refuse such cooperation, even though such refusal is unlawful.
There is little doubt that the main reason for the «soft» stance the
international community long maintained toward this resistance, as
well as for the reticence it has shown in making arrests on its own, stems
from fears of negative impacts on the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina
(Böhme 200, p. 118). The pictures of UN blue helmets taken hostage
have left their mark.
All this gives an inkling of the difficulties faced by the international
community in dealing with crimes against international law if the process
is not backed by the authority of the Security Council or if, for political
reasons, the mandate the Council gives its blue-helmet forces is
inadequate to the task at hand.
Taking local factors into account
The example of the Yugoslavia Tribunal as well that provided by
different kinds of national resistance to cooperation with this organ of
the international community show how sensitively States may react when
they feel that inroads are being made into their sovereign rights —in
this case, into their sovereign penal jurisdiction. This also explains why
the Cambodian Government decided to set up a national criminal tribunal
to try the cases of genocide committed in the country. In this case
UN international experts and expertise were allowed, even though the
court was established on a national basis. 
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This mirrors a general problem faced by international assistance for
crisis regions. The problem consists in the fact that it is very difficult to
take adequate account of regional factors. Yet the political context can
prove to be an impediment to the rule of law. Because they see political
and economic tasks as more urgent, new rulers often accord low priority
to the establishment of an independent judiciary following a crisis
situation. In addition, those in power must frequently fear a loss of their
power if an independent judiciary is in fact established. The literature
(cf. Mani 1998, p. 6 et seq.) cites a number of examples. The Government
of El Salvador, for instance, dragged its feet in implementing the binding
recommendations of the Truth Commission and disbanding the country’s
corrupt supreme court. When Namibia became independent, the Govern-
ment also neglected to take the steps required to sanction infractions
of the law committed by the country’s liberation movement, SWAPO,
during the struggle for independence.
The situation in Cambodia was even worse for years; here, with an
eye to securing the fragile peace, the international community insisted
on a continuing participation of the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian
Government. Under these circumstances it was quite inconceivable to
build an independent judiciary. Western legal experts, calling for the
introduction of a new legal order —common law for the Americans,
the code Napoléon for the French— were themselves running the risk
of disregarding the interests of the local population and showing insuf-
ficient understanding for the country’s historical and mental peculiarities
(Lithgow 1994, p. 44 et seqq.). This missionary zeal necessarily gave
rise to the —false— impression that Cambodia is a territory without
any centuries-old legal traditions of its own. Any approach of this kind
is more apt to put off the local population, though the aim should be
to ensure its involvement as a means of building an independent
judiciary. It is therefore imperative to ensure a strong involvement of
local NGOs at the earliest possible date in order to gain the participation
of a given region’s civil society in the process of rebuilding government
structures. The experience gained in East Timor underlines this fact
(Patrick 2001, p. 52 et seq.).
Practical experience in the role of law following conflicts
The rule of law is a key element in rebuilding social structures after
conflict and collapse. This is seen in the medium term as a precondition
essential for peace and durable internal stability. It is for this reason
that a large number of international players are involved in supporting
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efforts aimed at creating an independent judiciary. These include various
UN bodies such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights.
The World Bank lists ten elements on which legal reforms in develop-
ing countries should be based (Thürer 1995, p. 30). These centre on:
creation of an independent judiciary; security for judges; streamlining
of legal procedures and improvement of legal management; selection and
training of judges; establishment of legal institutions and an information
system; opening up of access to courts; legal groundwork needed to
create courts or bodies of arbitration and mediation commissions.
The growing importance of the fields of justice and security has
also found expression in UN peace operations. Practitioners have
proposed setting a new priority here (Brahimi Report 2000). The means
available to promote the consolidation of peace include the use of
civilian police and other law-oriented forces such as justice experts to
secure both the rule of law and human rights (UN-Doc A/55/305, para.
29 et seq.). A central role is assigned in this context to reform of the
judiciary and criminal justice as well as to support for the process of
democratisation (Cumaraswamy 1996, para. 4 et seqq.).
Compared with national law, the options available to enforce
international law are very weak. Apart from responses of the UN Security
Council to threats to or breaches of the peace, there is no central inter-
national enforcement mechanism. Consequently, it is as a rule not
possible to use international coercion to force countries to institute an
independent judiciary. Instead, customary international law and treaties
binding under international law oblige the world’s States to guarantee
an independent judiciary at national level. If such countries are called
upon by other countries or by international bodies to do so, this can in
no way be seen as interference in internal affairs. However, the inter-
national community has no choice but to rely on the cooperation of
the States concerned in redressing grievances.
This being a crosscutting problem, various UN organs have been
concerned, since 1980, with the independence of the judiciary as well
as with related issues. As early as 1980, the UN Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC), in its Resolution 1989/124, proposed appointing a
special reporter on these issues. The Human Rights Commission in
Resolution 1995/36 finally appointed such a special reporter. His
mandate consisted in assessing, on the basis of international best
practices, the significance of an independent judiciary and analysing
the impact of international assistance such as advisory services and
technical support. The aim was to adapt relevant international assistance
to the challenges posed by the task of supporting democratisation
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processes and the protection of human rights in the post-Cold War era.
The reports, analysing above all relevant existing human rights
instruments, reflect the present state of international legal affairs. The
second part of these documents describes the situation in various crisis-
torn countries of the world. Since most of these countries have declared
their willingness to cooperate with the special reporter, the reports also
reflect the positions of both the countries concerned and the relevant
aid organisations. Interested parties will be able to distil some general
information from the reports as well as from UN practice.
General findings derived from UN practice
In its peace missions in collapsing States in the 1990s, the UN
increasingly assumed a trusteeship role (Hufnagel 1996, p. 320). Any
such concrete activities of course require a detailed mandate for specific
operations and must be geared to local conditions. Still, some main
lines of development have become visible in practice. The international
community is, for instance, unable to rebuild government structures in
crisis regions without reference to certain values. Such activity is based
on a concept of good governance that is reflected in the specific
mandates adopted by the UN Security Council. If we look, for instance,
into the UN missions in Namibia, Cambodia, and Somalia, we find that
they share a number of common characteristics. These show that efforts
aimed at instituting the rule of law and setting up an independent
judiciary have been embedded in a comprehensive catalogue of
measures.
Democratic governmental structures are aimed for in all such cases.
In Namibia and Cambodia this was achieved by means of nationwide
elections, while in Somalia efforts have been aimed at forming represen-
tative organs at local level. The UN’s commitment here was not restricted
to the expression of the population’s democratic will, but also extended
to the preparatory work for elections. Comprehensive awareness
campaigns were used to inform people of their basic rights. This was
aimed at countering any attempts to intimidate the population. These
activities included information on possibilities of gaining access to the
media, presentation of the general right to vote, and a declaration that
this right applied to all persons, including refugees.
All UN operations have also been based on the aim of improving
the human rights situation on the ground. This was approached by
means of information programmes geared to creating an awareness of
human rights and educating people to respect human rights. In addition,
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the missions also had the task of investigating human rights violations
on their own initiative.1
In Cambodia the mission included a special human rights component.
One important task of these UN interventions was to secure the State’s
monopoly of power. Since both police and military, as armed and
organised groups, play a key role in internal conflicts, any solution must
begin with them. It is for this reason that control over the armed organs
of the State and their subordination under the political leadership has
always been a priority task. 
Apart from the ceasefire, peace operations have focused on disarming,
barracking, and demobilising the conflict parties. In practice, however,
there have been major problems here. Disarming the conflict parties
proved impracticable, for instance, in Cambodia and Somalia. 
The experience gained in building armed organs in the countries to
be stabilised has likewise differed from case to case. In Namibia, the
task was merely to monitor the process of reorganising an existing police
force. In Somalia, on the other hand, the police force had to be rebuilt
from scratch.
One feature shared by these operations is the aim of creating a police
force that acts not as an instrument of oppression but as a protector of
human rights on the basis of the rule of law. This task is derived from the
human rights of personal security and the right of freedom from fear. The
monopoly of power, which at the same time implies a subordination of
executive power under the democratically legitimised political leadership,
is one of the core elements of any democratic order.
The goals named above cannot be achieved if care is not taken at
the same time to institute the rule of law and create an independent 
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1 In Somalia, though, the credibility of UN commitment suffered heavily when, in
1993, at the height of the conflicts with General Aidid and other warlords, UN and US
troops were themselves involved in severe human rights violations; and human rights
organisations such as Amnesty International and African Rights levelled serious charges
against them. What was at issue here were, first —as was noted above all for the
Canadian contingent— cases of torture and racist excesses perpetrated on Somalis. In
the second place, hundreds of Somalis were detained for months without trial. And,
finally, UNSCOM troops had used wholly unreasonable force against the civilian
population, in this way violating international humanitarian law. After the charges
levelled by UN representatives had been rejected on problematic or indeed flimsy grounds,
a UN commission of investigation appointed by the Security Council, while clearly
placing the blame on Aidid, also criticised the US and the UN for the aggressive nature
of their actions and recommended payment of compensation to the victims among the
Somali civilian population. Furthermore, in September 2001 the UN human rights
representative for Somalia, Ghanim Alnajar, recommended a comprehensive investigation
of war crimes committed during the phase in which the UN troops were withdrawn. 
judiciary. This is why the UN devoted so much effort in Cambodia and
Somalia to creating a new system of courts designed to operate
independently of the government. As far as human rights and the right
to vote are concerned, international organisations or bodies have in
some individual cases even assumed jurisdictional functions. Under
Annex 6 of the Dayton Agreement, for instance, a Human Rights
Chamber was created for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its task is to ensure that
the country maintains the highest possible standard of internationally
recognised human rights. This court is made up of 14 judges, six from
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s constituent States, and eight international experts
(Nowak 1998, p. 192). Furthermore, the international community is also
providing support for the training of judges, lawyers, and judicial staff.
These missions have also been engaged in monitoring prison systems
and the treatment of prisoners (Bartole 2000, p. 162 et seq.). Numerous
changes in the national protection of human rights as well as in electoral
laws are likewise due to UN missions. And such countries have also,
not least, been provided support in working out democratic constitutions.
The task of building an independent judiciary in crisis areas can prove
successful only if it is accompanied by efforts aimed at reviving the
economy, though this is not a task immediately associated with UN peace
operations. Still, practice shows that it is in many cases impossible to
strictly separate the tasks of instituting the rule of law and (re)building
an economic infrastructure. To this extent, development-assistance
measures are also instrumental in creating the conditions needed for an
independent judiciary.
In his 1992 Agenda for Peace (UN-Doc A/47/277), former UN Secretary
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressly referred to this state of affairs
and called for a new type of technical assistance. The issues involved
here are support for the reshaping of inadequate national structures and
capacities as well as the strengthening of new democratic institutions.
The fact that the UN has had every reason to become active in this field
becomes evident when we consider that social peace is just as important
as strategic or political peace: «There is an obvious connection between
democratic practices —such as the rule of law and transparency in
decision-making— and the achievement of true peace and security in
any new and stable political order. These elements of good governance
need to be promoted at all levels of international and national political
communities» (Boutros-Ghali 1992, Section 59).
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International Law, Conflict Prevention and the Media
José Manuel Pureza
The modern international system is presently subject to a second
phase of structural change. The first one consisted of the worldwide
expansion of the nation-state as a pattern of political and social organ-
ization. From the ancient, narrow club of so-called “civilized states” we
have passed to a situation of almost 200 states that emerged from the
identification between self-determination and state building. East
Timor is perhaps the latest and most symptomatic expression of this
vision.
The second wave of structural change of the international system is
producing a dramatic intensification of cross-border interactions and
giving place to a new concept and experiment in political and social
community (new communities of fate). Territorial primacy is being
replaced by functional and thematic identities and, within this framework,
national communities have ceased to be the central references for both
regulation and loyalties. 
What international law is supposed to rule is no longer inter-sate
anarchy. James Rosenau, for example, suggests that the present inter-
national system is founded on a bifurcation between a state-centric
world, of which sovereignty is the cornerstone, and a multi-centric,
non-hierarchical world, formed of several non-territorial networks of
different international actors (writers, intellectuals, criminals, workers,
sportsmen, ecologists, etc.).
Therefore, these radical sociological changes —synthesised in the
word “globalisation”— involve a new construction and understanding
of international law. Several legal scholars have studied this paradigmatic
shift that globalisation is causing in international law. Most of them
analyse this phenomenon as a move from the classic inter-state law
towards a sort of law of all mankind. For example, Wolfgang Friedman
announces two opposite logics of international regulation: on one side,
the traditional law of co-existence, with a mere procedural scope, and
centred around the question of “how to keep them peacefully apart”;
on the other side, the modern law of co-operation, whose main concern
is “how to bring them actively together”. Whatever the accent may be,
the fact is that we are witnessing a recovery of a non-positivist and a
non-state-centric way of explaining and understanding international
law. Contemporary common sense concerning the constitutive and
regulatory functions of the international legal order underlines the need
to take into due account not only the efficiency of international rules
(i.e., the proximity between international rules and the actual behaviour
of states) but also their capacity to express, on a worldwide scale, some
crucial values of humankind as a whole. 
Therefore, this paradigmatic shift operating within international
law can be read as a process of rediscovering the potential of bringing
together legal and ethical categories, in the same way that some of the
founding fathers of international law have done. They were wise enough
to incorporate the novelty of a plurality of values and of political units
(the nation-states), without permitting a lapse into pure relativism. This
was the main importance of the notion of totus orbis (the whole world),
in Francisco de Vitoria, or of the centrality of the bonum commune
generis humanis (the good of all humakind), in Francisco Suarez. Given
the risks of negative utopianism that political globalisation today carries
with it, international law is once again called upon to incorporate the
new, while limiting its potential for perversion.
So, the question is: in what measure does contemporary international
law, understood as a law of all humankind, permit new forms of a bonum
commune humanitatis? In my view, there are two main legal areas in
which this tendency is found. The first is regimes based upon an alternative
logic to that of territorial sovereignty over natural resources and spaces,
like the “common heritage of humankind” regime. The second is the
international regime of human rights through which the exclusive
monopoly of States in the regulation of the legal status of individuals,
established since Westphalia, is abandoned and replaced by a general
international accountability of states concerning individuals under their
jurisdiction.
Dramatically contrasting with these developments that occurred in
international legal discourse during the last five decades, the 20th century
has been the most violent in all history. In fact, there have been as many
casualties from mass violence in our century as in the rest of human
history combined. Robert Manoff, president of the Centre for War, Peace
and the News Media, stresses that “the human race has seen fit to
engage in something like 250 significant armed conflicts in the course of
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this century, during which over 110 million people have been killed, and
many times that number wounded, crippled and mutilated.” 
This diffusion of mass violence and the dramatic increase of every
form of ethno-political conflict demand a refreshment of some crucial
concepts. The concept of security is obviously one of them. The traditional
state-centric and militarised view of security must give place to a multi-
level understanding that embraces individuals, groups, peoples and
humankind as simultaneous subjects of security. 
But what are the precise and consistent basis of a commitment
“beyond our tribe, beyond our nation, family, intimate network?”
(M. Ignatieff). If the concept of bonum commune humanitatis has a
significative presence in contemporary international law, “what scripts
and narratives of involvement get some of us to commit ourselves to
people we had no connection to until some chance encounter with
televised images of atrocity galvanized us into action”? (ibid).
Michael Ignatieff answers his own questions: “There is no narrative
of imperial rivalry or ideological struggle that compels the zones of
safety to make the zones of danger their business. What is left is a
narrative of compassion.” And he goes on: “Television has become the
privileged medium through which moral relations between strangers
are mediated in the modern world”. Ignatieff then denounces the deep
ambivalence of the moral relations formed on a media base: “On the
one hand, television has contributed to the breakdown of the barriers
of citizenship, religion, race and geography that once divided our moral
space into those we were responsible for and those who were beyond
our ken. On the other hand, it makes us voyeurs of the suffering of
others, tourists amid their landscapes of anguish.” The greatest danger
of this ambivalence of media-based ethics is misanthropy: “the ethics of
victimhood generate empathy only where victims are obviously blameless
(…). Where empathy fails to find the blameless victim, the conscience
finds comfort in shallow misanthropy. For the reaction —“they’re all
crazy!”— reproduces the reassuring imperial dichotomy between the
virtue, moderation and reasonableness held to exist in the West and
the fanaticism and unreason of the East”.
Summing up my argument until now: 
—Contemporary international law evidences some openness to
value-centred strategies, in which the notions of common good
and unity of all humankind are crucial;
—Notwithstanding this, the 20th century has been the most violent
of all history, imposing a renewal of conceptual constructions
like “security” in a cosmopolitan worldwide scale.
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—This renewal faces a crucial obstacle: the fragility of media-based
ethics, whose ambivalence may result in mere voyeurism and
even misanthropy.
Is media language able to overcome these ambivalent results and
serve as an operational support for peace and a fair international order?
Despite being aware of the potential that journalism has for conflict
management and prevention (deobjectifying the conflict actors for each
other, counteracting misinterpretations, identifying the core interests),
some of my journalist friends would immediately raise the question of
objectivity as an obstacle to any sort of partisan journalism. Peace, in
this view, is not a cause for media because media, by definition, have
no causes. They are supposed to be attached only to seeking the truth.
Let me state very honestly that, not being a journalist myself, I
follow Robert Manoff when he qualifies objectivity as a “vital illusion
and perhaps even a tragic one”. The epistemological and deontological
strength of “objectivity-as-neutrality” is also its moral weakness: it
stops its followers from intervening in the events they are covering and
voids them of any kind of responsibility for the consequences of
maintaining their distance towards the facts.
Now, I suggest that the paradigmatic shift operating in international
law demands a new journalistic paradigm. As a particular form of
social practice, journalism must be thought of within the framework of
the human combat against genocidal culture. This means that journalism
as a social practice must be reconfigured as a major contribution to the
prevention and resolution of conflict. Let me finish by quoting Robert
Manoff once again: “instead of starting with the media’s understanding
of their own possibilities, as determined by current paradigms, we have
decided to begin by establishing the desiderata for media action based
on the work of negotiators, diplomats, ‘track two’ practitioners and
protagonists who have participated in the resolution of conflict or who
have studied the process. This shift of perspective makes it possible first
and foremost to address the question of what conflict prevention and
management require of the media, putting aside for the moment the
question of under what circumstances the media may able to provide
it”.
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Conflict Prevention in the Co-operation Policy 
of the European Union 
João Cravinho
Nowadays, the concept of Conflict Prevention is a core aspect of
the main agenda of international donors, including the EU, academic
institutions and non-governmental organisations. In fact, this has been
increasingly translated into the debates and guidelines adopted by the
majority of international donors and actors, as well as in underdeveloped
countries, who are primarily responsible for their implementation.
I was therefore very pleased to accept the invitation to take part in
this seminar.
Conflict prevention - what is the EU’s policy?
During the last years, the EU has been trying to stand as one of the
main international actors defending the need of an effective policy on
peace consolidation and violent conflict prevention, management and
resolution. In fact, these are the core issues of the Union’s external relation-
ships, both at the levels of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
and of the Community Development Aid Policy.
According to the Treaty of the EU, the community’s development
co-operation policy is based on a very clear set of principles, namely: 
—to promote underdeveloped countries’ sustainable economic and
social development; 
—to promote their progressive integration in the world economy; 
—to contribute to the fight against poverty;
—and, globally, to contribute to the overall goal of development,
rule of law and democratic consolidation, as well as of respect
for fundamental human rights and freedoms. 
Besides developing and consolidating these fundamental values,
according to the mandate entrusted to it by the Maastricht Treaty and
further revised by the Amsterdam Treaty, the CFSP should also contribute
to peacekeeping and to the reinforcement of international security.
Well, here we stand before a situation in which a relevant inter-
national actor explicitly refers to the importance of using its available
means for conflict prevention. Amongst the most relevant available
means is the fact that the EU is one of the main international donors of
development aid (providing, together with its Member States, over
50 % of global Public Development Aid), as well as a relevant trading
partner. Therefore, the EU is extremely well placed to act on a set of
matters, which are normally at the root of violent situations. 
But, perhaps more relevant than those statistics, is the fact that the
EU is a unique actor in the international scenario, in terms of both foreign
policy and development cooperation. There is an ongoing debate in
many countries on the accurate relationship between foreign policy
and development cooperation policy. Often that debate is excessively
simplistic, but it can be characterised as a tension between the interests
propelled into foreign policy and the values that are revealed through
co-operation. It is clearly nonsense to separate interests and values in
this way, but still one must bear in mind that the EU is a completely
different case when compared to a State that has had a foreign policy
for many decades or even centuries and still has a recent, fragile and
incipient co-operation policy. 
At least for the time being, the EU’s foreign policy is something
that practically does not exist. On the contrary, co-operation policy is
something that has become more consolidated and complex throughout
several decades, standing as one of the most clear and visible ways of
projecting European values in today’s world. In other words, the EU’s
intervention in the world relies deeply on its capacity to intervene at
the level of development support, in which the conflict prevention
debate is naturally included. 
There is a growing understanding of today’s violent conflicts as a
result of a set of structural problems that, despite varying on a case-by-
case basis, seem to accommodate most of these situations. 
In general terms, we can say that in many of the cases these are
situations of structural crisis, often happening in extremely under-
developed countries, leading to chronic instability, insecurity, violations
of human rights, social and economic collapse, heavy reliance on external
aid, and growing levels of absolute poverty.
Secondly, the heavy costs of violent conflicts are not only felt in the
areas directly affected by conflict, but go far beyond the State’s own
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borders. This means that countries that have the misfortune of bordering
other countries with structural crises that overspill into conflict, themselves
end up with high probabilities of being destabilised by contagion with
outside conflicts.
Thirdly, though with different degrees of intensity and depending
on specific circumstances, in recent years these situations have been
feeding a feeling of uncertainty and mistrust. This results in a massive
rupture of foreign investment in the affected regions and in a certain
scepticism regarding the efficacy of international cooperation or even
regarding the real feasibility of development. This feeds into a vicious
circle, which tends to fulfil the most pessimist expectations. 
Thus, besides having a significant potential to do so, the EU has a
particular interest in acting on these situations, which have often made
the concretisation of the Union’s political aims impracticable (for
example, promotion of respect for human rights, democracy and the rule
of law, the fight against poverty, promotion of sustainable development)
and have considerably increased long-term development costs. This is the
core concern in the several documents adopted in the meantime, which
together have been outlining the performance mandate in this area.
Two contributing factors to the European stance can be ascertained
here. The first one is that it is the EU that tends to pay for conflict’s
physical costs. One example: during recent years the EU has invested
several million euros in Palestinian infrastructure, which in recent weeks
has been almost totally destroyed by Israel. The EU is now asking the
Israeli state for one hundred million Euros of compensation for that
destruction, but we are not very confident that this will bring the desired
result. 
The other relevant factor is that the EU is trying to find a certain
balance in respect to the American superpower, and the quest for such
a balance informs the European stance. Using the same example, the
EU’s foreign affairs ministers decided early this week not to have a clear
stance towards the conflict because they didn’t want to endanger the
mission of American Secretary of State Colin Powell. 
Thus, notwithstanding its very singular characteristics, the EU isn’t
free of the influence of realpolitik in this field, though perhaps to a
lesser extent than is the case with traditional states. 
From that general framework, it is worth mentioning that there is a
new guidance in the use of the EU’s tools —political, diplomatic, financial
and trading— towards strategic action on the immediate and structural
causes of violence. This translates not only the complexity of such
situations, but also the growing understanding of the potential of a
guided and integrated utilisation of the several tools. 
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It is here that the Union’s development aid policy comes in, having
gradually started to integrate a strengthened political component, in
which issues related to peace consolidation, management and resolution
are considered when outlining development strategies, programmes and
projects, in a framework of passage into a preventive approach. 
In the same way, the growing political debate with underdeveloped
countries and regions is becoming a relevant tool for this aim, as it
was, for example, consecrated in the framework of the new ACP-CE
Partnership Agreement, the Cotonou agreement, which has a reinforced
political dimension, capable of regularly tackling any subject of mutual
interest, at the global, regional or national level. 
Future challenges for the EU 
Despite the progress already made regarding the political definition
of the EU in this subject, there are still, however, some challenges
demanding answers, so that the policies already adopted can be made
effectively operational and credible. 
Firstly, there is the always-complicated case of the articulation
between the actions processed within the Common Foreign and
Security Policy framework and the community development aid policy,
as well as the Member States’ bilateral actions regarding the established
guidelines. The principles that supposedly guide the European stance
may not be shared by the Union’s Member States, which may have
different political, economic or historical interests, depending on the
context.
In this line of thought, the elaboration of Country Strategic
Documents is a relevant element, which may be able to ensure, on a
case-by-case basis, greater coherence and synergy between long-term
co-operation programmes and other complementary actions, specifically
devoted to conflict prevention and reinforcement of democratic
principles, as well as a greater articulation between the Community’s
actions and the bilateral support of Member States and other inter-
national organs. This process, aiming at creating an integrated approach,
sometimes works better and at other times worse. 
It will therefore be necessary to intensify efforts both within the
Community and between this and its Member States, and to gather
the relevant political will, so that, together with the beneficiary countries,
it is indeed possible to move towards a common approach. In fact, the
more the European approach is shared, the nearer it will be to the
aforementioned principles.
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The growing political debate that the Union is developing with
underdeveloped countries and regions is a significant mechanism of
dialogue on issues related to violent conflicts. In fact, conflict prevention,
management and resolution have been gradually integrated as a core
aspect of that process. However, there is a problem here: the “political
dialogue” ends up being invoked only in cases where dialogue itself is
extremely difficult, as happened recently in Zimbabwe. There is still a
long way to go in order to refine these mechanisms, but one can
positively say that there seems to be an awareness of this fact. 
One other relevant aspect is the need to strengthen the articulation
between the Union’s actions and those adopted by other international
actors. This has, by the way, been translated in the EU-UN dialogue on
the definition of common policies in the field of conflict prevention and
crisis management, in order to reflect both actors’ potential in the area,
as well as the need for increased information and co-operation exchange. 
However, for an effective improvement of the participation and
articulation with the UN and other international organisations, a strength-
ening of the political weight and influence of the EU within those
organisations is fundamental. The blend of the EU and its Member
States’ efforts towards this issue is, once again, an essential condition,
but it is known how this plays with Member States conflicting interests.
An example of this is the interest of the United Kingdom and France in
keeping their privileged status as Permanent Members of the United
Nations Security Council. 
Specific situations
One of today’s existing tensions in international co-operation policy
results from the tendency to reward the “good students” and punish
the “bad students”, the so-called “poor performers”. Obviously, it is
precisely in those countries afflicted by a context of political or
institutional frailty, that there exists a pressing need to lut conflict
prevention mechanisms into action. There are, for example, acute cases
where State structures have disappeared. In other cases, the central
power may look strong (such as in terms of military control) but it does
not possess the indispensable legitimacy, given its incapacity to carry
out a set of intrinsically fundamental tasks (including the provision of
basic services or of minimum security conditions), or to maintain
control of its whole territory. There are also those States affected by the
highest levels of underdevelopment and by added difficulties regarding
the incorporation of resources made available by the international
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community, considering the existing political and institutional
constraints.
A systematic conflict-prevention policy requires refining mechanisms
to improve co-operation, specifically in the so-called poor performer
countries. This doesn’t necessarily mean an increase in the resources
directed to those countries, but simply an identification of the most
effective mechanisms to achieve the goals of reconciliation and
pacification of societies. 
Besides the endeavours in the political dialogue framework, the
Community’s support should, in these cases, consider additional attention
to the rule of law, essential for the good functioning of the democratic
process, through strengthening of civil society and institutional capacities
(through training, support of social sectors, and reinforcement of the
judicial system). This reinforcement is also a fundamental condition
towards a better incorporation and utilisation of the resources made
available.
In fact, this is the only possible way of ensuring an effective
coherence and application of the commitments made regarding peace
consolidation and conflict prevention.
Allow me, lastly, to allude to the issue of the visibility of peace
consolidation and conflict prevention policies. 
Although actions in this area, if successful, are necessarily less
visible than those, for example, in the area of humanitarian aid or
peace keeping operations (which has in fact been pointed out as one
of the factors that have conditioned some donors’ engagement towards
these issues), it is in practical terms a fundamental matter. This is true
both for the beneficiary countries —primarily responsible for its
implementation— and for the donor community, given its specific
responsibility, as well as for the need for an effective credibility of their
aid policies, whose efficacy is being questioned due to the situations of
instability experienced in some geographical areas. 
In this field, the media have a fundamental role, but others more
qualified than I will tackle that issue.
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Swedish Conflict Prevention Policy and the Challenges 
of the Media
Cecilia Bruhn
The relation between conflict prevention policy and the media is a
burning but still quite unexplored issue. It is well known that bad
journalism may contribute to one-sided opinions about the causes of a
crisis, and even to its deterioration, but it has not been fully explored
how good journalism may have an influence on the positive development
of the same situation. 
In this paper the Swedish policy regarding conflict prevention,
especially its different approaches, will be presented briefly. As a
comment some reflections about possible strategies concerning the
media, especially in relation to international co-operation, will be
presented.
The Swedish policy below is taken from the Government communi-
cation entitled Preventing Violent Conflict, published in 2000. 
An integrated approach to conflict prevention politics
An integrated approach to the prevention of violent conflicts is a
central issue in the Swedish Government’s policy. The Government is
aware of the importance of democratic governance, respect for human
rights, gender equality, economic and social development, measures to
combat crime and environmental degradation and the strengthening
of international co-operation, in particular through trade and investment. 
The programme states that all these areas have to be integrated
and combined with economic, political, legal and military instruments,
in order to achieve human security, which is a precondition for social
stability. Making use of the collaboration within and between ministries
and public authorities, research institutions, non-governmental organ-
isations and the business community, the Government will strengthen
the capacity for pursuing conflict prevention and may also encourage
similar methods in the international arena.
Sweden has presented five main areas where the country believes
the future tasks of conflict prevention lie. 
1. Development co-operation
Sweden’s integrated development co-operation, including areas
such as social and economic development, human rights and the rule
of law, fulfils a key preventive function by combating poverty and
strengthening important societal functions. This policy addresses the
structural causes of destabilisation and armed conflicts. 
It is stated that efficient development co-operation can contribute
to a favourable evolution of peace and security, but to qualify as conflict
prevention, there must be a specific link between such co-operation
and a beginning conflict situation. The purpose of the measures must
be to help reduce the risk of an outbreak of armed conflict. The measures
may be both structural and direct. Support for a multi-annual project,
e.g. empowering women, or targeted aid, e.g. to an independent radio
station, can both have preventive effects and reduce the risk of a
situation developing into an armed confrontation. 
At the same time it is said that it is important to integrate the
preventive dimension into long-term development co-operation that is
not directly related to a potential conflict situation.
2. International law
Like many other countries, Sweden maintains that respect for
national sovereignty must not be an obstacle to acting in intra-national
conflicts. Taking early co-operative action to prevent violent conflict can
help to avoid the need for intervention at a later stage —a humanitarian
intervention that is not always accepted by the State in question. 
International law has a marked conflict-prevention dimension.
Armed conflicts are often preceded, or even directly caused, by flagrant
violations of the population’s rights, and international co-operation today
is largely concerned with promoting the adoption of, and compliance,
with international norms. 
Respect for international humanitarian law in armed conflicts helps
to protect civilians and facilitates humanitarian actions, which may
prevent the conflict from spreading to other areas and further escalating.
The Swedish government argues that long-term measures to strengthen
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a culture of respect for international law, in particular through educational
measures and political dialogue, have a structural conflict-prevention
function.
3. Democracy and security
Security and development policies, which have long been regarded
as separate fields of activity, are closely linked in Swedish policy. At the
same time, increasing importance is attached to the political dimension
of development co-operation and the need for measures to promote
democratisation in developing countries.
The Government states that democracy consists not only of formal
democratic institutions, but also of a democratic culture and respect for
human rights. There is a strong link between democracy and conflict
prevention, and this link is evident especially in situations where an
internal conflict is about to develop into a civil war. 
Sweden’s support for democracy is primarily long-term and is
designed to promote the gradual establishment of democratic institutions,
a democratic culture, gender equality and human rights. It is closely
related to efforts in other areas, for example equitable social and
economic development and pro-environment measures. 
To be recognised as conflict prevention measures in the operational
sense, there must be a clear link to a concrete risk of armed conflict.
However, the conflict prevention dimension should also be integrated
into other programmes and measures designed to develop democracy.
Support for democratisation must, therefore, be designed on the basis
of analyses of the power structures and interests of the actors involved. 
4. Economic and social development
Tolerable social and economic conditions are an important, but not
sufficient factor for political stability. Poverty tends to mean the absence
of human security, at the same time as the factors associated with
poverty —lack of rights, of participation, etc.— also trigger and sustain
conflicts. The increasing globalisation of the world economy and the
development of new information technology create opportunities for
increased prosperity for nations, groups and individuals, but also the risk
of wider gaps that may generate conflicts. The Swedish government
therefore states that it is important to combat poverty and increase the
opportunities for participation in economic development.
Scarce resources and uneven distribution are potential causes of
conflict that, alone or combined with other structural risk factors, can
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lead to armed conflicts within and between states. In several parts of
the world, water scarcity is at the centre of regional politics. In other
parts, issues such as deforestation are at stake. It is said that expert
assistance and economic support for the development of new technical
solutions, educational measures that lead to a more sustainable use,
and measures to ensure equitable distribution of resources, are necessary
to prevent scarcity of resources from being a contributing cause to
armed conflict. 
5. Economic integration and trade
It has long been recognised that economic integration as well as
technical co-operation at the regional and sub-regional level can have a
preventive effect. The government points out that collaboration creates
mutual dependence and increases mutual trust between the potential
parties to a conflict. Trade increases the opportunities for development
and mutual dependence between potential or former enemies. The
importance of maintaining trade flows means that armed force is not
seen as an effective or sensible means for settling disputes.
Economic growth, which is promoted by economic integration, is
said to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for eliminating
potential structural causes of conflicts such as increasing poverty and
economic inequality. There is a need, it is stated, to raise awareness of
the fact that economic co-operation and development can contribute to
peaceful development. Armed conflicts create opportunities for a kind of
economy that does not normally thrive in peacetime and which obstructs
conflict management and conflict prevention efforts. Knowledge of the
specific economic interests of the actors involved is therefore necessary if
an armed conflict is to be effectively prevented or otherwise managed.
Instruments and measures used for the prevention 
of violent conflict
It is stated that in order to act early to prevent violent conflict from
breaking out we must use existing instruments for partly new
purposes. Many of the instruments that are used today both within
development co-operation, international law, trade and economic co-
operation and also in crisis management and peace-keeping operations,
can be further refined so as to be even more effective in the context of
conflict prevention. There is also a need, it is stated, to develop new
methods for collecting and analysing information to make it possible to
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respond at an early stage to signs of a nascent conflict and to set up
new institutional mechanisms. A coherent strategy must be adopted
and the measures taken at various stages of a conflict must be
prepared on the basis of well-defined objectives. 
The instruments for conflict prevention can be divided into two
main categories in the Swedish programme. Structural prevention
instruments address the factors that are liable to generate conflicts in
the long term, while direct prevention instruments address the factors
that may lead to violent conflict in the short term. In most situations it
will be necessary to combine both direct and structural instruments.
These instruments can also be divided into four broad policy areas: the
socio-economic, the political-institutional, the diplomatic, and the
policy area relating to stability and physical security. 
The media and conflict prevention
In Swedish policy the role and responsibility of the media in conflict
prevention are not discussed. Even though the document exemplifies
some structural instruments, such as the training of journalists and the
support for an independent media, there is not a clear policy line dealing
with the link between the press and conflict prevention.
Having the Swedish policy document as a basis it is possible to trace
some general tasks that might strengthen the relationship between the
responsibility of the media and the conflict prevention politics. They are
not new findings per se but they are some reflections about the possible
strategies for the future policy concerning conflict prevention. To a certain
extent they could also be a natural policy line since there is a clear relation
between a democratic State —something Sweden opts for— and the free
production, publication and circulation of uncensored information.
To begin with, the training of local or national journalists is important
both from a democratic point of view and from a practical standpoint
when media cover a crisis or conflict. In the process of trying to guarantee
a free and independent media —through the training of national
journalists and support to national news agencies—, donors should
aim at making sure that they will and can give objective, transparent
and correct information. This, of course, depends largely on the
democratic possibilities in the country but it is important to change the
use of old patterns, stereotypes and one-handed material. 
Donors could contribute to the impact of news through the
training both of the actors in the field and of the journalists that are
covering a crisis or conflict. Showing how an event, presented in
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another way, can give other opinions about the conflict, and showing
how to solve the situation, both the media and the organisations
working in the field could eventually be able to contribute to another
development of the situation.
Journalists are not only persons who tell us stories. In a crisis they
are natural narrators who also have to analyse, investigate, give opinions
and propose solutions on a reality that may be very complex and difficult.
To be able to contribute to a fair development in a crisis, knowing that
the media alone probably will not prevent a conflict, it is crucial that
national and international journalists have good knowledge and under-
standing about the country’s historic and current situation, the good or
bad relations between different actors and possible external interests in
the crisis. 
The supply of journalists with these characteristics in every single
crisis or conflict is not high and the difficulties of an independent media
are still a problem in many countries. It is obvious that donors have to
find new or at least stronger arguments to underline the importance of
skilled journalists and the relation between a free press and conflict
prevention. Giving more money to different co-operation programmes
will not guarantee a better media coverage from the point of view of
conflict prevention. Donors have to change their strategies.
Secondly, the responsibility of humanitarian actors, civil society and
governmental organisations in the conflict prevention policies, and its
links with the media, has to be stressed even more. Here donors should
contribute to develop regular relations between the national and inter-
national media agencies, the international human rights and humanitarian
actors in the field and governmental agencies. It is likely that all these
actors instinctively think that they depend on others at the same time
as they all state that they are independent. Many cases have shown
how the humanitarian actors as well as the local or national governments
and the media use other parts for their own, or the victims’, purposes. 
The journalists and media agencies have to be aware of the fact that
the humanitarian actors in the field may be advocacy organisations trying
to put a special issue on the international agenda, which may endanger
the development of a crisis or conflict. Statements from the ICRC, for
instance, are always neutral and impartial but, even so, sometimes the
media distorts the messages. Hopefully neutral organisations will never
come to the point where they choose to supply only a handful of
journalists who are able to transmit news in the right way.
It is crucial that the journalists and the media in general cover the
whole situation, from the pre-crisis situation until the post-conflict
situation, using the right facts and figures. Normally the conflict is only
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reported during some peak days, whilst the possible prevention of a
conflict is rarely reported at all. The difficulties of knowing exactly
which elements are preventive may be one of the reasons, but most
probably is the sole fact that prevention itself does not make a headline.
Conflict prevention does not produce the images of suffering or
mutilated populations that are brought to us by the globalised media.
Today, part of the solution may be knowing how to create a headline
out of a «normal» conflict prevention story. That is, we must know
how to inform the audience not only when the man bites the dog but
also when the dog bites the man. 
Establishing a regular contact between, for instance, the humanitarian
actors and the media agencies, even during periods of time when there
is no immediate danger of an armed conflict, could lead to a regular
coverage in the press even in times when the every-day situation is
fairly good in a specific country or region. Surely the whole problem is
not only how to establish regular contacts between the field actors and
the press but how to break into the media cover in general with news
that do not show conflicts, misery or catastrophes. This is a question of
the agencies’ norms and also about politics, media priorities and
ownership. Donors may have great difficulties in changing these
conditions since normally the least important advice is that coming
from external actors. It is also known that the economic contributors to
the media agencies have their own preferences, as does the audience.
The media has to condemn crimes committed against international
law, according to the principle of universality, in order to put more
emphasis on the possibilities of the international legal system and its
preventive functions. Donors’ responsibility in this context will thus be
to guarantee a solid international legal framework and, if possible, to
influence the media’s strategies and ways of working. The case of the
NATO bombings in Bosnia and the legitimacy given to them both by
politicians and the media is well known. On the other hand, an
interesting case is the process in Rwanda where three journalists are
being prosecuted for incitation of genocide in the 1994 massacres. The
outcome of this case will be important for the future International
Criminal Court. 
There should never be «good conflicts», «second class conflicts» or
«forgotten conflicts» but unfortunately sometimes the voice of the
humanitarian actors, or the victims, is not enough. In this case a stable
relation between conflict prevention politics and the media could be a
crucial but not a sufficient condition. Much more has to be done in the
area of conflict prevention; the issue of the media is just one of the
elements that has to be fully explored.
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The Return of the Colonial Protectorate: 
Colonisation with Good Intent 
in the Western Balkans?
Robert C. Hudson
Introduction
Too much ink has been spilled by Western commentators over the
past decade in misrepresenting the background to the recent conflicts
that broke out between different factions and peoples who had once
lived in a country that was called Yugoslavia. This misrepresentation of
ideologies, discourses, history and events has placed blame fairly and
squarely upon different South Slav communities for conducting conflicts
based upon alleged deep ethnic hatreds and ‘blood-drenched earth’
mythologies of ethnic identity formation. This type of reductivist and
essentialist stereotyping of peoples, such as the Bosnjaks, Croats and
Serbs of Bosnia and Hercegovina (henceforth BiH) has since been
applied by western commentators to other conflicts. Witness, for
example, explanations of the conflicts that broke out in Chechnya and
Transcauscasia, Kosovo and more recently in the US-led campaign
against Afghanistan, situated within the framework of the ‘War against
Terrorism’. It is an attitude and a representation that is both dangerous
and deeply disturbing.
In the case of BiH, such essentialist analysis and comment would
deny four hundred years of tolerance between Catholic, Jewish, Muslim
and Orthodox Communities and would feed directly into what has
eloquently been denounced as a Balkanist discourse by the Bulgarian-
born, US-based academic, Maria Todorova (1997). Recourse to the
Balkanist discourse has, in turn, fanned the flames of Huntington’s so-
called ‘Clash of Civilisations’ paradigm (1993, 1996 and 1997) which
has had a considerable impact upon western policy-makers, politicians,
academics and field workers, whose efforts are crucial to contemporary
post-conflict rehabilitation processes. The misrepresentation of identities
is currently influencing the debate on the potential forth-coming war
against Iraq, and has equally impacted upon the recent crisis in
Afghanistan (Tariq Ali, 2000 and 2002, and David Chandler, 2002); the
ongoing debate over the ‘new military humanism’ (Noam Chomsky, 1999
and Michael Ignatieff, 2000) and the current thinking on the ‘new age
of imperialism’ (Robert Cooper, 2002).
It is this crisis of representation and the inherent dangers of observing
the Balkans and de facto BiH from afar, which has affected the disciplines
of anthropology, history, literature, philosophy, sociology and cultural
politics in the past in how we visualise, represent and think of this
region. This way of thinking only serves to affect the way that ministers,
public servants, think tanks and field workers from the international
community continue to draw up plans and policies and execute the
process of rehabilitation in the region.
Furthermore, on the heels of the implementation of post-conflict
institutions by the international community in both BiH and Kosovo,
there is a concern that rather than resolving problems by local means
at a local level, international organisations have been empowered at
the expense of these local institutions and have become de facto
colonial authorities in what is little other than a process of international
colonisation and colonialism in thought, word and deed. The attitudes
of some representatives of the international community might well
amount to little more than benign colonialism, yet a continued and direct
political interference on the internal political life of BiH might only serve
to reaffirm the continued emphasis on difference that has frequently
been returned in the raft of elections, managed by the Organisation for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) that have taken place
since 1996.
In this article, I will advocate rebuilding inter-communal tolerance
throughout the western Balkans by the fusion between a more traditional
set of indigenous values and practices and western demands for
establishing civil a society, based upon liberal, modern and democratic
norms, without the arrogance of believing that tolerance is necessarily
exclusive to the western democratic model. It is this writer’s belief that
it will be through the process of education (in both western Europe
and in south-eastern Europe, as well beyond) alongside the exigencies
of trade and commerce, that better foundations for building ethnic
tolerance might be established in these early years of the twenty-first
century.
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The pre-existence of inter-ethnic tolerance in BiH
For the past decade, south eastern Europe, specifically the Balkans, has
attracted a tarnished reputation in the eyes of the west, where popular
opinion, influenced by the media, populist writers and the academy, has
distanced the region from mainstream Europe, as the ‘other’ of Europe, or
Europe’s ‘backyard’. In the two post-conflict scenarios that have emerged
after the various armed conflicts in BiH between 1992 and 1995 and the
1999 conflict over Kosovo, which in both cases have witnessed the
establishment of international protectorates, it would appear that the so-
called ‘western Balkans’ have been transmogrified into being virtual
colonies of the West. For example, Adam Burgess (1997), writing before
the establishment of KFOR and UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo)
has argued that there is virtually a colonial character to the relations
between the two halves of Europe, whereby the west is ‘on a moral
mission’ to introduce democracy and economic know-how to the
‘potentially “unruly” natives’ (111); that the role of the United States
and organisations such as NATO and the OSCE, with its concomitant
‘international circus of “election monitoring”’ (112) is exacerbating relations
between the western and Balkan states, and that the ‘international
protectorate’ set up in BiH is little more than a ‘benign colonial regime’.
With reference to the Vance-Owen and Dayton maps of BiH, Burgess
recounts how the head of a radio station in Bosnia, in discussing the ‘carve
up of his country’ commented that ‘Only English colonial minds could have
drawn a map like this… The problem is, this is not Africa.’ (115).
Furthermore, despite the reality of the Balkans being, from a geo-
graphical perspective, inextricably part of Europe, the region is culturally
reconstructed as other, branded, from the early nineteenth century with
the epithet of ‘Balkan Powder Keg’ as a focal point for tribal enmity and
concomitant slaughter. Nevertheless, as Maria Todorova has remarked,
the peoples of the Balkans have no monopoly over barbarity: ‘Indeed
there is something distinctly non-European in that the Balkans never quite
seem to reach the dimensions of European slaughters.’ Indeed, one
wonders why it is that so many western commentators are ready to point
the finger at others, without ever considering the number of Vietnamese
who were killed by United States forces during the 1960s1, to say nothing
of other American foreign policy adventures throughout the developing
world, during the Cold War and its contemporary aftermath.2
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1 Estimated at 3,000,000 Vietnamese lives.
2 In a period of 17 days, during its Gulf War operation, in 1991, 243,395 people
were killed by United States armed forces.
Of course, it would be so easy to reduce the conflicts of the last
decade to a ‘clash of civilisations’ à la Samuel Huntington, in which
lines of cleavage drawn across the maps of Europe, Africa and Asia, have
been represented as perennial lines of confrontation. His controversial
approach might once have had some appeal as a generalised theory,
but it soon falls apart under closer scrutiny. For example, in the case of
BiH, he has described a cleft society arising from the existence of three
different faith communities in one region, and yet fails to recognise
that these communities had lived together in relative peaceful harmony,
with only the occasional outbreak of tension, for a period of five centuries.
Indeed, Robert Donia and John Fine (1994; 10) are more emphatic in
their proclamation that religious rivalry and violence had never been a
feature of Bosnia’s heritage:
…Nowhere do we find evidence of the alleged centuries of hatred
(whether religious or ethnic among the various Bosnian groups) that
has supposedly permeated their history. Though Bosnia in the Middle
Ages fought wars against Serbia and against principalities under the
Croats, at no time did the Bosnians fight civil wars along these or any
other ethnic lines. In fact, few Bosnians ever referred to themselves
as Serbs or Croats, and those who did were to be found in border
regions. Since the Ottomans categorized people by religion, Bosnians
did not use ethnic names under the Ottomans either, before their
gradual appearance in the nineteenth century. However, at the start
of the nineteenth century, Bosnians were certainly conscious of being
members of distinct communities defined by religion. Then, in the
nineteenth century, Orthodox and Catholic Bosnians gradually and
unevenly, under the impact of ideas exported by their neighbors in
Serbia and Croatia, began acquiring the ethnic labels ‘Serb’ and ‘Croat’
respectively.
Adil Zulfikarpasic´ (1998; 43-44) confirms this viewpoint, arguing
that religious, ethnic and cultural diversity are fundamental to Bosnian
identity. Talking of his home town of Foca, he adds that:
For centuries this area was the meeting place of East and West,
Islam and Orthodoxy, Serbs and Muslims —their cultures, customs
and ways of thinking. They were different, of course, but there was a
culture of communal living, tolerance combined with rivalry and
mutual respect and competition.
For a thousand years Bosnia was an example of how diversity
—whether religious, cultural or of any kind— does not hinder the
creation of a common society. Bosnia had its own specific Bosnian
society, a social structure that makes a country a common state.
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So, those writers, who are so ready to comment on the cruelty and
intolerance of Ottoman rule, should study the history of these three
communities and their interdependence in greater detail and depth. As
Ivan Lovrenovic´ (2001; 94) and Noel Malcolm (1994; 49) have both
remarked, a certain level of tolerance was shown to followers of other
faith communities, especially the ‘people of the book’, to a degree that
allowed them to preserve their identity. In reality, this meant that
adherents of the Christian and Jewish faiths would on the one hand be
able to practice their own faiths, but, on the other hand, would always
remain second class citizens in a society in which there was no equality
before the law, and in which non-Muslims suffered certain humiliations,
such as restrictions on dress or having to build their churches below the
height of mosques (Donia & Fine, op. cit.; 68). The result of the
interrelationship of these peoples is rather neatly summed up by Lovrenovic´
(op. cit.; 108):
In the context of all-embracing confessionalism, three cultural
identities emerged [in the nineteenth century]: Muslim-Bosniak, in
which Turkish-Islamic culture dominated; Serbian Orthodox, linked to
the Byzantine religious tradition; and Catholic Croatian, shaped by
western Christian traditions. After the expulsion of the Arabs and
Jews from Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth century, these three
components were joined by another, that of the Sephardic Jews. The
result was an exceptionally complicated and ambivalent society,
characterized on the one hand by cultural and spiritual isolationism,
on the other by tolerance for difference as a normal aspect of life.
The economy and trade, in particular, acted as a stimulant to tolerance
between the different communities, particularly as urban life increased
all over Bosnia in the sixteenth century, which would witness the great
monuments of Islamic culture in Bosnia, such as the Mostar Bridge, the
Ferhad Pasa Mosque in Banja Luka and the covered market in Sarajevo.
(Lovrenovic´, op. cit.; 97).
An example of this tolerance is well demonstrated by those Ladino-
speaking Jews who were exiled from Spain in 1492, and who settled in
towns, such as Sarajevo, Travnik, Banja Luka and Mostar, where they
were able to flourish, in an urban setting, under a regime of Ottoman
tolerance. It is indeed to the urban culture of Bosnia that one can look
to in stimulating Ottoman and de facto Islamic tolerance towards
others. This particularly forms the leitmotif to Adil Zulfikarpasic´ ’s book,
The Bosniak (1998); whilst the importance of urbanisaton as the best
means of ensuring post-conflict rehabilitation and inter-cultural tolerance
has been elegantly argued by Drazen Pehar in Forum Bosnae (2002).
THE RETURN OF THE COLONIAL PROTECTORATE: COLONISATION WITH GOOD INTENT... 107
Such inter-communal tolerance, engendered by urbanism, is further
stimulated by the existence of the komsiluk (neighbourhood or
neighbours) and it is this cult of good neighbourliness which Lovrenovic´
(op. cit.; 100) sees as having been grounded upon a very natural need
for survival which lies at the core of Bosnian inter-cultural dependence.
Perhaps one only has to read the novels of Ivo Andric´ to understand
how, traditionally, towns such as Sarajevo, Travnik and Visegrad played
an important role on inter-cultural and inter-communal tolerance, it is
only the influence of outsiders, which serves to upset the state of
harmony. Here, I am thinking, for example of the arrival of Austro-
Hungarian forces in Visegrad as recounted Andric´’s The Bridge over the
Drina (1945)3 in what Lovrenovic´ has described as a ‘civilizing mission’
(148). Yet although the Austro-Hungarian Occupation (1878) and
Annexation (1908) of Bosnia-Herzegovina brought about tremendous
change and radical transformation, these events were also partly
responsible for affirming the national consciousness of the three
communities along ethno-nationalist rather than confessional lines, of
the Ottoman period. Thus, it is worth taking into account Zulfikarpasic´’s
reflection on his conviction that it was the forty-year period of Habsburg
occupation protected the Muslim population from the hegemonistic
ambitions of Serbia and Montenegro, backed by Russia and that the
struggle for autonomy in the Austro-Hungarian empire drew the Orthodox
Serbs and Muslims together within Bosnia-Hercegovina (24).
Yet, amongst westerners, there has been a tendency to judge the
Ottoman Empire by its nineteenth century decline, thus disregarding the
existence of inter-communal harmony and, concomitantly, the existence
of an Ottoman golden age in the sixteenth century. Of course, it is
quite understandable that the Balkanist view was largely formed in the
nineteenth century at a time when the Eastern Question was a major
issue in foreign policy and where every major power had a stake in
influencing events in South Eastern Europe in the struggle for the
European balance of power that had interests in the demise of Ottoman
power, hence the terminology of the time, with ‘Turkey’ being presented
as the ‘Sick Man of Europe’ and the ready resort to Orientalist discourse
by European writers, anthropologists and artists alike. Edward Said
(1978;39), is useful on this, whereby Orientals, especially Arabs, are:
… shown to be gullible, ‘devoid of energy and initiative’, much given
to ‘fulsome flattery’, intrigue, cunning, and unkindness to animals;
Orientals cannot walk on either a road or a pavement (their disordered 
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minds fail to understand what the clever European grasps immediately,
that roads and pavements are made for walking); Orientals are
inveterate liars, they are ‘lethargic and suspicious’, and in everything
oppose the clarity, directness, and nobility of the Anglo-Saxon race.
Applying this negative reading of the other to the Balkans one is
presented with a raft of essentialist descriptions of a barbarous Orient,
starting at the gates of Vienna, or when crossing the River Danube
between Buda and Pest. So, outside influence, and nineteenth century
social, economic and political tensions, such as the need for land reform
in Bosnia, are constructed against the background influence of liberationist
nationalism, which will eventually erupt as inter-ethnic conflicts. After
1878, the religious-based communities of Ottoman times become
increasingly secularised and constructed in ethnic nationalist terms, as
nationalist sentiments began to impact on local sentiments. With this
process arose the gradual erosion of Bosnian identity, as such, and the
recognition of Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims as
separate ethno-religious communities.
Set against the more balanced view of Bosnia’s cultural and political
heritage, expressed by writers such as Donia, Fine, Malcolm, Pehar and
Lovrenovic´, are the serried ranks of the essentialist writers, who find an
appeal in explaining away the raft of conflicts that have taken place in the
region since 1991, with reference to ‘ancient enmities’, blood-drenched
earth’ and ‘Balkan Ghosts’. But, when one reads that such an approach
has allegedly influenced the US State Department and President Clinton
in their policy making during the 1990s, with reference to Robert Kaplan’s
essentialist travelogue of the region (1993), then there is some cause
for concern. It was Kaplan who wrote that: ‘The Balkans were the
original Third World, long before the media coined the term’ (1993; xxiii)
in what he saw as being: ‘…a time-capsule world: a dim stage upon
which people raged, spilled blood, [and] experienced visions and ecstasies’
(ibid.; xxi) he continues in a similar essentialist, existential and ahistorical
vein, with:
Twentieth-century history came from the Balkans. Here men have
been isolated by poverty and ethnic rivalry, dooming them to hate.
Here politics has been reduced to a level of near anarchy that from
time to time in history has flowed up the Danube into Central Europe.
(ibid.; xxiii).
Maria Todorova’s reply to this sort of hysterical nonsense is that:
Herder’s Balkan Volksgeist has been virtually transformed into Kaplan’s
Balkan Ghosts, and that the only spectre that has been haunting western
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culture over the past two centuries has been the Balkans. (Todorova,
op. cit.; 187).
In a similar vein to Todorova, another academic, the UK-based George
Schöpflin (2000; 5), has commented on how it is ‘truly lazy’ to see
‘Good western nationalism (civic, democratic, peace-loving etc.) juxtaposed
against a bad eastern European nationalism (nasty, brutish and anything
but short…). And, what is worse, by this interpretation, and particularly
in its application to post-conflict rehabilitation, western illusions and
worse, have been projected onto eastern Europe, giving rise, not only
to poor political analysis, but also: ‘…to the effect that if only those
benighted Easterners could be shown the errors of their ways, they
would rapidly become Jeffersonian democrats’ (ibid.) Clearly we are
being dismissive in our treatment of communities in eastern Europe.
We treat them as tribal, primitive and backward peoples. I go further
and say that what we are doing is behaving as colonialists both in
thought and in deed.
Furthermore, there is nothing uniquely western, modern or liberal
about some of the key values and issues that confront us today. For
example, toleration cannot be claimed to be a value that applies solely
to ‘western civilisation’; neither is it necessarily modern, nor is it liberal.
Consider how toleration was practised in the Ottoman Empire at a
time when it was not practised against the ‘other’ in Christendom.
Witness the fanatical hatred of Jews in England during the Middle
Ages, which led to the massacre of the Jews of York in Clifford’s Tower
in 1190. Similarly, one should consider the persecution of the Jewish
population throughout the thirteenth century, with a plethora of legal
restrictions, intimidation and many acts of reprisal against the Jewish
population, following accusations of Jewish paschal ritual murders.4 All
this enmity and loathing culminated in the Edict of Expulsion of Jews
from England in 1290. In a similar vein, the Reconquista in medieval
Spain led to the economic exploitation of Jews, the infringement of
rights of converted Moors (Moriscos) and the spread of the Inquisition,
culminating in a bout of religious intolerance that led to the forced
exile of Muslims and Jews from Cordoba and Grenada (the vìa dolorosa)
in 1492.
To polarise the debate between being either for or against liberal
democracy, is to take a terribly impoverishing standpoint, and may in
its own way be another form of fundamentalism. Indeed, rather than 
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resulted in the arrest of 91 Jews and the hanging of 18.
anguish belatedly over the vìa dolorosa of ethnic cleansing and war
crimes that took place in BiH in the first half of the 1990s, the task
confronting both the international community and the local communities
in BiH is now to search for a via media in attitudes and policies that will
re-establish inter-cultural tolerance in Bosnia in the near future.
The persistence of misrepresentation despite the theoretical
analysis of identity formation and conflict
So, the Balkans have been marginalized, excluded and collectively
transmogrified into playing the role of Europe’s ‘other’, whilst some
communities in the so-called western Balkans, the ‘former’ Yugoslavia,
have been represented in the collective conscience as tribal peoples who
have been essentialised and stereotyped largely through a reductivist
media, which itself has built its narrative upon two centuries or more
of populist and, often pseudo-academic writing. Just as western
opinion has patronised, excluded and marginalized the peoples of
Africa and Asia in the past (as it is barely refraining from doing so in the
aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001, with its representation
of Islam), so it continues to do so with the Balkans. Indeed, the very
terms ‘former’ Yugoslavia and the now more popular ‘western Balkans’
are themselves redolent of western ‘othering’ intent, thereby distancing
the region once again from ‘mainstream’ Europe in thought word and
deed. The epithet ‘western Balkans’ has been totally rejected by Slovenes
who describe themselves as either central or southern European. Whilst
many Croats, prefer to be identified as central Europeans and disdain
the expression ‘Balkan’ as being pejorative in its meaning and implications,
as is the word Balkan itself. Perhaps one could adopt the expression
eastern Adriatic, but even this has a whiff of colonialist intent to it,
being the expression long-employed for the region by the British Foreign
and Commonwealth Office. What, then, are we to make of expressions
such as, ‘Balkan mentalities’, ‘Balkan savagery’ and ‘Balkan tribalism’,
which seem only to serve the purpose of relegating the region to a lower
category of civilisation?
Ultimately, one can criticise writers, such as Huntington and Kaplan,
for many things, but at the end of the day, the major problem with the
Clash of Civilizations theory is that rather than attempting to understand
the different cultures that are and have been in conflict, so as to lessen
the danger of conflict in the future, Huntington has simply extended the
Cold War conflict into a new ideology. Edward Said asks the following
fundamental questions in his critique of the Clash of Civilizations:
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Is it wise as an intellectual and scholarly expert to produce a
simplified map of the world and then hand it to generals and civilian
law-makers as a prescription for first comprehending and then acting
in the world? Doesn’t this method in effect prolong, exacerbate, and
deepen conflict? What does it do to minimize civilizational conflict?
Do we want a clash of civilizations? Doesn’t it mobilize nationalist
passions and therefore national murderousness? Shouldn’t we ask
the question, why is one doing this sort of thing: to understand or to
act? to mitigate or to aggravate the likelihood of conflict. (Said,
2000; 573).
Put another way, Said argues that thanks to Huntington, those
planners at the US Pentagon and the US defence industry experts who
had lost their jobs at the end of the Cold War, have now discovered a
new vocation for themselves and that the Clash of Civilizations is: ‘a
very brief and rather crudely articulated manual in the art of maintaining
a wartime status in the minds of Americans.’ (op. cit.; 571).
Certainly, this sort of literature would pose some concerns, with
regard to the level to which it has influenced those who work in BiH
and elsewhere, as members of the international community. One
wonders to what extent, those grounded in the writings of Kaplan,
Huntington et alia would be able to appreciate some of the finer
nuances of Bosnia’s complicated culturo-political heritage. Would they
not be all too quick to lay blame for daily irritations at the door of one
allegedly ‘blood thirsty’ group of South Slavs against another? The
writer has a political responsibility to his reading public after all. The
influence of this kind of essentialist literature could so easily serve to
aggravate and delay the process of post-conflict rehabilitation.
At several levels, both with regard to the everyday running of post-
conflict rehabilitation and also in the attitudes of the internationals
involved in these processes, one has a feeling that one is working in a
colonial situation. This is something which we should be made aware
of, because the emphasis on reductivist essentialism in our representation
of the Balkans and also the growing cry for a new ‘benign colonialism’
could lead to a worsening of the western management of post-conflict
situations rather than to its improvement. One key problem that I keep
identifying is that of negative attitudes held by members of the inter-
national community towards local communities involved in post-
conflict rehabilitation. This is something that is found, not only among
western political leaders, but also among people working on the
ground in the various NGOs and supra-national organisations, such as
the OSCE. It would seem to be an inherent problem in such organisations,
from those at the top, running right down to those working on the
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ground, in what can be described as little better than a post-modern
colonialist attitude. My argument is that given the recourse to greater
intervention from outside bodies, a blindness to local cultural factors
can result, which is, in turn, detrimental to any attempt at establishing
post-conflict rehabilitation, especially when one considers that cultural
difference has often been used as an ideological resource by contestants
and can even be an accelerant of conflict. We therefore need to be
aware of the role that culture plays in conflict resolution and post-conflict
rehabilitation.5 It might, therefore, be useful to digress at this stage,
and consider some of the theoretical analyses that underpin our under-
standing of the relationship between identity formation and conflict.
For a long time our understanding of identity had been located in
the nation and the state. This had certainly been the case for International
Relations, as for History and Conflict Studies. The dominance of the
state in the realist school of International Relations has served to minimise
the role of culture and more particularly the role of identity formation,
which all, in turn will affect any process of post conflict rehabilitation.
As such, the role of cultural identity has been rendered invisible. However,
it is becoming ever more apparent that nation-state identity may now
be less significant than other identities, particularly ethnic identities,
which ‘often generate greater loyalty than any national identification
to which an individual should normally subscribe.’ (Davies, 1996; 79).
Certainly, after the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, after
the collapse of the state in Somalia and Liberia, the crisis in Albania, or
even the fragility of Walloon-Flemish relations in Belgium or Quebecois
separatism in Canada, alongside the notions of failed states, pariah
states, fragile states or even imagined states (such as Padania), it becomes
more difficult to think of states in their armour-plated post-Westphalian
form. Against this background, our understanding of the processes of
identity formation form one of the greatest challenges to the international
order at the beginning of the twenty-first century, especially given that
identity politics, and in particular ethnic conflict have been central to
the events of the post-Cold War world. Since 1989, our awareness of
identities, other than nation-state identities has come to the fore,
particularly our understanding of the role of religion in identity formation
(Smith, 1991; Duizings, 2000), the role of the region (Guibernau,
1999; Ignatieff, 1993), gender (Yuval-Davis, 1997) and even the role of
the Internet and identity (Hables Gray, 1997; Ignatieff, 2000 and 
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5 The importance of culture to International Relations is well developed by Kevin
Avruch in his Culture and Conflict Resolution (1998) and also by Richard Davies in his
‘Ethnicity: Inside Out or Outside In’ in Krause and Renwick (1996).
Hudson, 2002). It is now generally accepted that individuals have
multiple identities and loyalties, so that identities are not static, but
malleable or in a state of constant flux (Krause & Renwick, 1996, xii).
Community and national identities are made up of lots of other Identities.
Put another way, the problem of assuming that there is a uniform
distribution of culture is that each group, institution or affiliation places
the individual in a different experiential world. No two individuals share
the same sociological location in a given population for example class,
religious, national or ethnic backgrounds), and as such these sociological
locations entail (sub-) cultural differences, so that any two individuals
can not share all cultural content perfectly. This is what Kevin Avruch
describes as the sociogenic reason for the non-uniform distribution of
culture (Avruch, 2000; 18).
Generally speaking, there are three approaches to ethnicity. The first is
generally referred to as primordial, and is normally associated with the
work of the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz. In this case ethnicity is seen as
being something beyond human control. It is something to which one is
born, whereby one is ‘bound to one’s kinsman’ through kinship and
language (Davies, 1996; 81). This is what Huntington would refer to as
what one is, whereby there is no free choice to one’s ethnic identity, that
this is a given that can not be changed. (Huntington, 1993; 5). Anthony
Smith, with reference to Van den Berghe (1967) warns us that an ethnic
community; ‘must be sharply differentiated from a race in the sense of a
social group that is held to possess unique hereditary biological traits that
allegedly determine the mental attributes of the group.’ (Smith, 1991;
21). Interestingly, Davies notes that many groups which have been
involved in so-called ‘primordial’ conflicts are not rooted deeply in history,
but rather are known to be recent historical creations (op. cit.; 82).
The second approach is referred to as situational, contextual or
circumstantial, whereby ethnicity is seen as being an adoptive identity,
which is voluntaristic rather than enforced. This approach is associated
with the work of another anthropologist, Federik Barth, whereby ethnicity
is seen as being a dynamic form of social organisation in which ethnic
communities are created and transformed by particular elites, so that
individuals are mobilised in the pursuit of power for the benefit of
individual or collective interests. (Davies; 83).
A third approach is that of cultural collectivities, and this type is
generally associated with the works of Anthony Smith, who sees the
primordial and the situational variants as being two poles or extremes.
This approach emphasises the myths of descent and historical memories
(Smith, 1991; 20), as ‘cultural-historical’ community identity, whereby
ethnic identity as a group is identified by non-group members; the
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‘them’ as opposed to the ‘us’, which leads us into the discourse of
exclusion and identity. Thus, according to Smith (ibid.), the ethnic
community or éthnie my be identified by a list of six main attributes:
1. A collective proper name
2. A myth of common ancestry
3. Shared historical memories
4. One or more differentiating elements of common culture
5. An association with a specific ‘homeland’
6. A sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population
For Anthony Smith,
It is the intellectuals —poets, musicians, painters, sculptors, novelists,
historians, archaeologists, playwrights, philologists, anthropologists and
folklorists— who have proposed and elaborated the concepts and
language of the nation and nationalism and have, through their
musings and research, given voice to wider aspirations that they have
conveyed in appropriate images, myths and symbols. (Smith, 1991; 93).
These intellectuals became the national awakeners who would use
culture and mythologies to forge an ethnic identity. Of course, culture
is inherently political, and the impact of culture upon identity, politics
and conflict needs to be fully addressed if one is to gain a better
understanding of the issues affecting international politics in the early
years of the twenty-first century. Culture can be used as an ideological
resource by contestants. It can, therefore, become a source, or an
accelerant of conflict. When culture is thus politically charged —usually
by nationalistic racialist or ethnic discourses— this can lead to genocide,
as has been demonstrated in Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia and, before
them, Nazi Germany (Avruch, 2000; 18).
Yet despite the theoretical interpretations and analyses underpinning
the nature of identity formation and conflict, there has been, since the
beginning of the 1990s, a revival of essentialist and reductivist talk and
writing based on the out-moded theme of ‘mentalities’, reflecting the
attitudes and interpretations of another age, and this has become
quite popular amongst some journalists, academics, intellectuals and
practitioners in the field, at the same time as influencing political
leaders and their policies. The problem was already being flagged up,
as early as 1994, by Bogdan Denitch, in his Ethnic Nationalism: The
Tragic Death of Yugoslavia, where he commented (136):
A major disservice to scholarship as well as to interethnic peace
has been performed by generations of national historians, ethnographic
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writers and poets who labored mightily in trying to prove the special
role and virtue of their own group.
If criticism is levelled at the national awakeners in the South Slav
states for stoking the fires of ethnic and nationalist identity, it may be
equally applied to western writers and particularly publishers in the 1990s
in their bid to quench the thirst for background knowledge of a reading
public who were finding it difficult to come to terms with what was
actually happening in former Yugoslavia. This makes one think of the
proliferation of reprints of old texts on Balkan history that were suddenly
issued in the 1990s, Among them: Howard Temperley’s History of Servia
(1912); the much-maligned Carnegie Report (1913)6; John Reed’s War in
Eastern Europe (1916); R.G.D. Laffan’s The Serbs (1917); Rebecca West’s
Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (1942), and, of course Robert Kaplan’s
ubiquitous Balkan Ghosts (1994), a travelogue of south-eastern Europe, in
which he tries to emulate the writing styles of his Balkanist forebears.
Basically, anything was being published in Great Britain and America,
that appeared to provide the reading public with the background to the
then current crises and conflicts, sadly fuelling, at the same time, the
stupid, pointless onslaught of misinformation and the rapid reaffirmation
of the Balkanist discourse. The reprinting of the books mentioned above
has provided us with the wrong kind of historical background, as they
were written in a style that might have been considered appropriate at
the time of writing, but has since become totally inappropriate, one
would have thought, for contemporary western liberal tastes. With the
passage of time these books have become little more than pseudo-
historic texts that have misrepresented the region to western readers and
no doubt, many publishers made a quick buck out of the process. It is
this misinformed liberal opinion, fuelled also by the writings, speeches,
practices and policies of certain academics, journalists, politicians,
practitioners and administrators alike, which has resulted in the
establishing of a ‘benign colonial regime’, an ‘open-ended occupation’,
‘post-modern colonialism’ and ‘colonisation with good intent’. 
Establishing post-modern colonialism in the world after Dayton
Some policy advisors, politicians and other commentators have also
begun to advocate a ‘benign imperialism’ or ‘benign colonial regimes’ 
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and this is reflected in particular, in the recent writings of Robert
Cooper, foreign affairs advisor to British Prime Minister Tony Blair.7
Indeed, quite a furore has broken out in the United Kingdom around
a paper entitled The Post-Modern State: Re-Ordering the World, which
was written by Robert Cooper, and published recently by the Foreign
Policy Centre. Cooper has advocated the need for ‘a new age of empire’,
in which western powers no longer have to follow international law in
their dealings with ‘old fashioned’ states, whereby they can use military
force independently of the United Nations and impose protectorates to
replace regimes which are see to ‘misgovern’. This is what Noam Chomsky
has labelled the ‘new military humanism’ —which he considers to be a
contradiction in terms, if ever there was one. By contrast, Cooper’s
articulate reasoning would argue that, as part of the ‘new military
humanism’, the bombing of Yugoslavia could be justified on ‘moral
grounds’ rather than legal ones.8
In reading his article, one sees that Cooper has divided the world
into three types of state: pre-modern, modern and post-modern. If the
pre-modern state represents chaos; and the modern state is quite
prepared to resort to war in a Clauswitzian sense as, presumably, an
extension of politics by other means, then the post-modern state no
longer thinks of security in terms of conquest or of going to war, but
rather in terms of transparency or ‘mutual interference’. By Cooper’s
definition, the proffered examples of pre-modern states are Somalia
and ‘until recently’ Afghanistan; whilst the examples of modern states
are India, Pakistan and China. By contrast, the most developed example
of the post-modern system is the European Union, which is seen to
‘represent security through transparency and transparency through
interdependence.’ Cooper goes on to add that the EU is more a trans-
national than a supra-national system, a voluntary association of states
rather than the subordination of states to a central power. (Op. cit.; 3).
The real bite in Cooper’s reasoning, comes with the following passage:
The challenge to the post-modern world is to get used to the idea
of double standards. Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of
laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-
fashioned kinds of states outside the post-modern continent of Europe,
we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era —force,
pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with 
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those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for
itself. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when operating in the
jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle.
And, for Cooper, the best way of dealing with pre-modern or failed
states is through colonisation, although he admits that colonisation per
se is unacceptable to post-modern states, nevertheless, he argues that
what is needed is: ‘…a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a
world of human rights and cosmopolitan values.’
By applying these values and principles to the Balkans we are
presented with the following:
Misgovernment, ethnic violence and crime in the Balkans pose a
threat to Europe. The response has been to create something like a
voluntary UN protectorate in Bosnia and Kosovo. It is no surprise that in
both cases the High Representative is European. Europe provides most
of the aid that keeps Bosnia and Kosovo running and most of the
soldiers (though the US presence is an indispensable stabilising factor). In
a further unprecedented move, the EU has offered unilateral free-market
access to all the countries of the former Yugoslavia for all products
including most agricultural produce. It is not just soldiers that come from
the international community; it is police, judges, prison officers, central
bankers and others. Elections are organised and monitored by the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Local
police are financed and trained by the UN. As auxiliaries to this effort
—in many areas indispensable to it— are over a hundred NGOs. 
Ultimately, for Cooper: ‘…the “imperial bureaucracy” must be under
control, accountable, and the servant, not the master, of the common-
wealth. Such an institution must be as dedicated to liberty and democracy
as its constituent parts.’
At the end of the day, post-modern colonialism may have become the
reality. One British political scientist, who has written much about the
Balkans in the post-Dayton world is David Chandler. He, by contrast, objects
to the terminology employed by Cooper as being ‘the old-fashioned
language of realpolitik and western power’, and he has advocated dressing
it up in what some might refer to as typical rhetorical ‘Blair-speak’
(‘universally empowering’, ‘equality of human dignity’, ‘international civil
society’ and the ‘duties of cosmopolitan citizenship’ with the empowerment
of ‘local voices’, the provision of ‘capacity-building’ and supporting the
lengthy process of ‘democratisation’ and ‘civil society building’).9
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But, I think that the biggest risk here is what underlies the various
interpretations of our contemporary understanding of international
relations, with the misrepresentations of other communities and peoples,
which makes western thought, opinion and policy truly colonial, if not
xenophobic, not only in deed, but also in spirit.
This development has not eluded Bosnian intellectuals. In seeking an
alternative to what he describes as an impasse in his recently published
article in Forum Bosnae, on the civic elements of compromise in the
crippling implementation of the Dayton Agreement (2002),10 Drazen
Pehar acknowledges that one option might be to transform Bosnia into a
protectorate in which the OHR (Office of the High Representative) would
probably be the one to take the role of a ‘BiH emperor’ who would ‘rule
over a Bosnia in a fashion not unlike that of the period of Austro-
Hungarian rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He
admits that in such a scenario there would be little sense of compromise
in Bosnia and that there would be the strong likelihood that: ‘the leading
politicians would continue in their underground work on planning for the
period following the ‘colonial conquest of the High Representative’, when
the first chance to fight for pre-Dayton political objectives would most
likely be taken. Pehar also offers the possibility of Bosnia portioning itself
into a loose confederation of three entities, although he does not rule out
the possibility of this being achieved by resorting to further violence. This
is a position I share, in the continued belief in the important security role
that is being played by SFOR in maintaining stability in the region.
Concomitant with the musings of IR theorists and politicians, we have
also identified a western elitist view of the perceived incapacity of so-
called Balkan peoples to cope with democracy and, in a linguistic register
that is redolent of Howard Temperley’s imperialist prose style of the early
twentieth century, that they are ‘even incapable of governing themselves’,
thus legitimising the growth and the empowerment of international
mandates in the region. David Chandler, in his excellent Bosnia: Faking
Democracy after Dayton (1999), recounts an interview he held with Carl
Westerndorp, the one-time High Representative, based in Sarajevo, who
seems to be imbued with an essentialist view of the local population: ‘It is
ugly to democratise a country using force, but where you have such
abnormal mentality in the leadership [my emphasis], then you have to do
this.’ (Chandler, 1997; 133). Westerndorp’s reasons for saying this serve,
no doubt, as an attempt to both justify and empower the OHR’s role in
BiH, post-Dayton, and particularly after the 1997 Bonn PIC (Peace 
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Implementation Council), which gave the OHR de facto colonial powers,
thus transmogrifying the High Representative into a post-modern colonial
governor. Nevertheless, it says something too of the contempt for the
local population held by individuals in such powerful positions, which is
not that far removed from western attitudes towards the Balkans
throughout the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries.
Little hope of escape from reductivism and essentialism seems to
be provided by other political leaders; even David Owen felt moved to
write the following in the introduction to his book, Balkan Odyssey:
History points to a tradition in the Balkans of a readiness to solve
disputes by taking up arms…it points to a culture of violence…[and]
dark and virulent nationalism. (1995; 3)
Sadly, many western academics and politicians have fallen into this
trap and continue to do so. It is this reductivist, essentialist approach
that keeps re-emerging, probably out of a fear of getting embroiled in
a perceived quagmire of Balkan politics.
How many times has one heard or read this kind of rhetoric applied to
the Balkans? Ever since I first started studying southeast European history
at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London,
in the mid-1970s, I have come across this western disdain for the Balkan
other. I well remember the first time I came across Howard Temperley’s
History of Servia and the claim, reflected above by Westerndorp, that the
Slavs are ‘incapable of self-government’. So, here we are again, in the
opening years of a new century, repeating the same old mantra, that the
peoples of the Balkans are ill-suited to democracy and they are unable to
govern themselves. Plus ça change…
What has happened in BiH can easily be carried across to Kosovo.
With Rambouillet as a successor to Dayton and the imposition of an
international system that makes it well-nigh impossible for Albanian
Kosovar institutions to regulate themselves —to say nothing of the
situation for the Serbs, the ethnic Turks, Muslim Bosnjaks and the
Roma. Are we not sowing the seeds that will reap a bitter harvest?
But, in this case, the blame is not just on liberal opinion and an ill-
informed liberal press, but fairly and squarely upon those international
organisations —primarily the OHR (Office of the High Representative),
the UN and the OSCE, to say nothing of the IMF, the EU and the myriad
of NGOs (estimated at some 200 BiH alone) which have transformed
Sarajevo into the ‘world capital of interventionism’.11
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Another British academic, Adam Burgess, underlines the ‘virtually
colonial character of relations’ between western and eastern Europe
(107), arising from what is essentially western arrogance in its attitudes
to the East, with the West, on a ‘moral mission’ (110) to the ‘politically
unruly natives’ (111). This sentiment is similar to the concern expressed
by Said about the appeal of ‘running the affairs of lesser peoples’
(1994; xxvi), or his comment on the impact of missionaries on indigenous
populations in the past, or the ‘prevailing western consensus that has
come to regard the Third World as an atrocious nuisance, a culturally
and politically inferior place.’ (Ibid.; 31). This is a process to which Said
refers elsewhere in his work, with reference to Rudyard Kipling, as
‘taking up the white man’s burden.’ Extending the thrust of this logic
elsewhere, to the case of the new protectorates established by the
international community in BiH, since 1995, and in Kosovo, since
1999, they may be seen as being little more than the ‘benign colonial
regime’, referred to above, with OSCE, SFOR and KFOR and the raft of
other inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations serving
as the somewhat hamstrung agents of western imperialism and
hypocrisy, in the spirit of ‘new interventionism’ (Chomsky; 1999) that
was exemplified by NATO’s war against Yugoslavia in 1999.
But, in the case of the OHR, we are concerned not only with
attitudes, but also with outcome. Clearly, the OHR, which has been
transmogrified into a colonial authority which has: ‘more autocratic
control than even the colonial administrators of the past’, (Chandler;
273) placed alongside the OSCE and NATO has: ‘…removed all policy-
making capacity from Bosnian institutions’ (ibid.; 274), thus delaying
and incapacitating local government in what has become little more
than a ‘US-run international protectorate in BiH’ (ibid.). The power of
the High Representative has been reinforced by the Bonn PIC of 1997,
which has given the High Representative the power to impose
legislation directly, giving the international community both executive
and legislative control over a formerly independent state. This, in effect,
is the new post-modern version of colonialism —the return of the
colonial protectorate.
The upshot of all of this is that elected majorities have been given
little control over policy-making. Instead, high-handed international
rule has disempowered the Bosnian people and their representatives
(Chandler; 278). The reasoning behind this process is that the Bosnian
entities and their representatives are considered to be ill-suited to
democracy and unable to govern themselves, in a process which has
legitimised the growth of international mandates in the region. Thus
the Balkanist discourse continues to cloud western thinking and one is
THE RETURN OF THE COLONIAL PROTECTORATE: COLONISATION WITH GOOD INTENT... 121
rather reminded of Temperley’s mistrust of the South Slav’s capacity for
self-rule, which he expressed in 1912.
My own experience as an ‘international’ working on the ground;
working at a grass roots level, on temporary secondment to the OSCE,
in five elections in the Yugoslav successor states, has been the growing
awareness and unease at how some of my fellow ‘internationals’ see
themselves as fulfilling the role of some kind of mission civilisatrice,
bringing peace, democracy and harmony, or at least some semblance
of civil society to the restless and obdurate natives. For example, I well
remember the patronising attitude of two female American colleagues
towards their drivers, interpreters and the chairmen of the polling
station committees, with whom they were supposed to be working as
advisors. By the end of the election period in BiH, in November 2000,
the two individuals, who also claimed to have been working for or to
have had connections with the US State Department, had managed to
have the leading local representatives of the OSCE team in the town
where were based in eastern Hercegovina, removed from office.
Conclusion
The impact of inter-cultural relations on post-conflict rehabilitation
is an issue of considerable importance to both our understanding of
contemporary international politics and the way in which we deal with
post-conflict situations on the ground. This will continue to constitute a
major challenge for the immediate future, particularly in the aftermath
of September 11 which has engendered the creation of a ‘war against
terrorism’, which has led to the current post-conflict situation in
Afghanistan and the war against Iraq. But rather than strengthen the
autonomy and self-confidence of local peoples, it would seem that the
hands-on role of enforcing democracy has done little more than serve
to strengthen the United States-led international community. This
would seem to be the case in BiH, where rather than bringing disparate
communities together, factional, identity-led politics have been
strengthened, as has been demonstrated by the raft of OSCE-organised
elections which have taken place since 1996, which have resulted in
little more than voting along ethnic lines. By contrast, the international
community has been strengthened and an empowered OHR has
become little more than a post-modern colonial governor. If anything
goes wrong, they, the Bosnians get the blame for it, in criticism that
resorts to the usual reductivist, essentialist and stereotypical clichés of
exclusionism which reflect two centuries of Balkanist discourse.
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There are perhaps two solutions to the problem. The first is to ensure
sensitivity and an in-depth knowledge of the history, culture and identity
of BiH amongst those members of the international community working
in the field. This would be enhanced by a moderate working knowledge
of Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian, and by a greater investment in training
and education in area studies and cultural politics at a university level, in
West European countries and in the United States. 
The second solution would be to give full encouragement to local
initiatives, such as the Sarajevo-based non-governmental organisation,
International Forum Bosnae (IFB) with its mission of building a new
intellectual community in BiH, by inspiring and promoting research
networking, debate and research into the culture, history, language,
literature, philosophy and politics of BiH. So that, by enhancing an
understanding of the unity and diversity of BiH, the essential basis for
eliminating the tensions and mistrust that have been composed on and
in the society of BiH may be provided.
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The Media and Conflict Prevention: 
Warning or Monitoring? The Case of Drvar, Bosnia
Victoria Firmo-Fontan
Introduction
Conflict prevention seems to be a recurring theme within the
discipline of peace studies. While some argue that conflict prevention lies
at the core of human decency, more pragmatic actors rely on its cost
effectiveness, based on the idea that, as the ‘civilized world’ will end
up paying for the reconstruction of countries emerging from years of
atavistic civil strife, conflict prevention should be used to fight these
‘deviant tendencies’ at their roots. This paper will explore the idea that
conflict prevention lies more in Margalit’s (1999) notion of building a
‘decent society’, than that of preventing latent conflicts from re-appearing
at a later stage. Conflict prevention will be analyzed in this article
specifically as the prevention of further conflict within post-conflict
environments. The role of the media in the prevention of further armed
conflict will be assessed.
Indeed, while placed at the forefront of the information debate,
the media, whether local or international, may be utilized to play a
warning role in conflict prevention. Rather than fall exclusively within a
closed academic debate, the concepts raised in this paper should be
seen as a potential way to facilitate the media’s action in conflict
prevention, as well as to provide a reflection of the Western imposition
of values and models that do not necessarily match the field’s aspirations
and needs, and that, eventually, lead to a resurgence in ethnic conflict.
The municipality of Drvar, in eastern Bosnia, will provide a case study to
that effect, and will show how a subtle restructuring of traditional
media coverage of the area could assist in post-conflict rehabilitation,
and more importantly in the resolution of ongoing, and in the prevention
of future, conflicts.
1. The media: witness or monitor?
The role of the media in post-conflict rehabilitation remains under-
studied, partly for reason that the link between post-conflict rehabilitation
and conflict prevention is not obvious to all observers, particularly to
international actors on the field. As the media industry stands, post-
conflict situations that do not harbor open dissidence between formerly
warring groups are seldom reported on: they constitute ‘old news’.
This was the case of Iraq in late May 2003, when many foreign news
editors were considering a withdrawal of their reporting teams. Iraq
was rapidly fading away from prime time, at a time when the media
could have been allowed to act as a warning agent, in preventing the
escalation of violence between the growing Iraqi resistance and Coalition
troops. Indeed, many reporters complained to the author of the
disinterest that they faced when communicating the situation to their
editors. A free-lance journalist lamented to the author, “they only want
to hear of mass graves back in Paris, the resistance is mounting, but they
are not interested”.1 Iraq reappeared in the news when the situation had
gotten out of hand and the US army was facing one attack a day or
more. Often, the mere mention of post-conflict rehabilitation suggests
that a conflict has ended, which is not necessarily the case for every
conflict. Of importance here lies the rationale of peace, which can
either be negative, a mere absence of conflict, or positive, bringing
people to live together again. The former was the case in Iraq. What
becomes apparent in an increasing number of post-conflict environments
is that armed conflict might not be waged as such, but that different
parties in the former conflict have not resolved their pre-war grievances.
A post-conflict environment can therefore develop into a time-bomb.
Could the media play a role in defusing this time-bomb? If so, which
role would it be: prevention or warning?
1.1. Which role for the media?
First and foremost, which role can be ascribed to the media? Would
a preventive role, or any role at all, be ethical? Would the implication
of a role not corrupt its vital precepts of press freedom? What are the
media and what should they tend to be? When observing the behaviour
of news outlets in a conflict or post-conflict environment, one is struck 
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by the different dimensions that reporting can take.2 One confines the
journalist to the role of scribe, reporting events as they seem to occur,
sticking to filing deadlines and word-counts granted by an almighty
editor in a remote and secure office. The scribe, in his descriptive role,
will not question his editor’s choices, and tends, either through time or
financial pressure, to attend official press briefings. Investigative journalism
seems to be remote from the working ethics of the scribe, who sees his
or her role as being a ‘witness of history’. Scribes who rebel may suffer
the fate of CNN reporter Peter Arnett, sacked for interviewing the Iraqi
military during the war, and labelled a traitor by many of his peers.
Indeed, when the author attempted to break into the world of
journalism, she was repeatedly told that she should not be lecturing in
her articles, that a ‘report’ was meant to highlight facts, and that only
‘feature’ articles allowed analyses and comparisons to be drawn. The
fact that the media is split between these two ethics would not be of
such concern if feature articles were not usually confined to a newspaper’s
back pages, or a television bulletin’s last minutes. Contrasting with the
‘scribe’ type of media activity, a second dimension, found in some feature
reports though rarely in news pieces, places the individual as a monitor
of the centres of power, questioning and assessing political decisions,
placing situations in their deeper context, and acting as a watchdog for
taxpayers and voters. Such a reporter will try to ensure that decisions
made on behalf of the public are ethically sound, and will seek the truth
by investigating all sides of a story. A ‘monitor’ of media professional
will be accountable to the public sphere, while the ‘scribe’ will be
accountable to power, whether it emanates from his media outlet, or
his government. However, monitoring centres of power is a hazardous
activity which necessitates strong editorial support. It is therefore not
affordable for all journalists, who may have other priorities, such as
ensuring their families’ future. As a matter of fact, very few members
of Fox News working in Iraq during and after the second Gulf War
showed any respect for their network’s choice to obliterate the truth to
the American public.3 However, they chose to comply with editorial
decisions in order to survive, just as some media outlets choose to rally
around the flag in times of war in order to gain necessary governmental
support. If the media were not an industry, then a monitoring, warning
and preventive role could be ascribed to its practitioners. However, as 
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2003.
the corporate nature of the media stands, it is unreasonable to hope
for absolute integrity in reporting. While some journalists may be
afforded the luxury of monitoring centres of power, most can only aspire
to becoming more ethical scribes. The role of the media in conflict
prevention is therefore one prone to wishful thinking, especially when
the prevention of conflict may not be on the political agenda of the
governments or corporations concerned. The following analysis will
therefore assume that the media, that is to say some reporters, could
place themselves in a position to adopt a preventive role when following
certain guidelines. It is not the author’s wish to admonish the media
industry, or to demand integrity from every journalist. This article merely
aims to explain how an analysis by the media of a given conflict situation
could help defuse its potentially lethal consequences, either through
warning or prevention. Iraq is too volatile a topic, so Bosnia-Herzegovina
will be used as an illustration of how prevention of further conflict may
be possible.
1.2. Understanding conflict development to inform accurately and/or
prevent further conflict
The media could be given a specific role in post-conflict rehabilitation
and conflict prevention, should they choose to accept it, through being
given the tools to apply a suitable understanding of post-conflict
environments. Murray’s (1997) conflict life cycle seems to provide an
appropriate link between post-conflict rehabilitation and the prevention
of further conflict, and alludes to the idea that inappropriate post-
conflict rehabilitation can lead to a recurrence of conflicts. By reporting
on a situation while bearing in mind some simple precepts of conflict
development, the media could act as a safeguard against the deepening
of a volatile situation in where there is an absence of open conflict (a
‘negative peace’). While the relationship between grass-roots rehabilitation
and conflict prevention is of crucial importance, one should be cautious
as to why such a link needs to be emphasized. One aspect of media
coverage of the Balkans could be corrupted, as it has been in the past,
by a tendency on the part of the international media to report from an
essentialist perspective, based on assumptions of endemic ethnic hatred
and the ‘Othering’ of the Balkan natives (Hudson, 2002). The life-conflict
cycle should not be applied in this light, but as a means of understanding
and addressing the failures of key players, past and present, in the
region’s politics, in order to warn, and prevent failures from becoming
causes for conflict escalation. The aforementioned theory will be
employed as a means to understand the role of the international
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community4, including the media, as an entity that tends to act more
as a ‘fire brigade’ than a proactive entity. A potential warning role for
the media will be explored in this light. 
A media interpretation of the conflict life cycle (see figure 1.1)
builds its strength on a common understanding of conflict development. 
STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT ELEMENTS
Historical context Territory
Group disadvantage Power
Group awareness Religion
Reaction (media coverage leading to IC reaction) Culture
Accommodation Politics
Ethnicity
Perceptions
Actors
Figure 1.1
Conflict dynamics and parameters. Source: Murray, 1997
It identifies various parameters linked to history, group dynamics,
and conflict accommodation, alluding to the idea that the international
community, mostly through media awareness, only reacts to a situation
when the group in question fully asserts its own perceived deprivation.
The dimension of historical context can be a perceived episode in the
group’s history, such as the battle of Kosovo Polje for the Serb and
Kosovo-Albanian communities, or the WW2 Croatian Ustashe regime,
allegedly responsible for the death of thousands of Serbs. Of importance
at this point is not the event in itself, but the perception of it, followed
by the interpretation and integration of alleged events within the
national consciousness. Minority disadvantage can also be an important
factor: examples include the scarce or non-existent allocation of civil
service jobs for the Kosovo-Albanian community in the province of
Kosovo, and the disparities in the provision of housing, an issue at the
core of ethnic discontent in post-war Drvar. Minority awareness then
comes as natural result of minority disadvantage, and can be either
awareness of the minority, like Serbian concerns for the Serb minorities 
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as well as the international agencies, non-governmental and others, active in post-conflict
environments.
of Croatian Krajina, or more commonly experienced by the minority.
The ensuing reaction can then stem from this awareness, and be used
to justify a military campaign, such as Milosevic’s campaign to ‘protect
Krajina Serbs’ in the early 1990s, either from the minority or from the
state. Many elements can contribute to these parameters, and should
also be analyzed by the media and international actors involved in either
conflict prevention or post-conflict rehabilitation. They range from
territorial grievances, to issues of power, religion, culture, politics and
ethnic identity. The media’s failure to look into these dimensions and
parameters has resulted at best in the condescending over-simplification
of conflict reporting, and at worst in the unquestioning validation of
‘rogue’ foreign policies (Firmo-Fontan, 2002). 
When matched to a schematic expression of conflict development,
these parameters could promote intervention at level ‘three plus’ of the
following chart, resulting in a preventive approach for future conflicts
(see figure 1.2). 
Figure 1.2
Conflict-life cycle and conflict prevention
At present, the trend is for media reporting to intervene in late
phase one, namely peacekeeping, while the International Community
tends to intervene reluctantly during late phase one or more willingly
during phase two, at the negotiating level. The failure to draw a link
between stages one and three, that is to say, the failure to understand
how not addressing original grievances may lead to a community re-
mobilizing politically in the future, could lead to further conflict developing.
While the media should ideally act as a warning agent for the initial
prevention of a conflict, they should therefore also be present in post-
conflict settings, to monitor advances that have been made since a
Level of
violence
1 Peacekeeping
2 Peacemaking
3 Peacebuilding
3 + Prevention
Time
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cease-fire was brokered. In this light, the media could therefore act at all
stages of conflict, not only late in phase one, and not only as a witness.
2. Practical application of life-conflict cycle to monitoring 
post-conflict rehabilitation
The rest of this paper is dedicated to the application of this model
to a concrete situation, that of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to a) show
how the media interact with the present situation, and b) how the
International Community (IC) addresses the grievances and factors that
led to the conflict. The data concerning Drvar were collected up to
March 2002, the time of the Coimbra seminar.5
2.1. Overview of the Dayton Agreement
The General Framework Agreement for Peace, negotiated in Dayton,
Ohio, and signed in Paris on December 14th 1995, had the positive
result of stopping the war and preventing more lives from being lost. It
also created a state whose executive powers were to lie in the hands of
an international body specifically created for the task of implementing the
civilian aspects of this agreement, the Office of the High Representative
(OHR), and whose entities were to be separated between the Republika
Srpska and the Bosnian-Croat Federation. The international structure
currently in charge of the implementation of the Dayton agreement is
mainly composed of the aforementioned OHR, the Organisation for
Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the International Police
Task Force (IPTF), the United Nations Civil Affairs organisation (UNCA),
and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). 
The situation of Drvar municipality was chosen for review for several
reasons. Drvar has many specific characteristics that make it a unique case
in post-Dayton Bosnia: its population of 97 % Serbs before the war
was ‘ethnically cleansed’ in September 1995, and replaced by a Croat
population of displaced persons (DPs) that had never previously lived in
Drvar. It is also the largest area, outside Sarajevo, to which Serbs have
returned, despite obstacles put forward by both communities, in the RS
and the Federation, respectively. It is believed that the implementation
of the Dayton Peace Accord in this area has been overlooked since the
THE MEDIA AND CONFLICT PREVENTION: WARNING OR MONITORING?... 131
5 The situation has subsequently improved, as a result of OSCE Human Rights
Officer Lucio Valerio Sarandrea’s commitment to restoring the rule of law. 
end of the war, for two main reasons: first, the lack of professional
involvement and dedication from key IC players in the area; second,
the political isolation of the municipality as a minority in the Croatian
Canton 10, reinforced by a negative role played by the local media.
A brief statement explaining each agency’s theoretical role in town
will exemplify how Dayton is to be implemented on the ground. The
OHR was created as the instrument through which the IC would “monitor
the implementation of the peace settlement”.6 Its principal role would be
to facilitate the return of refugees to their pre-war environment and
ensure a sustainability of returns. The process of returns has been halted
on several occasions in the past by OHR Special Envoy to Livno, also
covering the Drvar area. The OHR Special Envoy allegedly attempted to
slow-down the returning process to Drvar until the arrival of newly
appointed OSCE HR Officer in August 2001. Up to March 2002, and six
years after Dayton, only 140 “evictions” had taken place, even though
an “eviction” in Drvar generally involved an already vacant housing
unit and the spontaneous delivery of keys. The International Police Task
Force’s role in Drvar is to monitor and advise local police with the
objective of “changing the primary focus of the police from the
security of the state to that of the individual”.7 The UN Civil Affairs role
is to advise the IPTF on the local political situation. The OSCE local field
office is composed of a representative of the Human Rights Department
and one from the Democratization Department. The Human Rights
department’s heavy workload concentrates mainly on the implemen-
tation of property law, while addressing sustainability of return issues on
an ad hoc basis. The Democratization Department’s role is to implement
tools provided by the Head Office, concerning the co-ordination and
facilitation of civil society, specific issues of good governance that in
Drvar’s case do not match with events in the field, and the development
of local political parties, which can only operate within a designated
Political Resource Centre situated an hour and a half from Drvar. The
implementation of an inadequate DMC mandate in Drvar corresponds
in practice to the organization of sporadic round-table events. The role
of the UNHCR in Drvar is of a unique kind when compared to other
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effort so long as required, rehabilitation of the infrastructure and economic reconstruction;
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human rights and the return of displaced persons and refugees; and the holding of free
and fair elections.
7 UNMIBH Fact sheet.
UNHCR mandated areas: the primary role of the UNHCR in BiH’s is to
facilitate the returnee process, while providing direct assistance in
rebuilding housing units. 
Seven years since the end of the Dayton Peace Accord and over $5
billion of aid later, what is the situation in the field?8 More importantly,
how does it relate to the life-conflict cycle presented above, structurally
and in relation to the media?
2.2. Vulnerable groups and current issues in Drvar
According to the precepts of the life-conflict cycle, key vulnerable
groups can be identified in post-war Drvar. They are the refugee returnees,
who return to their legally held pre-war accommodation; the displaced,
who presently occupy accommodation illegally; women, who are econ-
omically marginalized; and young people, who remain politicized and
polarized.
2.2.1. RETURNEES
Returnees in Drvar are the most vulnerable group in the municipality,
due to the ethnic composition of the returnee population, which is
virtually 100 % Serb. Before the ethnic cleansing of the town by the
Hrvatsko Vijece Obrane (HVO), the Croat army, in September 1995, the
town was 97 % Serb. As a direct result of the HVO’s arrival in Drvar, Croats
displaced from central BiH moved into accommodation abandoned by
Serbs, and were promised by the HDZ that they would never have to
leave Drvar. The appendix provided demonstrates the HDZ commitment
to the ethnic cleansing of Drvar at the time. Of importance here is also
the fact that the aforementioned document was distributed to Croat
refugees beyond BiH’s frontiers, mainly among the Croat refugee
community based in Germany. 
The time has come for property law to be implemented in Drvar,
which of course is a deeply resented fact among the displaced population.
History has been re-interpreted by both communities to their advantage.
While the Serb community states that the town was ‘theirs’ before
September 1995, and the Croat community, among them the local
Parish Priest Dom Zjelko, argue that the town was ethnically cleansed
during WW2; others go further back in time to argue that the town 
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was ethnically cleansed more than 100 years ago.9 As historical parameters
could stretch out ad infinitum, the present project will focus on property
law and its implementation according to deeds and claims related to
pre-war property occupation. Many businesses in Drvar fall under the
Croat-owned Finvest Company umbrella, and a majority of others simply
belong to Croat displaced. Prices are displayed in most shops in Croatian
Kunas. Moreover, out of the public apparatuses, only the municipality
falls under Returnee control (through elections). 
As a result, the returnee population faces the following problems.
They are provided with limited health care, there are no Serb doctors
and Serb returnees usually pay higher prices for medical treatment. No
social security or pension system is made available to returnees; in
practice the only pension available is for HVO veterans. The local school
curriculum is entirely Croat, and biased against returnees. Returnees do
not benefit from any employment opportunities in the public sector,
comprising the post office, the electrical company and the local hospital,
excluding the office of the Serb Mayor. As virtually all businesses in
town belong to Croats, including occupied business premises, returnees
are employed only through Serb businesses. Access to public resources
like phone lines, mail or electricity is also restricted. Ms. Mira Popovic,
head of the Serb Women’s NGO Lasta, was told by Mr Neven Maric,
Director of Post Office and former local HDZ leader, that she would
never get a phone line because she was involved with Lasta. She has
been waiting to be re-connected for the last three years, while ‘others’
—displaced persons moving into the town— can get a line in less than
five days. Mr. Maric was repeatedly approached by the IC on the issue
and to this day has not reconnected Ms. Popovic. This unfortunate
example can also be applied to other all other services controlled by
the Croat community.
Security is also a concern, the local police force is comprised of 60 %
Croat officers. In order to match the ethnic composition of the town, a
Serb chief of police has recently been appointed. This will sustain the
deadlock concerning the efficiency of policing in town, almost exclusively
dedicated to traffic offenses. The presence of the Croat army in the
town does nothing to ease the tension. The absence of a public prosecutor
has also been detrimental to the returnee process, among other
problems. It remains a common occurrence that houses vacated by DPs
are vandalized before being abandoned. The army presence also causes 
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can be found in ‘Impunity in Drvar’, International Crisis Group Balkans report No. 40, 20
August 1998. These allegations remain ‘on the grapevine’ to this day.
obvious resentment from the Serb community, as most soldiers are
illegal occupants.10
The relationship between the municipal authorities and the Canton
10 Government is also of concern, and directly contradicts the Dayton
idea of providing a working framework to facilitate the returning process.
As the governing body, forming part of the Bosnian-Croat Federation,
the Canton 10 Government is perceived by the returning population as
obstructing the municipal government of Drvar. The division of offices
and tasks between the Canton 10 Government and the municipality of
Drvar is indeed impeding the returning process at many levels,
including most importantly education and municipal governance. The
appointment of teachers falls under Canton 10 jurisdiction, as well as
the establishment of the school curriculum. The Canton 10 Government
has no intention of addressing the education situation in Drvar. Of
relevance in the case of Drvar is that, under the Dayton agreement, the
Serb returnees are considered as a minority under Federal Law. They
therefore do not hold the same rights as the Croats or Bosnians. The
Canton 10 Government is therefore under no obligation to provide
mixed education. The issue clearly falls under the remit of the OHR,
whose over-cautious attitude over the past seven years needs to be
challenged swiftly. One project of mixed education has been carried out
in a primary school located in the village of Bastasi, in 1998. Concerning
municipal governance, the budgetary situation of Drvar remains
precarious. While all the key industries have been hastily privatized,
leaving the municipality with no directly generated income, the
municipality’s forestry resources are allegedly being illegally logged out
by the Croat owned Finvest Company.11 Finvest is evading payment of
customs duties to the municipality. It is worth mentioning that in 1998,
the Federation Parliament voted to partly devolve responsibility for forest
management to the cantons. These operations are therefore granted
tacit authorization by the Canton 10 authorities. 
2.2.2. DISPLACED PEOPLE
After being told that they were never to be forced out of Drvar, the
displaced population is left confused by the application of the rule of
law, resulting in unavoidable evictions. They feel vulnerable, marginalized 
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and let down by the national HDZ. They recently have been politicized
under the banner of the local, Drvar-based HDZ, whose Head is the
local mafia boss and petty criminal Drago Tokmadzjia. While their living
conditions are considerably easier than those of the returnees, they
perceive themselves as direct victims of the International Community,
and the OSCE in particular. The displaced population (DP) needs increased
awareness as to what is the role of the International Community through
radio shows and constant representation. For the moment, Radio Drvar
sides against the any IC efforts to carry out evictions, where regular
broadcasts vilify members of the IC as well as OSCE local staff. Local
politicians, including Mr Maric and Tokmadzjia regularly appear on air
to criticize the IC and provoke unrest. Death threats to the IC are a
common occurrence. The media also play a negative role, backing most
of Radio Drvar’s statements. For instance, a Dnevni List article of 22
February 2002 stated that “Lucio Valerio Sarandrea … want[s] to
systematically expel Croats from Drvar”. These actions are extremely
detrimental to public order and post-conflict rehabilitation in Drvar. So
far, the OHR, whose mandate it is to regulate the press, has done
nothing to address the situation. 
2.2.3. WOMEN
In Drvar, the vulnerability of women is the indirect result of the
politicization of the two main women’s NGOs, ‘Lasta’ and ‘Zena 47’,
which have been present in Drvar since 1998 and fall under the
returnee/displaced axis. While aware that they need to appear to co-
operate and to show their goodwill in order to get funding, they do
not co-operate on a daily basis. In the rare event that they write project
proposals together, they are known to ‘take the money and run’ back
to their respective offices. They actually share the same premises and
have been given co-existence training by the Political Resource Centre
in Livno under an UNHCR initiative. They need to be introduced to an
idea of accountability and sustainability after having being given funding
for a project. This represents a long-term solution to breaking the
returnee/displaced axis (they have had numerous training sessions on
co-existence and have ‘heard it all before’). The consequences of this
for women in general are that there is no gender awareness in Drvar,
female participation in local politics is negligible, and as there are limited
employment opportunities, equality concerns are not a priority. 
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2.2.4. YOUNG PEOPLE
In Drvar, the youth NGO sector seems more open to interethnic
activities. The last summer camp hosted a wide range of youth groups
(out of 30 participants). However, their day-to-day interaction —or lack
of it— suggests that they fall under the umbrella of their respective
‘mother’ associations: the Serb/returnee ‘Friends’ youth association
under the ‘Lasta’ umbrella, and the Croat/displaced ‘Inside’ youth
association under ‘Association for the Welfare of the Displaced’
umbrella.
The youth organizations do not operate in total independence from
their umbrella organizations, and they need to be encouraged into
distancing themselves from them. The latest initiative of the IC was a
Halloween party designed to bring the younger members of the youth
community together through a series of games and presentations. The
initiative failed as the groups, comprising members as young as six
years old, polarized into intense competition.
One more issue is that of transportation for youth parliament
meetings in Livno. As public transport is poor throughout Canton 10, a
rapprochement of all Canton 10 youth NGOs has been made almost
impossible because of logistical problems. 
Education also represents a crucial element in the development of
the youth in Drvar. Research on the transmission of ethnic identity
within a conflict environment identifies schools as the most important
environment for ethnic polarization to occur and manifest itself.12 In a
post-conflict environment like Drvar, the problem is emphasized by the
lack of consensus over schooling. At present, the only secondary school
in town falls under a strong Croat nationalist influence. Teaching staff
and curricula are strictly Croat. All local children, either returnees or
displaced, are subjected to the same biased and outdated education.
As mentioned earlier, the OHR, partly mandated for education
rehabilitation, took the initiative in 1998 to introduce a Serb curriculum
and teachers at the Bastasi primary school. The project, supposed to be
a success, has not been extended to the rest of the Drvar municipality. 
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2.3. Priorities for the improvement of citizens’ quality of life
2.3.1. INITIATIVES PREVIOUSLY TAKEN
Initiatives previously taken can be categorized with respect to the
ideas of multi-track diplomacy. Within track-one, or top-down initiatives,
can be found the Dayton Peace Accord, regulating the refugee returns
—a paradox in itself. Elections can also account for track-one
reconstruction; the creation of a Youth parliament by Canton 10
authorities, initiated by the OSCE DMC Department, is a step towards
reconciliation. It is unfortunate that the youth of Drvar should be
marginalized as a result of the lack of adequate public transportation.
Track-two, or bottom-up, initiatives include the Bastasi mixed-school
curriculum initiative from the OHR, an eventual bilateral NGO dialogue
prompted by the OSCE DMC Department, youth rapprochement
initiatives and a series of meetings elaborated by the former Serb Mayor,
Mile Marceta, to attract investments from other parts of BiH as well as
the former Yugoslavia. The Municipal Outreach Program, an idea raised
by the OSCE DMC Department to address municipal governance issues,
is still being elaborated. Of main concern here is the lack of OHR action
to prevent the local press from disseminating false information and
encouraging antagonistic behaviour. 
Figure 2
Multi-track Diplomacy in Drvar
MINORITIES
TERRITORY
CULTURE
POLITICS
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ACTORS
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DRVAR
1) Historical context
2) Minority disadvantage
3) Minority awareness
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4. MUNICIPAL OUTREACH PROGRAM
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1. DAYTON PEACE ACCORD
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2.3.2. CIVIL PARTICIPATION AND INFLUENCE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
The main problem of Drvar is that its people do not interact outside
ethnic boundaries, because they do not consider their coexistence as a
long-term matter. For instance, on the returnee side, some think that
they do not need to work with the displaced because they are bound
to leave the town anyway. While on the displaced side, many perceive
themselves as being persecuted by the International Community on
behalf of the returnees. An example of this can be found in the forest
fire that occurred in September 2001, which may be said to have been
prompted by Radio Drvar’s constant campaign against the evictions. While
forestry resources belonging to the municipality tend to be usurped
through illegal logging by the Finvest Company, and under the nose of
the OHR, the forest surrounding Drvar was criminally set ablaze in
September 2001 as a symbol that even though the Croat population ‘has
to depart’, it would not leave the forestry resources to the Serb population
of Drvar. Such an act demonstrates that the refugee situation of Drvar is
a zero-sum game, despite the fact that the OSCE HR Department
constantly makes it known that Croats can stay under the condition
that they occupy property legally. 
In order for events of this kind not to recur, the OSCE and the OHR
Special Envoy need to introduce the following initiatives, in accordance
with its limited mandate, inappropriate to the pressing needs of Drvar:
inform the citizens on the activities of the international community in
Drvar as well as in other parts of BiH (to show that in other areas, other
ethnic groups find themselves in the se same situation as the displaced
persons of Drvar), through radio shows; raise awareness on property
law issues; set up a strategy that will encourage the development of a
common feeling of belonging to the town. The strategy will be to
organize a series of events targeting first youth, professionals and
women. They could be conceptualized into the introduction of track-
three diplomacy, geared towards the facilitation of grass-root actor
interaction, for local benefit, and as a means of setting the local
reconstruction agenda. For instance, such an initiative could take the form
of a Professionals Discussion Meeting, where a returnee carpenter would
meet a displaced carpenter, and talk about carpentry issues and problems.
Such an initiative would facilitate grass-root dialogue, while breaking
away from the returnee-displaced axis, hindering the reconstruction
and returns to Drvar. Another initiative would be to ask the Municipal
Council to change the date of Drvar Day, now 14 September, the day
when the Croat HVO army arrived in Drvar, to a less bellicose date
evoking a common event, such as the anniversary of the Dayton Peace
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Accord. To date, the international mandate in town remains inappropriate
to facilitate such initiatives. An example which has been implemented
by the OSCE Head Office was a campaign entitled “We Can Do It….”,
in the autumn of 2001, designed to provoke a reaction among the
youth into ‘standing for themselves’ and finding work. Such an initiative
has indeed provoked reactions, but of another kind. As the editor-in-
chief of the youth magazine “Buka” notes, the OSCE “offered the
youth a pre-made solution again”, and does not understand the
reason why the youth of BiH prefer to “wash dishes in McDonalds or
clean toilets in European train stations … rather than offer their
intellectual, creative and other services to the country that rejects then
constantly”, and where it is impossible to find work. Such an initiative
had the result of marginalizing the youth even more than the IC’s initiatives
for reconstruction. Furthermore, such a PR disaster demonstrates the
lack of track-two dialogue within the OSCE, whereby officers in the
field offices are made aware of the local issues they need to address,
but are not given the possibility to engage in a constructive dialogue
with their Head Office. Track-one dialogue also seems to be lacking, as
the campaign was imposed on the field without any prior piloting. Of
importance here is the discrepancy between BiH society’s needs, the
IC’s policies and the BiH media concerns. 
3. Potential monitoring role for the media in conflict prevention
According to the life-conflict cycle, the situation depicted above,
contributing to the perceived marginalisation of virtually all sectors of
the population of Drvar, has the potential to erupt into political
conflict. As mentioned above, local media outlets, exclusively held by
the displaced population, constantly vilify and sap the efforts, or lack
thereof, of the international community to apply a mandate that at
times is not specifically appropriate to demands of the field. As for the
international media, their representatives were only seen in town
during the October 1998 Croat riots against Serb returnees, in which
the democratically elected Mayor Mile Marceta was left for dead,
having been thrown out of his office window in the town hall by an
angry Croat mob. He was saved in extremis by the Canadian SFOR
army battalion. Again, the international media was only to be seen
during late phase one of the life-conflict cycle (see figure 1.1). The
riots, caused by an incident between Serbs and Croats, resulted in still
further mutual antagonism. As for Mayor Marceta, the embodiment
restored democracy in the town: he was awarded a medal by President
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Clinton after his recovery in hospital. This event was widely covered by
the media in the Republica Srpska, although ignored or ridiculed in
Canton 10, and sporadically mentioned by the international media.
Shortly afterwards, OHR Special Envoy Peter Chapel, allegedly involved
in illicit activities with Croat mobsters, removed Mr. Marceta from
office for being the focal point of the riots. He was held responsible for
having ‘triggered’ his own attempted assassination. No international
media covered Mr. Chapel’s ambiguous decision, and once again, the
Serb/returnee population was alienated from the Croat/displaced
population. The failure of the international media to report on the
situation and monitor the centres of power with regards to international
decisions in the field, decisions taken on behalf of the tax-payer, could
well, in the future, trigger more conflicts to defuse; and an ungenerous
person might add, more conflicts to cover. 
The failure to understand the nature of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
from being ‘negative’ to, rarely, becoming ‘positive’, is leaving the
media, international as well as local, short of accomplishing a monitoring
role. A basic conflict-theory established reporting, let alone investigative,
may well allow the media to forge reliable and relevant judgements
(see figure 3). A conceptualisation of the situation in Drvar as precarious
could therefore have prevented the 1998 riots, and may well help
diffuse potential problems in the future. By holding the international
community responsible for its actions, through investigative monitoring,
the media may influence its policies.
Figure 3
Negative peace in Drvar
Dayton
Accommodation
2002 +
Action?
1998 Riots
Minority awareness
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4. Conclusion
Since this paper’s data collection and the Coimbra seminar, the
volatile situation in Drvar has been diffused, not because of media good
practice, but through the courageous implementation of OSCE Human
Rights mandate, ignoring Croat threats of further political and civil
unrest and repeatedly clashing with OHR Special Envoy’s personal agenda
of collusion with Croat mobsters holding businesses in town. This drastic
change and the exceptional conditions surrounding it, the ‘early
retirement’ of a high-ranking OSCE official, guilty of corruption, and the
internal investigation of Mr. Chapel’s actions, has not been reported in
any news-media. The lessons learned from Drvar will therefore not be
kept on record for further post-conflict zones, nor their conflict
prevention potential. 
The industrial nature of the media, prompting opportunistic editorial
decisions, remains an impediment to investigative and monitoring
reporting. However, should reporters of conflict be made aware of
basic theories related to conflict development; should they, with time,
choose to bring their past experience to their reporting; then a more
ethical testimony of a given situation could help in preventing further
conflict. Considering priorities within the media industry, scribes will be
scribes, but they may also become aware of their surroundings.
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Africa: From Conflict Promotion to Conflict Oblivion
Jordi Raich
Introduction
I have been asked to write about Africa, not a country but 53 of
them, about an entire continent. Needles to say, the enterprise seems
to me impossible due to limitations of space and the complexity of
such a vast territory, far more diverse than Europe. Africa is not a ‘case
study’ but thousands of them. However, I will try my best to present
the big picture, partly drawn from the experience of someone like me
who, when it comes to Conflict Prevention, is always late. As an emerg-
ency humanitarian aid worker during the past 18 years, by the time I
reach a place conflict and violence have already erupted.
In the early 1990s, caught in the global whirlwind of the so-called
New World Order, many African states began processes of democratisation
and pacification that seemed to mark the beginning of a fresh era of
multi-party pluralism, rule of law, and the end of a past politically unfree
and socially violent. The novel trend was led by a new generation of
more pragmatic and ‘Westernised’ leaders, many of them children
when their countries gained independence: people like Museveni in
Uganda, Kagame in Rwanda, Zenawi of Ethiopia and Afewerki of Eritrea.
Years later, after the horrors of the Rwandan genocide or the butchery
in Liberia, we are now coming to terms with the fact that the hopes
raised were a mirage, and some parts of Africa are experiencing a
return to the brutal and authoritarian days characteristic of the post-
colonial period.
The coup d’état still remains a common way to attain power in
some African nations like Niger, Nigeria, Burundi or the Congos. Yet, it
is true that many other countries, actually the immense majority, prefer
to play the more internationally acceptable democratic game and bend
its rules until it is barely recognisable. Intimidation, manipulation of
censuses, arrests, blunt killing of political adversaries, elimination of the
secret nature of the ballot, tampering with counts, are all integral parts
of many African elections, Zimbabwe being one the latest examples. 
The main aim behind these actions is always to give a democratic
varnish to a dictator, a successful practice if judged by the fact that the
international community contents itself with a narrow and normative
conception of democracy when it comes to African states. Only that
explains the much praise received by Yoweri Museveni, an exemplary
leader according to the White House, who claims his ‘no-party system’
—a new euphemism for the classic old-fashioned ‘one-party system’—
is perfectly free. Another example is the 1997 election of warlord
Charles Taylor in Liberia through elections described by international
observers as ‘free and transparent’, a case of international legitimisation
of a well-known criminal. Many Western governments tend to downplay
the democratic failings of their African colleagues as long as their
economic policies are favourable to them. The world outlaws the coups
d’état but can live with false and puppet democracies.
Many political processes are accompanied by, or are the primary
cause of, armed violence and internal disorder. ‘Success stories’ are at
hand and some nations like Mozambique, Uganda, Namibia and South
Africa have abandoned violence during the recent past and initiated a
remarkable political transformation with majority-based regimes. But
concentrating on a handful of exceptions is misleading. Thus, the ‘great’
leaders cited before have been or are at war with at least one of the
others. A war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a coup d’état followed by
a civil war in the ‘exemplary’ Ivory Coast, increasing disorder in Uganda
and Zimbabwe, remind us how fragile and unstable these processes
can be. To these, a long list of old and new African conflicts and violent
outbreaks has to be added. Since 1970, more than 30 wars have been
fought in Africa, most of them of an internal nature. In 1996 alone, 14
of Africa’s 53 countries were afflicted by armed conflicts, which were
responsible for half of all war victims worldwide and more than 9
million refugees and internally displaced persons. Centralization of
power, corruption, despotism, systematic persecution of minorities,
wealth hijacked by the military, political, religious and tribal groups,
and the lack of representative systems, make people fight for access to
space, to water, to natural resources, to power. Even genocide becomes
a state enterprise in modern Africa, as it did in Germany during WWII.
All these conflicts dangerously undermine local governments’ efforts to
provide prosperity, peace and stability to Africans. 
In our real-time globalized world, none of this occurs out of the
blue, without signals and warnings that should ring alarm bells, but do
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not. All these patterns are neither causes nor problems; rather they are
symptoms of that long-lasting African illness, internal political decay,
which in extreme cases leads to so-called ‘failed states’, of which
Somalia is the paradigm. 
Somalia
When I first went to Somalia in the spring of 1992 it was a society
already a long way down the path of disintegration, quickly plunging
into chaos. Everybody was aware of it and the signs were evident all
over the country. But I found only 500 Pakistani UN peacekeepers,
scared to death, confined in their compound because their cars, weapons
and radios had been stolen by armed gangs driving the sadly famous
‘technicals’. The situation was so dangerous and abnormal that even
NGOs, UN agencies and the ICRC hired their own Somali armed guards,
their own private soldiers. The international community only reacted
when the mass media reported about the suffering of the Somali
population. Yet, instead of taking resolute actions to address the root
causes of the problem, the United Nations Secretary General fired
Mohamed Shanoun, his special envoy and a very much respected
interlocutor by all sides, and the United States transformed a deep
political crisis into an innocuous humanitarian TV show. In December
1992, I myself helped the CNN crew to find a nice rooftop with beach
views from which to film the long-awaited American disembarkation.
President George Bush senior sent a US military contingent to lead a
new UN-sponsored multilateral force, called UNITAF, to ensure the safe
delivery of humanitarian aid, something the majority of charities never
asked for. More than 35,000 troops were quickly deployed in what was
widely termed as ‘armed humanitarianism’. The international forces’
failure to disarm the Somali factions and destroy their weapons reassured
the warlords that American soldiers would soon be out of the country.
In October 1993, the whole ‘humanitarian’ campaign suddenly collapsed
when Farah Aidid’s forces killed 18 US rangers and wounded around
80 in an urban ambush. Images of a dead American soldier being dragged
through the streets of Mogadishu were broadcast around the world,
and played an important role in the sudden American withdrawal from
Somalia. The United States put the blame on the UN and retired all its
forces. In March 1995, the UN also pulled out without any peace
settlement in sight. The Somalia fiasco became the Somalia effect, to
be felt for years to come.
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Rwanda
Rwanda, 1994, awakened the world to the fact that in Africa
widespread violence could also be the result of deliberate and careful
political planning, and that the media could become a deadly weapon
of mass destruction. When I visited Rwanda in 1993 there were unrest
and bomb blasts in Kigali, attacks and killings in the countryside, arms
were being distributed to the population, and many people were
talking about the lists of names and addresses being broadcast by
Radio Mille Colines. 
Governments and international organizations ignored the clues of
a genocide plot, received months before the shooting down of the
plane carrying the Presidents of both Rwanda and Burundi. The plane
crash triggered the start of a strategy of genocide that went on for more
than four months. The reaction of the United Nations Security Council
was to avoid the problem and withdraw 2,000 UNAMIR troops, leaving
behind only 250 soldiers to protect a few foreign nationals. Four months
later the UN decided to send 5,000 peacekeeping troops to Rwanda,
mandated to protect civilians at risk and to provide security for humani-
tarian assistance. However, member states were not willing to commit
soldiers to such a mission ‘somewhere in Africa’. Meanwhile, around
800,000 Rwandans were slaughtered. Nothing was done to stop a
campaign of genocide that was broadcast live. ‘Never again’ was said
after WWII. ‘Never again’ was repeated after Rwanda.
Then, an army of Tutsi refugees invaded the country from Uganda,
deposed the architects of the genocide and sent two million Hutus
fleeing across the borders into neighbouring states. Amongst the wave
of refugees were the perpetrators of the genocide, who took control of
the camps and manipulated the distribution of humanitarian assistance.
They transformed the refugee settlements into guerrilla training bases.
In 1996, the untenable situation prompted the new government in
Rwanda and other nations to send military forces into eastern Zaire,
setting off an insurrection that toppled Mobutu Sese Seko. In this new
phase, thousands of Hutu refugees were systematically chased and
murdered in the forest. 
At the end of 1996 I was back in the region, stuck on the Rwandan
side of the border with Zaire, in the company of dozens of TV and
radio crews from all over the world. After weeks waiting we were
allowed into Zaire, but covering the story of such a dispersed refugee
population hiding in the tropical jungle was considered too difficult.
The public had difficulty understanding how perpetrators of genocide
could become victims themselves. One day, the news that there would
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be no international troops coming to deal with the violence spread
through Zaire like a bushfire. Besides, the French transport strike was
paralysing Europe and saturating the headlines. Within a week most
reporters left the area. What was to have been Africa’s First World War,
with eight countries participating, became a non-issue in which more
than two million people have lost their lives since 1998.
Sierra Leone
In the 1980s a combination of corruption, ambition and negligence
by a succession of governments was plunging Sierra Leone into chaos.
International organizations, together with African and Western states,
preferred to ignore the violent signs pointing to war. By 1991 Sierra
Leone’s civil war was a fact. In five years more than 50,000 people lost
their lives and half the country’s population was displaced. Even then,
there was no significant pressure to reverse the fragmentation process
and stop the fighting between government forces and the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF). The democratically elected government of 1996 was
followed by a coup that allied former enemies in a terror campaign of
massacres and mutilations. The 1998 civilian government, restored by
Nigerian forces, was followed in early 1999 by a wave of violence in
Freetown that left 5,000 dead and wounded and scores of women raped.
Yet, the RUF was later welcomed to be part of the government in the
Lome Agreement. Lome led to a sort of ceasefire and a partial disarming
of the RUF, while British intervention helped to train police and soldiers.
Nonetheless, the Sierra Leone experiment is far from the successful
intervention some scholars and politicians, especially the British
government, pretend it was. Despite the setting up of a Special Tribunal
and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, there has been no real justice
process. Many murderers and warlords have been welcomed into the new
army, giving the impression that violence brings rewards and no
punishment. Not surprisingly, corruption is still widespread in towns and
rural areas, where the availability of small arms fuels new militia groups
seeking a share of power and interfering in neighbouring Liberia.
Conflict prevention?
Could we have prevented all that? That is the million-dollar question,
because success in conflict prevention is almost impossible to demonstrate.
How can you be sure that your efforts have stopped a conflict from
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erupting? On the other hand, war proves easily that conflict prevention
has failed. Yet, it should not be difficult to agree that not enough was
done to address the causes of conflict or to guarantee a lasting peace,
that many tragedies could and should have been prevented, that in
many cases the commitment was too little, too late and lasted too
short a time. 
It has long been argued that prevention is better than cure,
something people working for medical humanitarian organizations
know very well: providing safe drinking water is far cheaper and saves
more lives than treating diseases with drugs. Likewise, preventing
conflict is more cost-effective than responding to a crisis or a war. Conflict
prevention is said to be good for international business and commerce,
preserves human life and the organizations involved are relatively
cheap to fund compared to military budgets. It is all about preventing
the emergence of violence, building peace in fragile post-conflict
situations, and creating the necessary conditions for sustainable develop-
ment in order to avoid future wars.
The root causes of conflict often lie in discrimination, denial of
rights, poverty, corruption and proliferation of arms. Fortunately, conflict
prevention initiatives also proliferate. They come from the US, Canada,
the EU, the UN, the G8, and Africa itself. Most of these schemes are
centred on combating poverty, promoting democracy and human
rights, tackling the availability of small arms, establishing early-warning
systems, improving the professionalism of local armies, promoting an
impartial and committed media, enhancing the role of civil society and
fighting impunity.
Concerning Africa, a considerable number of proposals have been put
forward, including the idea of Africans being responsible for conflict
prevention, management and resolution of crisis in their own continent.
Thus, a conflict mechanism with an early-warning system was created
at the OAU, presently ‘replaced’ by the AU. The US, France and the UK
proposed several times the creation of an ‘African Crisis Reaction Force’,
a sort of on-call army composed of members from various African
states, ready to be deployed anywhere whenever the alarming signs of a
potential crisis are detected. No doubt, the AU and Africans themselves
should assume more responsibility for their own lives and destinies. The
bitter experiences of Angola, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Burundi, Sudan
and the Democratic Republic of Congo show the low level of interest
and commitment that the states that control the UN have regarding
Africa’s problems. But unless we make the terms of trade more favourable
to primary commodities, open up our markets to developing countries,
settle the debt problem, re-design highly corrupt bilateral development
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aid, and re-examine the impact of economic adjustment programmes
on distressed populations, all our talk about Africans sorting out their
own problems will be cynical hypocrisy. One wonders why some Western
states are ready to support and help financing a standing army for the
AU or the ECOWAS but are against doing the same for the UN.
Africanising problems, responsibilities and solutions is a dangerous
piece of disengagement distilled in the ‘Africa for Africans’ rhetoric and
the naïve idea that answers for Africa’s troubles must come only from
Africans themselves. Letting Africans to identify, design and implement
solutions is a must, but indigenising problems, pretending the West
should stay away because somehow ‘it is not our business’, and expecting
proposals from weak states is preposterous. Recent peacekeeping
operations are a good example of this tendency. After the fiascos and
killings of foreign troops in Somalia and Rwanda, the UN has more and
more trouble in finding developed countries ready to supply soldiers for
missions in Africa. About 77 % of the forces currently deployed in 15 UN
operations come from developing countries, Nigeria and Ghana being the
main African contributors. Thus, the bulk of peacekeeping is left to
soldiers from poor nations, most of whom belong to national armies that
are untrained, badly equipped and accustomed to violating human rights
in their own countries. Paying Africans to sort out their mess is, at the end
of the day, cheaper and less politically risky than doing it directly, but this
is not conflict prevention, this is irresponsible dishonesty.
The famous revived economic interest in Africa goes together with
a supine lack of political interest, badly hidden behind testimonial visits
from Western representatives, who keep focussing on ‘success stories’
such as South Africa, Mauritius, Senegal, Uganda or Botswana. The
continent has lost political weight in the eyes of world powers, not
only because of the end of the east-west confrontation but also due to
the growing geopolitical importance of the EU, the Middle East, North
Africa, Eastern Europe and China. Nowadays the so-called international
community is more interested in managing African crises with donations
of beans, rice, maize and high-energy biscuits than in solving them
through prevention, diplomacy, negotiation, and reconciliation. The
withdrawal from Somalia, the impassivity and indifference in the face
of the atrocities in Rwanda, Liberia and Sudan, the slow response to
the floods in Mozambique... Compared to the reaction to the suffering
of the Kurds in Iraq, or the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, the difference
in scope and scale of the response is astonishing. Increasingly, developed
countries show a spurt of concern over Africa’s afflictions during a given
crisis, which fades away soon afterwards. Only worst-case scenarios,
only tragedies, are considered. Graça Machel put it more bluntly:
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“When we are dying by the thousands, then they come running, but
it’s always too late”. 
Some may wonder how I have dared to write for so long without
saying a word about how much the world has changed since 11
September, 2001. Since that fateful date, we are told, politics demand
a new kind of war against global terrorism and swift action to defeat a
hidden enemy in a battle with no front lines. But terrorism, concealed
enemies and diffuse wars are not new. True enough, some things have
changed dramatically. Today, Human Rights and Democracy, the two
pillars of Western foreign policy before September 2001, have been
replaced by a violent campaign against ‘terror’ in the name of which
everything seems justified. Besides, there is a lot of talk about the way
the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon showed how
conflict in one part of the world could affect the lives of people on the
opposite side of the globe. Likewise, much is being said about the
dangers of ignoring the suffering of African nations whose poverty,
miseries and frustrations, we realize now, could threaten peace and
international stability. 
Yet, concerning Conflict Prevention little has or will change because
of September 11. We only have to follow how the US-led Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan is evolving. Most parts of the country
are more dangerous now than they were under the Taliban regime,
and the warlords, whose atrocities justified the very existence of the
Taliban, are back in business with Western support and approval. Although
there are 5,000 European peacekeeping troops in Kabul, the US
rejected plans to deploy them in other parts of the country. They remain
in the capital and a few big cities, confined in their secure bases,
getting out only for very specific offensive operations and occasional
photo-ops. Similarly, the 2003 US military campaign to ‘liberate’ Iraq
has transformed a country at peace into a guerrilla war zone, where no
one is secure and political stability looks more remote every day.
Despite the events of September 11, the United States’ reluctant
commitment in drought- and war-ravaged Afghanistan and decomposed
Iraq is alarming. Afghans and Iraqis have plenty of reasons to doubt
White House promises because Washington has deserted them before.
And it will abandon Afghanistan and Iraq again once it has accomplished
its limited military and economic objectives. This is not new either: it is a
pattern repeated throughout the world and a trademark of US
interventions throughout history. Therefore, do not expect much political
commitment to Africa beyond bombing Somalia, Sudan or Libya.
Rather than a problem of an unfavourable Western policy towards
Africa, it is often a problem of lack of any policy at all. Thus, the US
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keeps bouncing from direct involvement in Somalia, to disengagement in
Rwanda; from leave it to Mandela in South Africa, to bombing a drugs
factory in Khartoum to combat international terrorism... The only African
issues that clearly worry the world beyond the continent are AIDS,
emigration and terrorism. In this regard, journalists, and specially the
media companies they work for, have a big responsibility in covering
what is going on in Africa in a more consistent, impartial and long-term
basis, not only when conflicts and epidemics erupt or when Western
leaders tour the region. Likewise, local African media, such as radio
stations and newspapers, have a duty to inform in a balanced and
unbiased way and to educate the population into the culture of peace,
discussion and negotiation, without stirring ethnic and social tensions.
In Africa, during the Cold War, the superpowers instead of Conflict
Prevention practiced Conflict Promotion. After the Cold War, Conflict
Promotion was replaced by Conflict Oblivion. The events of September
11 have not changed that.
Conclusion
Conflict prevention and resolution in Africa are still in their early
stages, and no doubt much work remains to be done. The former OAU
interventions in Central and Western Africa showed the limitations of the
organization’s capabilities. Repeated diplomatic and non-violent attempts
to resolve the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia,
Liberia or Sudan have ended in failure. Furthermore, there seems to be
still not sufficient clarity on how to bring together the objective of
preventing conflict with other goals such as combating poverty and
disease, integrating developing countries into the global economy, and
improving African governments’ accountability and transparency.
It will be difficult to reconcile theory and practice. On the one
hand, it is impossible to maintain a peace that does not exist. Even
worse, sometimes imposing peace promotes war by giving factions the
opportunity to gain time and reinforce their positions. On the other
hand, knowing about potential conflicts in advance is very different
from being able to stop them erupting. But deadly violence is not
inevitable by definition and the need to prevent it is urgent. An
effective policy of conflict prevention and resolution requires a
comprehensive and flexible political, social and economic strategy that
entails actions and funds. Most often, the problem is not one of lack of
resources, knowledge or planning, but of will.
AFRICA: FROM CONFLICT PROMOTION TO CONFLICT OBLIVION 151

Colombia, Conflict Prevention 
and the Media: Do Texts Match?
Manuel Salamanca
Premises
This paper intends to discuss the relationship between the discourse
of conflict prevention and the written text in the press as a discourse. It
will address different facts from a specific situation which will be taken
as a case study: the break-off of dialogues in Colombia between the
government of President Andrés Pastrana, and the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC-EP (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, an insurgent leftist organization that has now been fighting
for power for around 40 years). 
The paper starts from some basic assumptions: 
1. It intends to develop what can be called a case study, in terms
of observing a specific fact of reality and bringing it to both
knowledge and analysis. 
2. It understands conflict prevention as a part of Conflict
Resolution and/or Peace Studies, still to be defined, even
conceived, and thus far from being clearly treated as a technique,
discourse or policy. In this direction, conflict prevention will be
taken as a course of action or text still to be produced and
interpreted.
3. It considers the mass media news as another type of text,
coherent within its own logic and possibly related with other
texts or discourses, such as Conflict Prevention. 
Under such assumptions, the document will: 
a. Establish a relation between one specific fact of reality and a
text produced in one press media in the direction of determining
the use or not of terms implied in theoretical discourses on
Conflict Prevention.
b. Discuss the form in which the specific news on a specific fact is
presented in a specific mass medium, trying to offer a critical
view on the presence of a conflict prevention discourse.
c. Question whether defining a responsible use of mass media is
enough to contribute to conflict prevention in terms of defining
a principle of co-responsibility between reality, conflict actors,
media controllers and media discourses, transcending the logical
conclusion of responsible use of media.
Although probably necessary, the paper will not try to describe the
violent confrontation in Colombia, as the general purpose is to discuss
the relation between media and conflict prevention and not the description
or judgment of a situation per se. Nevertheless, when necessary, facts
will be mentioned, not to raise opinions but to share a clearer picture
of a violent conflict as a whole. 
There is a moral or ethical statement implied, though. The paper
will not assume the tragic destiny of some violent conflicts, such as the
Colombian political dispute. As Keane puts it, even if “Fantasies of omnip-
otence among politicians, diplomats, generals and citizens should be
abandoned by the logic of triage: just as field medicine first categorized
the wounded into the three categories of slightly wounded, terminally
injured and critically ill in need of priority treatment, so today’s uncivil
wars are not all remediable”, there should always be a pathway to
peace cutting across the dirty course of violence. As it will be seen, the
paper will clearly contradict any kind of omnipotence, but will live under
the shelter of a humane, humanistic option: that of a possible non-
violence. Even if so, it will approach what it considers myths of conflict
prevention, a concept that will be seen both as a possible text and as a
question yet to be resolved; not as a given of Conflict Resolution theory
and practice. 
Why texts, why interpretations?
Where conflict prevention and mass media configure a relationship
is a delicate question to start from. This, because literature has been
produced on conflict resolution and media, conflict treatment in the
media, or the press and its role in conflicts, always under the assumption
that a responsible production of mass media news and messages is, at
least, beneficial. It is said, or at least commonly understood, that a
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responsible use of media is good for societies and events occurring
inside them. It seems that not only conflict resolution gets benefits
from a responsible use of mass media. 
Nevertheless, the question about the responsibilities of mass media
use or news and conflict prevention is, by all means, less clear. This,
probably, because conflict prevention seems to be still far from defined.
Maybe conflict resolution too, but at least there is a field that explicitly
addresses the facts, actions and theories of resolving disputes between
human beings. Not so their prevention. 
Prevention of conflicts remains, or may seem still, a mystery. Probably
that has to be taken as implied, for conflicts usually do not follow
patterns or logics of occurrence. Conflicts simply emerge, in their own
very natures and narratives, in their own specificities and developments,
a fact that poses serious questions on what resolving conflict means.
Then, reaching the point of conflict prevention might still become a
further complicate subject. 
It is clear that some of the Conflict Resolution challenges towards
the future is to become a real conflict resolution action, and not only
the descriptive efforts of valuable scientists, being their work either
quantitative or qualitative. This means that conflict resolution efforts
must rapidly evolve to contribute to Peace Studies in terms of becoming
real peace science and action and not just the presentation of figures
and deep analysis. Conflict Resolution is, and has to be, a combination
of theory and practice, a combinatory course of action based on
responsible reflection on specific situations. Conflict prevention is a
part of it, a part yet to be defined. 
In fact, the big questions are when to prevent, how to prevent and
what does prevention mean. Prevention is action: action during, before
and after conflicts. It is also action during, before and after the emergence
of violence in conflicts. Its variable nature may constitute a notice of
how diffuse prevention as a concept can be. It is a given that human
beings can only prevent situations they know. No one has ever prevented
anything to happen as long as he or she has not had a previous reference,
being this reference close or far. This means that any preventive action
put in motion to face a not-known fact is definitely condemned to
failure. 
As ironic as it may sound, reality might be a good argument to prove
it. The disastrous events of a violent conflict, or its terrible outcomes can
rarely be predicted, due to the inner unpredictability of conflict dynamics.
“Knowing in advance”, a “logical” idea that could be logically implied
in conflict prevention is almost an impossible, especially if no reference
is had. And even if references exist, history has proven that human
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beings have not learned the painful lessons of their own past, at least
as regards the occurrence of violent conflicts. Fisas has clearly stated
this, explaining how the 20th century saw 110,000,000 persons killed
during violent armed confrontations. Most of these casualties have
occurred since World War II. 
Keane goes even further, trying to characterize the violence of the
20th century: “Genocidal wars, firebombed cities, nuclear explosions,
concentration camps, spreading plagues of private blood-letting: this
century has seen more than its share of planned and unplanned
violence, with prospects of still more to come. Historians of the next
century will no doubt record tales of the courageous who struggled to
survive its storms of violence: the tunnel builders of the ghettos,
determined to outwit those who planned their extermination; the
mourning women bearing white scarves stamped with the names of
their loved ones, standing in silence in the shadows of a terrorist state;
‘ethnically cleansed’ men and women, weeping over the destruction of
their houses and farms, praying that their conquerors do not raze their
crops. These tales will prove remarkable for future generations, but
only because of the colossal cruelty symbolized by the trenches of the
Somme, where soil and flesh were pounded into pink-grey mud; the
burning and recycling of corpses into gunpowder to make more skeletons
out of future enemies; the dripping flesh and swollen faces inflicted by
a bomb whose flash proved brighter than the sun; the torturer armed
with prized instruments like electrodes, syringes and the rectoscope, a
device used to place gnawing and clawing rats inside the victim; the
military officers flinging drugged or murdered bodies of young men
and women out of helicopters and planes into the ocean depths below”.
Graphic as it may sound, the descriptions above put us in front of a
fact: human beings knew about all these disasters via the mass media,
in their first role, that of mediation: being the bridge between reality
and the public. To some extent, this confirms the idea of the validation
of events through the media. In fact, it seems clear that only what occurs
in media “really” happens. Only what is shown, talked about, printed,
viewed, seems to acquire a value of truth. Given this, it is worth con-
sidering the chances of prevention of violent conflicts through the
media, from the media and with media collaboration, in the face of a
tremendous reality: can the disastrous outcomes of the violent conflicts
described above be prevented? It is a double-edged question: on one
hand it confronts the possibility of prevention; on the other, it approaches
the possibilities of prevention, using the mass media as a tool. 
There is a moral fact still to be considered: what Eco recalls as a
sign of our conflicted times: war does not occur between two separate
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fronts. “In ancient wars, potential enemies were interned (or massacred);
if a compatriot, from the enemy territory, talked about the reasons of
the adversary, at the end of war he would be hanged. But war can not
be frontal any more, due to the nature of multinational capitalism itself
... it is in the logic of the news industries to sell the news ... it is not
that mass media refuse to play the trumpets of war: simply, they are a
mechanic piano that plays a music already carved on its roll ... even if
mass media were gagged, new communication technologies would
accomplish fluxes of information that are impossible to stop ... this flux
of information plays a role that in traditional wars was played by the
secret services: to neutralize any surprise action ... But information does
even more: it continuously gives the word to the adversary.”
The end of the “secrecy” of war implies a subsequent explosion of
images, broadcastings and discourses, that is, a profusion of texts. This
profusion of texts almost leaves no space for the surprise of the “con-
tinuation of politics by other means”, and opens the discussion on the
role of mass media in violent conflict prevention. But the discussion must
focus, first, on what prevention can mean. 
The when, how and what question implied on prevention seems
particularly tough to answer, for sometimes the synchronicity needed
to put in motion a preventive action is almost an impossibility. Conflict
resolution itself might be understood as a wishful act that intends to
synchronize confronted factions, respecting their own time logics. In
fact, the process of resolving a conflict can be interpreted as the intention
to coordinate cosmologies, time perceptions, and diachronies, in order
to find points of coincidence upon which accords may be constructed.
Conflict resolution, then, could be seen as a form of dealing with the
challenges of human diversity and as a tool for democracy: it implies an
attempt to build a political, peaceful ordination of disagreement,
rendering disagreement to a point in which it can be desirable or highly
tolerated.
Prevention becomes a matter of opportunity, a matter of time.
Prevention, in fact, may be pro-active or re-active, and always intends
to start processes of transformation when approaching conflicts. In this
sense, prevention can start before or after violent possibilities show up
in a conflict, in a double direction: to prevent the eruption of violence
itself, or to prevent degeneration of violence (all violence IS degeneration)
once its dynamic has begun. 
The point is to state that prevention is a term related with the
transformation of conflicts; that it may imply action or reaction; and
that it can also be violent, politically, physically or psychologically. In
fact, prevention is a very dangerous political tool when it comes to the
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scene of avoiding the emergence of conflicts. Conflicts are desirable;
violence is never desirable. Divergence is a motor of transformation;
divergences degenerated into violent processes are motives of disaster.
Dialogical oppositions are constructive; silence or intentions to keep
forced silences are destructive. 
But prevention may also be constructive, if it is conceived as a
creative political means, such as the setting up of early-warning networks
and agendas, such as processes based on cultural transformations and
not only thought of as immediate responses to events. Preventing the
unknown is impossible; preventing the possible may be feasible if the
possibility emerges from processes that have already taught lessons, and
lessons are well learnt. Prevention, somehow, must lose its naiveness,
even its ingenuity: tragedies can not put up with another set of lip
service intentions, for prevention cannot be rhetoric but technical.
Technical, it must be said, in terms of developing prevention towards
democracy, not towards the dangerous avoidance of confrontation and
elimination of discourses and differences. 
Prevention, in sum, is a discourse; a text that takes place in time
and that in time finds its very reason to be. Prevention, as action, is a
key towards the avoidance of violence in conflicts and against the
spreading of violence in disputes. It may have three moments, clearly: 
1. When violence has not emerged but is somehow seen coming.
2. When violence has emerged but is still subject to transformation.
3. When violence has ceased and the emphasis of conflict resolution
has to be put on post-conflict situations. 
All these assumptions are correct when talking about political con-
frontations, prone to violence. Interpersonal conflicts may be even
harder to picture, for no politics explains matters related with affection.
Tracing and tracking down the nature of prevention must depart from
the fact that, by now, prevention is a discourse. This discourse holds to
itself some necessary, useful terms. It seems that the first one is the
ability to predict. In fact, it is recognized that “As it is deduced from its
very name, the fundamental purpose of conflict prevention is to act
satisfactorily when the first symptoms of a conflict emerge, with the
intention to avoid it to surpass a determined violence threshold ...
Thus, prevention consists in detecting conflict on time, to deal with it
conveniently ... Conflict prevention, or preventive diplomacy, is referred
to those actions, policies, strategies and governmental or non-
governmental institutions that expressly try to contain or soften the
threats, the use of organized violence or other forms of coercion of some
concrete States or organized groups… [Prevention] can also be defined
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as the set of measures that contribute to the prevention of undesirable
conflict behaviors… These measures can have, in definitive, three types
of purposes: 
—To prevent a behavior or an action considered undesirable or
inadequate,
—To prevent the escalation of a conflict situation,
—To limit its effects to a tolerable threshold.”
As stated, the question of time seems at least inevitable when
considering prevention. In fact, there is a general recognition about the
fact that, when talking conflict resolution, prevention can be certainly
put in motion before, during and after confrontations. The three imply
different actions, thoughts and outcomes. 
When referring to actions before conflict, we certainly talk about of
what can be done in terms of pro-active measures. This is, preventive
actions aiming to avoid the evolution of the symptoms of conflict into
conflicts that are negative, i.e. violent and/or destructive.
When referring to actions during conflict, it is the time for reactive
actions, all these being efforts of reducing violence to its minimum
expression or to manageable levels in terms of finding ways to set the
environment for a possible dialogue between parties. 
When referring to actions after conflict, we mention the possible
ways of preventing and dealing with the aftermath, this is, doing the
best possible from the outcomes of conflict. If conflict has been
especially violent and destructive, then the outcome will be particularly
negative to deal with, and prevention will start from reconstruction of
infrastructures and structures. If some sort of creativity has already been
seen during the occurrence of conflict, in terms of a search for options
by the actors themselves, then prevention will be a continuation of
creativity, and lessons to be learnt will be more easily visible. 
As seen, time is the definitive question. The life of conflicts implies the
ways to deal with them and the forms of preventive action. Prevention,
then, is not generic; it is not an action in general, but an action in
specific. This is the reason why this paper deals with it as a text, in terms
of its terminology and its variation of discourse. If prevention evolves, it
may probably mean that prevention has not succeeded at first. This
means that prevention in its later stages (the after conflict) is a need,
taking into account that conflict was not prevented beforehand. Then,
if the prevention after occurs, a whole narrative sequence has already
taken place:
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As seen, the courses of action, in what can be called a serial sequence
of facts, can be interpreted as a type of narration in which, depending
on how things evolve, the endings might be of one form or another. If
prevention fails, in general, violence is reached. If it succeeds, then peace
will be at least closer, although the most probable outcome of success
is precisely none: if prevention works, nothing will happen. Nothing
bad, at least, it is implied. 
Structural as it may seem, the graph shows the dimensions of time
and prevention, and justifies the fact that this paper can read conflict
prevention as a text, with a beginning and an ending. Each failure in
prevention implies a step towards the following stage: that of violence,
where another effort at prevention might be undertaken. Each success
in prevention implies a step towards the following stage: that of peace,
where prevention becomes a state of things, for the lessons have been
learned and peaceful dynamic environments will develop their own
prevention mechanisms towards a culture of prevention. 
Nevertheless, it must be said, wars do not occur as a sequence now-
adays. Each stage of the steps between peace and armed confrontation
violence peace violence peace violence peace
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has its own dynamics, almost as a node, independent from the rest.
Such is the big challenge for prevention initiatives, for reality cannot be
drawn as a scheme, but more as an amalgam of situations, each so
unpredictable, each far from being possibly controlled. 
Prevention, then, must confront its own discourse with real world,
for conflicts emerge in sudden moments. Early-warning systems can
only be built upon assumptions of what has occurred in determined
times and places, which becomes a reference, sometimes external, of
what can be taken as a sign of a forthcoming event. Prevention, also, can
be a form of dialogue, if it complements the peace talks of confronting
parties. In fact, peace dialogues might occur when negotiation is the
alternative to violence, although sometimes negotiations occur during
violence and violent environments can lead to negotiations in a very
dangerous double-direction causal relation. 
To conclude, prevention might be understood as a sudden moment
that stops time. In violence, the prevention efforts will tend to provoke
a disruption: that of the logic of violent events. If violence is a language
that creates new, negative situations, from a state of things in which
instability turns into destruction of lives, structures and cultures, with a
possible outcome of nothingness (for nothing will remain if violence
evolves to more or total violence: a hecatomb), prevention would also
mean a reflection moment: the instant needed to opt differently or to
change one’s mind. Possibly, the narrative of violence could take a
different direction: that of creation, as opposite to destruction. 
In such terms, it is important now to give a glimpse to a case, in order
to determine if another language —that of the press, corresponds with
the text implied in prevention of conflicts. The question, as stated
above, transcends the logical conclusion about the responsible use of
media, although for the case chosen —Colombia, a reference must be
made. The press is a sum of various printed texts: in the written press,
the texts also analyze, for they assume that readers will dedicate time
both to the writer’s analysis, and form their own type of analysis on
specific situations. 
Written texts confront the challenge of their main competitors for
audience, audio-visual discourses, offering the supposed seriousness of
producing non-instant messages. This makes them very conductive
discourses that not only narrate but also tend to opinion and to form
opinion. Their text logic does not necessarily show the events in a
sequence (a function that images may fulfill far more easily), but through
interpretations, even reflections. 
In theory, media could contribute to peace prevention. Media could
be mediators, in the sense of developing a preventive, creative peace
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action that could become a space for the necessary dialogue in what
Keane describes as “mesopublic spheres”. “Mesopublic spheres are
those spaces of nonviolent controversy about (violent) power that
encompass millions of people watching, reading or listening across vast
distances. They are mainly coextensive with the nation-state, but they
may also extend beyond its boundaries to encompass neighbouring
audiences… their reach may also be limited to regions within states…
Mesopublic spheres are mediated by large-circulation newspapers…
[and also] by electronic broadcasters”.
Such mesopublic spheres, advocated at large by the author, constitute
a civil initiative against uncivil wars, for example. If information was
transcended as the role of the media, then their contribution to peaceful
debate could be effective in terms of building peace. Nevertheless,
media discourse, related with media owning, is more constitutive of
powers and reveres powers, being at the same time their means and
their objective. This fact may contradict the possibility of creative media
contributing to creative peace and to conflict prevention. The case
below will be discussed under this perspective. 
A day in the press: The breaking off of peace dialogues 
in Colombia
Peace talks between Colombian Government, under the presidency of
Mr. Andrés Pastrana, and the guerrilla of FARC-EP ended on 20 February
2002 following a sequence of events that led the parties to a point of no
return. After three years of interrupted dialogues, president Pastrana
decided to cut contacts with the guerrilla movement of the FARC-EP. The
reason: a commercial plane hijacking act, and the subsequent kidnapping
of its passengers, among whom a senator, who was held hostage. Right
after the fact, Mr. Pastrana decided to end the so-called demilitarized
zone, an area of 42,000 sq. kilometers including the territories and the
populations of five municipalities in south-central Colombia. The area
would be the meeting point where the talks would take place. The
FARC-EP blamed the government for the dialogue’s break off, arguing,
among other reasons, that no state results were visible in the war
against the paramilitary forces conforming the Autodefensas Unidas de
Colombia - AUC (United Self-Defense Organization of Colombia). 
Without going into the depth of a description, it must be said that
the case of Colombia is precisely one of those non-paradigmatic
situations, since it follows no logic and, more than that, can be seen as
a negative paradigm in itself. In fact, the protraction of the conflict has
162 MANUEL SALAMANCA
even led to think of it as a manifestation of cultural violence at its highest
peak. The armed confrontation, reaching its 50th year of continued
occurrence, seems to be one of those non-tractable situations, so
unlikely to be resolved. Such is the commonplace internationally
spoken and presented by the media. It might not be that far from
reality. 
With a population of around 40 million and a murder rate of around
80 murders per day, Colombia is nearly the most violent country in the
world, and certainly a place where the basic human rights are commonly
violated. The conflict has already surpassed the lines of positive prevention,
leaving only the space for a very long projected action in terms of
building peace infrastructures and cultures. Very little can be done
today in terms of building peace, and the breaking off of peace talks is
only another reason to worry about the future of the uncivil war fought
in almost all of Colombia’s 1,140,000 sq. kilometer territory. 
The discourse of prevention lost its reason long ago. Thinking
responsibly, it can only be understood as a tool for the future, since at
the moment there is no possible prevention due to the fact that direct,
structural and cultural dynamics of violence combine in a tale of shame
and pain that has surpassed every limit of decency. Still, the question of
a possible peace accord remains largely unconsidered. The heat of war
has not allowed the time for a necessary reflection: the one that leads
us to understand that, more difficult than achieving peace is the
challenge of administrating peace. Creative prevention would find a
good space for action in post-conflict situation for an environment eroded
by violence such as Colombia: not because little can be done, but
because a lot has to be done in order to prepare a future of well learnt
lessons.
But the rhetoric of prevention has to be confronted with the discourse
of the press in order to achieve the main goal of this paper. For the case
analyzed, the operation has to take into account a brief consideration:
the evidence of the relationship between press and power in Colombia. 
The analysis will be referred to a specific fact, as stated above: the
break-off of peace talks between the guerrilla of FARC and the govern-
ment of Colombia. These are just two of the actors of the violent
confrontation, but were the only ones committed to a formal dialogue,
since January 1999. The contacts with other organizations have been
informal, at least, or non-public. The Ejército de Liberación Nacional -
ELN (National Liberation Army) has only had approaches to dialogues,
and no formal (or public) contacts have been held with the AUC.
In such terms, the coverage of facts has occurred on a specific
dynamics of a specific situation that can be seen as a fragment of
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reality. From the overall picture of Colombian armed conflict and
violence, the break off of the dialogues between FARC-EP and the
government is just one of a myriad of events. Just to put it somehow,
the armed conflict in Colombia causes “only” nearly 20 % of the almost
30,000 murders each year. This means that a comprehensive peace is
much more than a successful negotiation, everywhere but particularly
in Colombia. Nonetheless, media coverage on “peace” only focused
on the immediate event that could affect the dynamics of violence: the
broken off negotiations. 
Both armed conflict and the end of talks are part of the whole
picture of violence. The latter is even included in the first, to be more
exact. But media tend to present the fact (the news) as the picture of a
whole violence, in an inductive operation that tends to make forget that
peace is a complex, multiform achievement, and not only the success of
some peace dialogues. It is to note that Colombian media present the
peace talks under the generic term of “peace process”, a conceptual
mistake. Peace negotiations are only a part of the whole process of
building peace, not the process itself. 
El Tiempo, the main newspaper in Colombia, falls into this mistake.
From this, some conclusions might be extracted in terms of comparing
the discourse of prevention and the way the specific fact is presented. 
Some clarifications must be made: 
1. El Tiempo is a newspaper of national circulation, the only daily
publication with a national outreach. No other newspaper is a
serious competitor for El Tiempo, which constitutes in fact a
monopoly of daily information.
Violence
Armed conflict
Negotiations
broken off
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2. One family, the Santos, owns el Tiempo. They have had active
participation in politics, from the presidency to ministries. One
Santos is currently running for vice-president, as the running
mate of the candidate that is now top in the polls. Information
and power go hand in hand.
3. For the purpose of this paper the information taken as press text
was the one published on Thursday, the 21st of February, 2002,
the day after the breaking off of peace talks between the FARC
and the government.
Some conclusions might be extracted: 
1. The conceptual framework is erroneous, for the fact becomes
the whole. It seems assumed that the achievement of peace
depended on the success of negotiations. If logic overcomes, then
the success of negotiation would lead to peace. No negotiation
would mean no peace, which actually may be true, for no war
can be present in peace. Nevertheless, no violence is the condition
for peace, not only the absence of armed confrontation. The
deductive operation of media, as stated above, is what leads to
the affirmation “Peace Process is Over”, and not to the more
correct one: “Peace Talks between FARC and Government
Interrupted”.
2. The references to terror are constant, a day after the FARC were
considered a political faction and not a terrorist organization. In
fact, the press echoed Mr. Pastrana’s status derogation of FARC.
The guerrilla group was all of a sudden called a terrorist group,
which constitutes a closed door for the possibility of going back
to the negotiation table. Negotiations can only occur between
political actors, and not between a legal political actor and a
terrorist faction. A sort of post 11-S syndrome rarified the environ-
ment of war in Colombia, and the terrorist euphoria led to see
every violent action as a terror action. Not to say that the FARC
actions are not terrorist actions, but to consider what occurs
when words and terms change in a certain violent convenience.
In fact, El Tiempo mentioned the hijacking of the plane as “the
first real incursion of FARC in air terrorism”, in a clear reference
to the modality of using planes as terror artifacts, something not
very clear in this case, but clear as a reference.
3. If the Peace Process and Peace Dialogues correspond, then the
inevitable paths towards war and peace depend on the failure
or success of peace talks. 
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Since in fact the peace dialogues failed, war inevitably had to
take place. More than that, war could be justifiable, since a clear
responsibility could be identified. The discourse of prevention has
no space in such a scheme. When a responsibility is individualized,
in terms of knowing who responsible is (FARC for the case), the
logics of punishing are imposed, not the principle of co-responsi-
bility, common to conflict prevention and conflict resolution.
Obliteration of those responsible is then justified, and achieving
peace through violent means becomes normal and expected. 
4. 15 personalities in Colombian politics, including presidential
candidates, were interviewed. All of them expressed their
concern. Some defended the government’s initiative and some
did not. It is to note that the AUC commanders, declared military
enemies of the FARC and illegal, were quoted with the same
status as all the other fourteen legal characters in Colombia’s
political environment. 
5. Word use frequency conclusions, a form of interpretation that pays
attention to quantitative matters more than to the qualitative
matters on which this paper has focused, could also be extracted.
Nonetheless, the mere presence of expressions can give an idea
of the tone used through the presentation of facts: “hypocritical”,
“slap back”, “cruelty”, “FARC used time to make a transit to
terrorism”, “traditional tendency to search for peace through
dialogue replaced by preference of an open confrontation”, “Card
Peace Process = Peace
Dialogues
Dialogue
success
Dialogue failure
Inevitable,
justified war
Peace
Responsibility
Peace
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of International Community is exhausted”, “B Plan”, “No option
for government”, “Pastrana heard the people’s voice”, “Call to
arms”, “40 million army”, “Urban terror”, “no fear of barbaric
acts”. Few examples of a discourse that, far from preventing
violence, incites to violence, even justifying its use as the means
against violence. No references to nonviolence, prevention or
possible future dialogue were present.
As a concluding remark, it must be said that the unpredictability of
conflict in Colombia is certainly a challenge for the discourse of conflict
prevention in general. But it was stated: prevention is not general, but
specific. Media, as mediators, could collaborate with prevention or at
least support peaceful initiatives. The trend of events hardly seems to
allow such luxury. But the debate must change its tone. Otherwise the
hecatomb can only get deeper. Such a panorama would be, by itself,
an invitation: to develop all kinds of conflict prevention discourses, and
to media to mediate. 
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Listening to the Voices of the People: 
The Media, Peace and Justice. The Case of East Timor
Teresa Cunha
Youth Action for Peace: an old pacifist movement 
I would like to present a brief and simple reflection about my
cultural background in NGOs. My political training, as concerns Peace
Work and Conflict Management, was (and still is) mainly within the
international NGO “Youth Action for Peace”.
Youth Action for Peace is a European movement with quite a long
history: it was created in 1923, in France. Our own legend says that
during the First World War, some young soldiers from France and
Germany, struggling in the front, were invited to meet for mass and
celebrate Christmas together for some hours. After this encounter,
they returned to the front lines and had to shoot each other under the
orders of their commanders. The legend also says, that some young
people, in this extreme situation, promised themselves to stop shooting,
to desert and begin a movement for peace in Europe. This small group
of young deserters called themselves “Chevaliers de la Paix” and their
basic conviction was as follows: we cannot shoot and kill anyone that
we have met and who has then become our friend. 
The interesting thing of this concept of building peace is that it
requires, as a first step, crossing borders, meeting people on the other
side of the “line” and building a friendly relationship. It is very much
based on a personal/individual approach, and very much rooted in the
value of positive emotions. This story has a moral, as somehow they
always do: it brings us one dimension of Peace Construction and Conflict
Prevention: personal contact, personal relations, no matter the national
borders and what is imagined as being national: unique, different, and
by definition, in confrontation with other unique and different national
identities, on the other side of the border1.
1 See Pureza, José Manuel.
These “Chevaliers de la Paix” did not succeed in their mission. We
don’t have any news of relevant changes in the external relations of
their countries (Germany and France), and some years later, another
brutal war began, more or less on the same battlefield. 
But they didn’t stop their activities for peace and conflict prevention,
and during the Second World War, the movement adopted another
name and was found throughout Western Europe (Belgium, Switzerland,
France, Germany, Netherlands, the UK and Italy). At that time, in these
countries, and using Switzerland as the main crossroads for its actions
for freedom, the Christian Movement for Peace (the updated “Chevaliers
de la Paix”) was engaged in hiding Jewish people and helping them
escape from the ruling Nazi and fascist regimes in Europe. In our historical
narratives, this period was one when women started to become very
important in the decision-making process and their actions very
significant. Great leaders were known as very courageous militants. (I met
some of them in 1992 in our International Congress in Berlin dedicated
to YAP Women and Peace Building). 
At that time, building peace was not only a personal measure and
was not only based on emotions and friendship. The movement assumed
peace as an action against oppressors and for conflict prevention. Taking
public positions about political regimes and trying to be coherent via
concrete, sometimes risky, actions, was the main way of contributing
to peace. 
More and more, the discourse on peace began to focus on structural
violence in society, and the extent to which war is just the logical
conclusion of all kinds of violence in society.
The changes in the world during the sixties and seventies brought
another problem to the agenda of YAP: People’s Liberation Struggles. For
the first time, YAP crossed oceans and became not merely a European
but an international movement: one branch was established in Canada
another in South Africa. Co-operation with grassroots organizations (for
social changes and with links with national liberation movements) was
developed in countries like Palestine, Algeria, India, Salvador, Malta,
Lebanon, Guatemala, East Timor, Northern Ireland, Namibia, Western
Sahara, Eritrea. Quite often these contacts and projects were mediated by
what we call, in general, “progressive Christian communities”. 
YAP was asked by these grassroots organizations to do two main
things:
—To denounce their oppression as much as we could via the media
—To provide international forums or arenas for their leaders to do
it with their own voices. 
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CMP did so and the early seventies gave us a wonderful tool: the
European Youth Centre of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. The
internationalism, the international solidarity started to be a relevant
and strong framework of our peace work.
What is the importance of this development? From my point of
view, it brought several strengths and several problems. Starting with
the strengths:
—Peace, started to be considered as an issue, related to international
relations between countries, worldwide; this is a political problem
and not only one of irrational violence. 
—Peace is linked with rights, which are “universal” in the sense
that they are a common patrimony (like self-determination) of all
peoples, nations, countries and persons. Rights have to be respected
and guarantees of freedom, justice and peace are also a common
and universal duty.
—Peace and building peace is perceived as a global question,
touching and dealing with personal dimensions, societies, nations,
and the international community. Peace is where and when rights
and duties are mutual and reciprocal. 
Aiming at peace for all, many studies, many demonstrations, much
information was produced and disseminated, many seminars, many
study visits, street actions, many exchange and development projects,
many contacts were organized and made.
This special period brought two key issues to our NGO:
—How to overcome (solve) the contradiction between refusing
violence and violent ways of conflict resolution or even conflict
management, and the acceptation of, and even the support for,
people’s liberation struggles, with their armies and military
actions?
—How to include in our identity, mostly constructed in an western
and European matrix and atmosphere, the contributions,
discussions and the visions of the world, coming from our African
fellows, Muslim friends, Asian and South American compañeros?
How to make a synthesis and continue our action for peace? 
After 1989 Hungary, Romania, Latvia, Russia and Ukraine joint the
movement. The old CMP didn’t reject so many new identities and
renamed itself as “Youth Action for Peace” after more than ten years
of discussions and debate (started long before the fall of the Berlin wall)
about our specificity and our mission, in this new and complex world.
Nobody was really satisfied with this name because it does not reveal
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any special vision of Peace and Peace Building. It only states a desire for
action and gives this privilege to youngsters.
If our name doesn’t say much of relevance about us, the preamble
to our international constitution gives a framework for peace action
and conflict prevention, supported by some values, that goes beyond
this challenged identity:
“Youth Action for Peace is an international movement which aims
for societies of justice, peace and human solidarity. It struggles against
different forms of violence, exploitation, injustice and exclusion; against
networks of ideological, religious, sexist, political, cultural and economic
oppression and imbalance of natural surroundings. It supports all those,
women and men, who want to take their destiny into their hands so as
to organize collectively a responsible, liberating society”. 
In my opinion, work for peace and conflict prevention, in YAP, after
eighty years of its founding, is based in three main convictions:
a) Peace is much more than an absence of military war. So, in this
sense, peace building has to be founded on global Freedom,
Justice and Solidarity; 
b) Peace is a permanent struggle against any source of oppression
or discrimination;
c) Peace is a collective task which doesn’t accept conformism.
The question of the environment is not sufficiently explicit in this
text so I don’t take it as real concern in the approach of YAP.2
What does building peace mean concretely? What do we do to
somehow achieve these aims?
As I said before, in peace building, we continually deal with
contradictions and ambiguities. It is, indeed, a very complex issue. In
the daily life of an NGO, we have to face so many operational, ethical
and cultural problems that we need to create a few references, limits
and non-negotiated principles for ourselves. So, we participate in
peace building, at three levels:
—Heterogeneous action for peace construction and conflict pre-
vention, in local communities at the grassroots. This local action
has to be very much based in the self-identification of the needs
and skills of a certain territory and the people living there, and
goes through a diversity of local development projects, personal
empowerment and political awareness initiatives, like: 
• Preservation of the ecological environment of turtles in Mexico, 
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2 But for me personally, is ever more crucial.
• The reconstruction of schools and medical centres in Palestine, 
• Hosting children from the West Sahara refugee camps for
schooling in Switzerland, 
• Training unemployed young people and supporting them to
create their own jobs in France, 
• Provide Portuguese language courses to East Timorese
students, in Portugal,
• Setting up a pottery cooperative in Cabo Verde. 
At this level, everybody can decide and do what they believe to be
relevant to their living place, and build up a “society of justice, peace
and human solidarity”. Quite often these actions are quite efficient and
recognized as useful and innovative.
This local work allows us to use our oldest method of building
peace and conflict prevention: we exchange people, information, ideas
and projects. We have quite an important network for these exchanges,
and everyone, without any discrimination, can travel and host travellers. 
At this level we go beyond the local community and are already on
the path of internationalism, networking, extending good practices,
creating transnational solidarity.
In total, YAP organizes almost 300 international work camps, every
year in 27 countries from the different continents. We also organize
international seminars, study sessions or conferences in different countries
and continents. We exchange around 100 volunteers among the different
local projects. We create a wider community via projects, but also via
personal relations, affection, and emotions between people coming
from very distant and distinct places in the world.
3. Finally I want to say some words about the ethical and ideological
reference of YAP: Human Rights. We use the Universal Declaration or
the European Convention of Human Rights, as the reference, normative
and ethical text, for internally and externally legitimizing our action in
building peace, in three different ways:
a) Denouncing in international forums, like NGO Platforms,
Conferences, and UN Committees, situations of oppression. The
problem is to find consensus about what are the priorities,
concerning situations of oppression; when achieved, this is
often fragile and polemical.
b) To take part in the international movement of opinion —in the
words of Boaventura de Sousa Santos, this cosmopolitism, this
way of producing counter-hegemonic globalisation for Human
Rights, claiming and fighting for the inclusion of every person in
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the world, from any space, without any pre-condition, other than
being a human being, in a common rule of rights. The indivisibility
of Human Rights is also, a main concept in our approach. 
c) As a legal tool, to claim or fight for a certain right. This was quite
important to obtain the right of asylum for Algerian refugees in
France or for Albanians in Italy in recent years. It was quite
important for our work in East Timor, for instance.
But, once more, we have problems, very often, to determine where
are the limits; in what measure these charts 
—help us to understand the world here and there, 
—help when we have to decide what is the most common
interpretation (the maximum of meaning) of a certain right or duty 
—help us to remain efficient in our action.
A significant number of decisions and actions are made, based on the
belief that what is written down in the Chart is a minimum. Associated to
this we use criteria like social usefulness in the context, quite a lot of
intuition… and a permanent political debate within the organization. 
We hold extensive dialogues, and try to exchange ideas and
perspectives, before acting.
We have huge discussions when we take a position, which can be
considered quite important from the political point of view. For
example, on the situation of Palestine, the official position is as follows:
Israel is not respecting the International Agreements, and any peace plan
has to stop all violence and assume the reciprocal right of existence.
However among us this position is not a final one because while it is
enough for some, for others it is too little.
Quite often our colleges from the southern branches clamour for
more action and less statements.
The case of East Timor
Until 1999
Since the beginning of my work, I have always linked conflict
resolution with peace building, because I believe that both go together. 
YAP Portugal engaged itself within the international movement of
solidarity with East Timor, of which the most important leader has been
the CDPM3, since 1983. 
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3 Comissão para os Direitos do Povo Maubere - Commisson for the Rights of the
Maubere People, based in Lisbon.
The situation during the Indonesian occupation was very hard for
the people of the territory; not much information was available and we
needed to confirm and update it, continuously. The main “weapon” we
had, was the unfinished list of names, dates and locations of torture or
murder, some testimonies and a few photos. With that material we
tried to make the so-called “civil society” aware of what was going
there, in East Timor. Journalists were an important part of the process
and they were invited to press conferences whenever we had a little
piece of reliable information to offer. We knew that public opinion plays
an important role in this context. Knowing, which generally means
seeing, is a pre-condition for acting.
East Timor was also a sensitive political question for Portugal and
the Portuguese government. It was clear for the solidarity movement
that we needed to obtain a clear position on East Timor from politicians
and make it public, using the media as much as possible.
At the international level, it was important systematically to remind
our friends everywhere that the principle of self-determination is an
inalienable right of every nation, including East Timor; we also had to
redraw the map of the planet to make the little island of East Timor visible.
We needed to approach different publics, repeating to everyone,
with full conviction, that history hadn’t ended and there was hope for
human liberty, bringing justice to East Timor and its people. 
Other nations and other peoples were under the same rule of
occupation as East Timor and we knew that the proper strategy was to
transform this “domestic” solidarity into a transnational movement, in
permanent dialogue with the external diplomacy of East Timor. In this
respect, this co-operation between the “solidarity movement” and East
Timorese leaders was always close. 
For this purpose of internationalisation, we gathered in different
occasions and places, people from East Timor, Namibia, Southern
Africa, Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Brazil, Eritrea, West Sahara, Palestine,
and Indonesia. We learnt as much as we could about all these struggles:
reasons, purposes, methods and aims. We created a special network
and established personal, cognitive, political and cultural relationships.
The empowerment was mutual and we constructed a common knowledge
about what we can do, together, for peace and conflict prevention,
outside of the formal (political or intellectual) arenas but very much
rooted in every day peace action. We learnt how much one gesture
here could bring at least hope, there.
The Council of Europe gave us, on several occasions, full support to
do so: financing, providing all kind of facilities, including for getting
visas for those living outside of Europe. In each seminar, conference or
LISTENING TO THE VOICES OF THE PEOPLE: THE MEDIA, PEACE AND JUSTICE 175
symposium we invited the media and performed mostly symbolic street
actions, to try to broaden the question of East Timor and the right of
self-determination of every nation in the world. To reach as many
people as possible was our goal, because we already knew that silence
is the best friend of oppression, conflict and dictators. 
One of the hardest lessons from this period was the following: is
really difficult to break out the wall of what is considered important or
not, to the media. Often they know almost nothing about the issue
and to convince them to listen was a quite difficult job. Step by step,
the silence had been broken and, as we know, some journalists, and
the media in general, played a crucial role from the very beginning (the
work of the four murdered Australian journalists in 1974) until September
1999 when UN troops entered East Timor to stop the violence and
mobilize the necessary mechanisms to lead to a peaceful situation.
1999 and the preparation of the People’s Consultation
FIRST PHASE
In January 1999, a new hope for peace and for the end of the
conflict was open by the former president of the Republic of Indonesia,
Habibie. Finally a formal and a legal step were foreseen: a people’s
consultation about the future of East Timor. This was the main claim of
the East Timorese People and the solidarity movement: a genuine act
of self-determination outlined in the international law and supervised
by the international community (UN).
The Agreement of 5 May signed in New York between Portugal
and Indonesia under the auspices of the United Nations created the
international framework for a Referendum in the territory of East
Timor, about the future of the nation. I want to recall three things about
this Agreement:
—First, the People’s Consultation, as the referendum was called,
had the aim of finding out through a democratic process, whether
the Timorese wanted to remain in the Indonesian Republic with
a political status of a “special autonomy” within the unitary
republic of Indonesia or, if they wanted to reject this autonomy;
—Second, this Referendum to be accomplished needed, “immediately
after signing of this Agreement, an appropriate United Nations
Mission in East Timor”4, (UNAMET) which has to work in strait 
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4 United Nations (1999), Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the
Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor, article 2
co-operation with the Indonesian authorities, which were
responsible for “maintaining peace and security in East Timor, in
order to ensure that the popular consultation is carried out in a
fair and peaceful way in an atmosphere free of intimidation,
violence or interference from any side”.5
—Portugal and Indonesia should set up an Official Observation
Mission to follow the different phases of the implementation of
the People’s Consultation.
I recall these questions to make clear that the Portuguese government
had, besides all the diplomatic work normal in such situations, the duty
to provide official observers, and to be able, through their “observations”,
to evaluate if the process of registration, campaign, ballot and vote
counting was done according to the conditions previously agreed. 
Portugal chose to organize an Official Mission of Observers
including diplomats, security forces (army and police), representatives of
the 5 political parties represented in the Parliament and representatives
of national NGOs.
I was chosen as one of the representatives of the national NGOs
platform to this Official Mission of Observation in East Timor in 1999.
To go to East Timor, in June 1999, raised several questions in my
mind, of which two were preeminent:
What will be most important to observe, to see? 
And:
What will I do with my observations?
I knew about the climate of intimidation and permanent conflict. I
was also sure that it would be impossible for me, being in the eye of
the hurricane, to remain outside of conflict and violence.
So, how to prepare this experience of participating in a mission of
conflict prevention? How to contribute to a direct, secret and universal
ballot, in fair and peaceful way, in an atmosphere free of intimidation,
violence or interference from any side?
I could identify some basic and fundamental actions such as:
1. To update knowledge about the situation in East Timor in as much
depth as possible: for instance, 
—To estimate the number of Indonesian army and police forces
and their apparatus in the field, the militia and their public
statements, their leaderships and their localization
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5 United Nations (1999), Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the
Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor, article 3.
—To better understand the patterns of acts of intimidation and
murder, in remote villages or within cities
—To assess the possibilities of external communication with East
Timor, by phone, email, satellite, etc.
—To find reliable contact persons in the field, to ensure access
to relevant places, events, and persons, to find safe places in
case of objective danger. 
—To record prices and general conditions of life.
2. To make contact with the other NGO observers and to check
with them if we could agree in certain common procedures, such
as having a contact person in Portugal to receive information and
know what to do with it, as a backup or alternative source of
information for the Portuguese government and the public.
3. It was also important to talk deeply with Timorese representatives
of CNRT, outside of the territory, to better understand the
challenges and dangers of the Agreement and also to negotiate in
what terms CNRT could be used as a channel of communication
to the outside world.
4. To read the notes of previous experiences in other stages of
armed conflict such as Northern Ireland and Western Sahara,
and recall the procedures of personal security and how to
behave in a hostile environment. In the field, every procedure of
security is simultaneously personal and collective because we
depend on each other very much indeed. 
5. To take note of experiences that YAP has gathered in years of
work in peace building.
6. Finally, to read carefully all the documentation about the official
observers, their role, their legitimacy and their limits.6
The main aim of participating in a mission like this one, was to
contribute to the implementation of the New York 5 May Agreement,
which could lead, I was absolutely persuaded, to the end of the conflict,
to peace and to independence for East Timor. To guarantee physical and
psychological security was thus, a duty and a responsibility. 
SECOND PHASE
So, it was really important to observe, to see, to touch the truth as
much as possible. The truth was, basically, what Indonesians wanted to 
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6 Of course there are other personal procedures, like health, for example, that are
not relevant to this reflection.
hide from foreigners. To reach this aim, to see the truth, it is necessary
to have an eye of the way beside us, to guide our eyes, hearts,
movement and questions. The Mata Dalan, as they say in East Timor. 
To know the field is absolutely fundamental. To be able to move
everywhere is essential. Without this linkage with the native people,
we are lost in five minutes. In conflict (prevention) we cannot allow
ourselves to be confused, cheated, or trapped. We need help from one
who knows more about it than anybody; we need to find the proper,
the right Mata Dalan.
Besides moving always and everywhere, I decided to take notes in a
diary. Day by day, in the act of writing, I could also try to re-make or re-
organize useful information for the following days. On the other hand,
I could use it afterwards for further and deeper reflections about
conflict prevention and peace building. Tracking a process, reviewing
events and their connexions could help me and others to understand
more about peace, or about absence of peace and what is necessary,
to make the essential ruptures, in this logic of war and violence.
Being in East Timor during the summer of 1999, I could test my
accumulated experience in peace building and conflict prevention that I
constructed in the luxurious rearguard in Europe within YAP, during so
many years.
PEACE IS A PERMANENT STRUGGLE AGAINST ANY SOURCE OF OPPRESSION OR
DISCRIMINATION
East Timor had a visible and significant military presence. The East
Timor Observatory estimated that there were a total of 32 500 military,
police and paramilitary personnel in the territory. The proportion was,
according to this Observatory, one official for every 25 inhabitants. The
most impressive, was to find troops, recognizable by their radio antenna,
in little lost villages of three or four bamboo huts in the mountains or
in distant places on the southern coast.
The misery of the population was complete: the people lived from
what the little gardens they cultivate could offer. Malnutrition,
tuberculosis, malaria, dengue fever, diarrhoeal diseases and Japanese
encephalitis were (and still are) endemic.7
The development, announced by Indonesian government during 24
years of occupation, concerning roads, electricity, and drinking water,
can be summed up as: hundreds of kilometres of roads to give military
and police forces access to some villages and check points. 
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The availability of products in the main shops in Dili was scarce
and of very poor quality (and virtually non-existent elsewhere).
Drinkable water had to be bought in bottles and electricity was very
irregular. 
Accomplishing a phone call in East Timor in 1999 was an adventure
and a test of patience and luck. The newspapers and TV stations were
completely controlled by the government. 
In East Timor the situation was harder than is imaginable: without
free information, without means of access to other sources of information,
poor and terrorised by military, police and militias, the Timorese people
lived in one giant concentration camp, which was their own homeland.
The people were always very reserved towards foreigners. The fear
could be felt and recognized very easily. This was all very visible and
very impressive. 
Despite the continuous militarisation of the society during the war,
which destroyed a significant proportion of social relations (local
leadership, conflict resolution mechanisms, family loyalties), the people
found ways to organize themselves in order to be able to respond
efficiently to any situation of danger. They were starving, half naked
and full of health problems, illiterate, but found means of efficient
communication among them. They took actions, every day, to avoid
more risk than was necessary. Their discipline was irreproachable
during the dramatic events following the announcement of the results
of the Referendum in order to avoid any possibility that the government
of Indonesia would invoke civil war or any other argument, to remain
in the territory and place the ballot in question.
Their aspiration for peace was greater than any other objective.
Beyond this incredible lucidity they were ready to provide foreigners
with all the infrastructure they needed: information, food, maps,
guides, interpreters, translators, drivers, cooks… To support observers
and independent journalists, was perceived as a strategic role on the
path for liberation. 
May I say, that during 32 days in East Timor (August and September
1999), travelling every day in the mountains from Baguia near the
Mate Bian to Tutuala in the eastern part of island, I only saw one journalist:
a free lance Japanese photographer! After the murder of the local
leader, Liurai Veríssimo, he disappeared.
But you saw violence on TV broadcast news. How, if my colleagues
and I didn’t see cameras and people looking for information and
images? This is a mystery that I never solved.
Anyway, can you now imagine how much and how cruel was the
violence in reality throughout East Timor?
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The violence in East Timor at that time was such that I could never
have imagined it. No one who was not a hero could have been
prepared for it, or able to manage it and to transform it into a tool for
peace.
PEACE IS A COLLECTIVE TASK THAT DOESN’T ACCEPT CONFORMISM
I came back, full of new experiences and full of the wisdom of my
dearest friends, the eyes of my way, who stayed in East Timor. 
I assumed the role of building peace and preventing conflict in East
Timor by:
—Telling their story, 
—Helping the world to not forget their courage and their capacity
to change the destiny they never chose
—Stating that peace building is possible even under extreme
conditions
—Saying that liberation concerns earth and soul, territory and
society, politics and social relations:
We should all understand that liberation of the fatherland [and
motherland] is only half of the objective of independence. After
independence, liberation of the people constitutes the other half of
the objective of independence.
Xanana Gusmão
5. Conclusions
After this experience in East Timor, some of the remaining questions
about pacifism and conflict management, conflict transformation or
conflict resolution and their contradictions have become even more
acute.
—I don’t pretend to find definitive answers, of course. However I
want to raise questions permanently, before and after each step
of peace building, within or outside YAP.
—I want to avoid reproducing the simplistic demagogy and
rhetoric (too often becoming the normative discourse), of those
that never had to take the position of being there, in the eye of
the conflict.
—I believe that it is necessary to be aware of limits, but also, to be
aware of the potentialities of co-operation in order to construct
a common world of peace. 
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—We also need, in spite of physical distance or cultural ambiguity,
to permanently exchange ideas, information, projects, and
people so as to build up networks.
—To prevent conflicts, it is essential to hear the people, their
voices, their perceptions, their hopes. They must exist.
—We want an international community strengthened by an
ecological vision of the world where everybody has the same
dignity and can never become a commodity.
—Peace building is producing and redistributing richness in
another type of market where price and value go together. There
is no Peace without economical and cognitive Justice. 
Peace building and conflict prevention need time, research,
perseverance, lots of humility and extreme daring.
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Report of a Seminar:
“The Role of the Media in Conflict Prevention 
and Peace Building”
The Netherlands Association of Journalists
The Hague, 20 February 2002
Commissioned by
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands 
I. Introduction
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands commissioned
the Dutch Federation of Journalists to convene a seminar on the role of
the media in conflict prevention, conflict management and peace
building.
Besides the organisation of the actual seminar this also comprised
an inventory of available project reports, publications and articles as
well as the activities of Dutch NGOs concerning media and conflict.
This has resulted in an extensive Overview document containing
detailed descriptions of available resources, as well as an extensive
listing of cases on the subject of media and peace building. Additional
copies of this document can be obtained by sending an email to
mvangeelen@fastmail.fm.
Below you will find the report of the seminar, which took place in The
Hague on the twentieth of February 2002. The seminar brought together
media organisation representatives, policy makers, representatives of
non-governmental organisations and journalists / media practitioners.
The overall objective was to discuss the role media can play, or actually
play, in preventing and resolving violent conflicts. More specifically
answers were sought to the following questions:
—Do the media play a significant role in reducing/increasing
tensions between conflicting parties?
—And if so, how can the international community stimulate the
media’s role in reducing these tensions?
Introductions to the subject were delivered by two keynote speakers,
namely Cees J. Hamelink, professor of Mass Communication at the
Universiteit van Amsterdam and Ross Howard, project director of the
Canadian Institute for Media, Policy And Civil Society (IMPACS). After
the plenary session participants were split up in three working groups
focussing on three specific geographic regions, namely the Balkans, the
Middle East and Indonesia / The Moluccas. Following introductory
presentations by the working group facilitators the participants formulated
specific recommendations concerning possible media interventions by
the international community in the regions concerned. In a plenary
session at the end of the day the working groups reported back their
findings to the chair. This was followed by a discussion on the findings
of the working groups and additional key issues and concluding
remarks by the chairman.
In this report you will find the summaries of the contributions by
the keynote-speakers (sections III and IV), as well as the opening
statement by Maarten Lak, Head Policy Planning Staff of the Ministry
(section II). In section V you will find the most relevant findings /
recommendations of the three working groups. Section VI deals with
more general key issues and points of debate, which emerged from the
plenary session. Attached is the full version of the speech by Ross Howard
as well as the programme of the seminar and the list of participants. 
II. Opening Speech by Maarten Lak, Head Policy Planning Staff 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
In his opening words Mr. Lak welcomed all the participants and
introduced the two keynote-speakers: Ross Howard, project director at
the Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS) in Vancouver,
and Cees Hamelink, professor in mass communication at the Universiteit
van Amsterdam. He remarked that the great interest in this seminar
points to the relevance of the subject for the work of many of the
participants, i.e. journalists as well as representatives from non-govern-
mental organisations dealing with the media, research institutions, the
EC Commission and ministries. 
“In the last ten years or so we have witnessed a constantly
growing role of the modern mass media —newspapers, radio and TV
as well as the internet— in reporting on ethnic conflict, religious
controversy, warfare and the like from all over the world. We all
remember the Gulf War in the early nineties when, for the first time
in modern age, one TV station —notably CNN in Atlanta— kept a
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sort of monopoly informing a worldwide audience on the latest
developments. More recent examples are the Kosovo war, the
Chechen conflict and the 2001 war against Taliban and Al Qaeda
and the daily reports on conflicts in a number of European, Asian
and African countries.”
Mr. Lak argued that in distinguishing roles of the mass media,
many will in the first place think of the ongoing ‘movie stories’ they
present in showing emotional, often sensational scenes that may appeal
to a ‘basic need’ of curiosity. Excitement and sensation are often
keywords here. We all know examples from our own experience, Mr.
Lak said. According to Mr. Lak the more traditional function of the media,
that is disseminating information on what is going on in «hot spots» in
the world, is of more relevance to today’s meeting. The audience is the
international community at large as well as in the regions concerned,
including decision makers, opinion leaders and activists. 
Mr. Lak pointed to yet another function of the mass media that has
come more to the foreground in recent years, namely the role they play
in civil society by contributing to peace building and the prevention of
renewed conflict. Organisations like UNESCO and numerous NGO’s are
nowadays involved in projects and programmes to contribute to conflict
prevention and peace building. “A country like the Netherlands has
supported and still supports a range of activities in this area. This specific
role of the media is often less known and not always transparent. This is
the main reason that we have decided to hold this seminar and see if
we can deepen our common understanding of mechanisms that work
and those that do not work.”
Violent conflict is widespread and forms one of the biggest problems
of this time. Although the short-term relief to war torn countries is
vital, the affected populations need more than medical supplies, food
and blankets. One of these needs is the need to be informed. Today,
there is a general consensus that media can play a significant role in
conflict situations, not only in provoking hatred and killing, but also in
promoting conflict resolution, peace building and reconciliation. Research
tells us that the most effective combination for successful communication
is a well-thought out mixture of ‘entertainment’ and ‘desired outcome’
programming. 
“Today we will discuss various possible approaches for media
initiatives. By e.g. actively involving local media practitioners and
establishing a proximity with the populations involved, advantages,
like more accurate and culturally suitable content and a higher chance
of future sustainability, are created. In some conflict situations,
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however, it is impossible to establish such a ‘presence on the ground’.
In these cases the reconciliation or humanitarian needs programming
must be beamed in from abroad, this approach is often taken by
international broadcasters.”
Mr. Lak explained that compromise is an essential element in all
conflict prevention and media projects. Recent research has shown that
managers of media interventions often find themselves having to strike
a careful balance between maintaining a working relationship with
local authorities and providing their audience with information to
improve their well-being and to their ability to act in that sense. Mr. Lak
quoted from a report by Media Action International: “Foreign media
interventions in conflicts are fraught with potential difficulties and even
dangers.” For that reason, some international donors have focussed
their attention on supporting local efforts instead. By making available
space or airtime for the expression of grievances, the media can encourage
a healing process. However, if the audience feels the message is imposed
from outside, it is highly unlikely to be receptive. Mr. Lak stressed that
in his opinion media interventions need local partnership if not ownership
to be successful.
Mr. Lak concluded by expressing the hope that this seminar will
provide all participants with a few practical conclusions and recommen-
dations that may guide them in their day-to-day work. “We can all learn
from successes and failures on which we will briefed by such outstanding
experts today.”
III. Keynote speech by Cees J. Hamelink, Professor of Mass
Communication at the Universiteit van Amsterdam
The Assumptions
Mr. Hamelink started his presentation by distinguishing three
important assumptions on which the discussion on media and conflict
prevention in academic literature, seminar reports and popular writings
is often based: 
—More and better information is essential to conflict prevention.
Once people know more about each other, they will understand
each other and be less inclined to conflict. Therefore peace-building
messages are essential to conflict prevention.
—It is also common to follow a core observation from the Constitution
of UNESCO: war begins in the minds of men and therefore the
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minds of men need to be influenced through the mass media. The
implied suggestion is obviously that if the mass media can influence
the minds of men in negative ways, the media can also —through
positive messages— develop a culture of peace. 
—There is a linear historical and moral progression in which humanity
evolves from a state of war mongering towards a state of world
peace. Peace represents an utopian vision to the realisation of
which information/communication could and should contribute.
Critical Footnotes
Much of the thinking on the relation between media and conflict is
based upon an attractive but seriously flawed cause-effect model. Mr.
Hamelink stated that the idea, that communication is the key variable
and depending upon how it is manipulated peace or war are the outcome,
has been disproved by communication research. Communication/infor-
mation processes do not occur in the linear mode of a simple Pavlov-type
Stimulus/Response model that assumes linear, causal relations between
information inputs and behavioural outputs. These processes are more
complex; involve feedback mechanisms and somewhere between the
message and the receiver there are intervening black box variables that
may create predictable, expected and desirable as well as unpredictable,
unexpected and undesirable effects.
Concerning the first assumption Mr. Hamelink remarked that some
healthy scepticism is needed. From this assumption it follows that if
adversaries knew more about each other, it would be easier for them
to reach agreement. He stated that it is difficult to find empirical evidence
for this suggestion and one could equally well propound the view that
social harmony is largely due to the degree of ignorance that actors have
vis-à-vis each other. As an example he gave the fact that many societies
maintain levels of stability because they employ rituals, customs and
conventions that enable their members to engage in social interactions
without having detailed information about each other. There may indeed
be a conflict situation precisely because adversaries have full and detailed
information about each other’s aims and motives. Therefore, it can be
argued that a functional level of secrecy can be helpful in containing
potential conflict. 
Mr Hamelink continued by questioning the second assumption:
War begins in the minds of men. He explained that wars among members
of the human species start with the material, physical fact or their
bodies. Quote: “The human life form is —like other life forms— constantly
involved in a struggle for life. Inevitable components of that struggle
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are aggression, violence and war. Greek philosopher Heraclitus called
war the father of all things: it is the permanent human condition. And
centuries later Emmanuel Levinas writes that the human being is locked
up into the state of war.” Mr. Hamelink explained that in the struggle
for life human beings, unlike other animals that are restrained by their
instincts, must hope that rational considerations put limits to this struggle.
As the human being fails so often in this effort, his/her competition and
aggression tends to be exercised with violence that knows little or no
restraint. Mr. Hamelink concluded that the expectations about the
power of information/communication neglect the fact that conflicts
often address very real points of contention and may be based upon the
antagonistic interests of fundamentally divergent political and economic
systems. If disputes are about competing claims to scarce resources (as
often is the case) it is unlikely that distorted communication is the crucial
variable or that correction of this distortion would resolve the conflict.
As an example Mr. Hamelink made the prediction that the bloodiest
conflicts of the 21st century are likely to be about water.
The idea, that history proceeds in progressive steps and that
through enlightenment, rationality and particularly through science &
technology humanity is on the road towards harmony and peace, is a
myth. This myth of the progress in modernity was exploded in Auschwitz
and Hiroshima. Quote “There is no linear progressive process, history is
circular and moves around the same core: the human possibility. The
suggestion of moral progress is misleading. Mr. Hamelink remarked that
inhumanity is part of the human phenomenon. It is a human possibility.
We should therefore primarily ask which are the material, physical
conditions of this possibility. 
Making matters worse
Although Mr Hamelink was sceptical about the potential of infor-
mation/communication as the key variables in conditions of peace and
war, he stated that they can certainly make the human condition a lot
worse. This has been demonstrated by the role that mass media have
played in genocidal conflicts. In 1994, in just a few months, some 500,000
to one million Tutsi’s were killed by Hutu’s. Radio Television Mille Collines
(the Hutu extremist radio and TV station) played an essential role in the
massacre by repeatedly broadcasting messages in which Tutsi’s were
slandered and ridiculed and depicted as despicable. 
Mr. Hamelink explained that this example points to one of the
world’s most critical problems: The alarming and worldwide increase of
ethnic conflicts. With almost certainty it can be predicted that several
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violent ethnic conflicts are still to break out in the near future. The potential
for such conflicts is extremely high in different parts of the world. Around
the world some 10,000 distinct societies have to find ways to live
together in some 200 countries. At the dramatic core of ethnic conflicts
is the grand scale perpetration of crimes against humanity. Crimes
against humanity transgress taboos that apply in most cultures, such as
the murder or torture of defenceless men and women, and the killing
of children. Among the crimes against humanity —as defined by
international law— are murder and extermination of civilian populations,
genocide and apartheid. 
Although crimes can be committed without apparent motivation,
the exercise of gross violence at a grand scale —as in crimes against
humanity— need motivating beliefs. These motivating beliefs, which
Mr. Hamelink referred to as “elimination beliefs”, are usually spread
through a systematic distribution of hate propaganda and des-information.
In this propaganda the “other” is dehumanised, whereas the superiority
of one’s own group is emphasized. The propagandists convincingly
suggest to their audiences that the “others” pose fundamental threats
to the security and well being of society and that the only effective
means of escaping this threat is the elimination of this great danger. 
According to Mr. Hamelink crimes against humanity are unthinkable
without elimination beliefs, therefore all those who propagate beliefs
in support of genocide, through whatever media, have to be treated as
perpetrators of crimes against humanity and should be brought to
justice. To prevent incitements to genocide Mr. Hamelink plead for an
International Media Alert System that monitors media contents in areas
of conflict. This system should spot —and subsequently expose— public
expressions of elimination beliefs as early as possible. Those perpetrating
those crimes should be prosecuted, and with the advent of the Inter-
national Criminal Court there is a serious prospect of implementing
this.
Mr. Hamelink admitted that towards the end of his presentation he
still seemed to attach importance to the role of the media in conflict
prevention. However, he made it clear that in his opinion serious conflicts
are most often about material and physical interests and are not just
the result of incitement through the media. Even so, the incitement to
genocide in media is often the early sign of very dramatic events and
the development of an International Media Alert System might
motivate the international community to intervene in the early stages
of the killing fields.
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IV. Keynote Speech by Ross Howard, Project Director 
at the Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS)
The second speaker, Mr. Ross Howard, is closely involved in designing
a «Framework for Media and Peace Building». This framework is
meant to assist donors, international agencies and non-governmental
agencies and media institutions, to recognize the potential of media in
conflict resolution, and to evaluate what they can do in this respect.
This framework will be posted on the IMPACS website soon. The
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) funded this effort.
Howard distinguished between conventional and unconventional
journalism. In his view the conventional kind professes neutrality and
personal disengagement and is still enormously important in reducing
conflicts and bringing about stability within war-torn states. Around
the world democracy nowadays varies almost directly with the presence
of a competent, diverse and free media. If the media are competent —
meaning accurate and reliably impartial— it provides early warning of
potential outbreaks or renewal of violent conflict, serves as a watchdog
over leaders and officials, and monitors human rights. 
A diverse media reflects competing opinions and interests and
enables citizens to make well-informed choices. An independent media
is essential to the functioning of other civil society actors beyond the
government, from community groups to political parties. According to
Howard good journalism provides channels of communication, which
counteract misperceptions. Quote: «Good journalism identifies the
interests at stake, and provides a safe outlet for emotions, among other
things.» He made reference to recent developments in Bosnia
Herzegovina and Cambodia. According to Howard in Bosnia Herzegovina
there is no comprehensive journalism training or education in place.
The existing journalism faculties are politically tainted, obsolete and
often incompetent. Many of the most talented journalists have emigrated
and will never return, the younger generation of journalists lack mentors
to teach them the craft. 
While in Cambodia the UN-imposed constitution theoretically
allows the most untrammelled free media in South East Asia, there is
absolutely no tradition of independent or reliable indigenous newspapers.
The papers are almost all partisan and constantly repeat innuendo and
political libel as fact. Because there is no independent broadcasting
authority the radio and television are generally bland, biased towards
the government and totally uncompetitive. Quote: “It is clear that
journalism development must go beyond journalists and technology.
You need a media-supportive infrastructure, which includes regulations
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and agencies, codes of conduct and statutes and political commitments
to ensure a free and diverse media.»
For journalists who are in the «peace building business», whose
intentions are clear and involve a committed response to conflict, some
of the techniques of journalism are proving to be effective tools. According
to Howard there are «media-smart people» who are doing some very
impressive work by using unconventional journalism to ease conflicts.
He stressed that their techniques deserve more attention. In most societies
the ability of the media to reach large populations over large areas is
simply too powerful to be ignored. Cheap technology has made the
media so pervasive around the world that it is almost like air. Peace
builders lacking other elements of social cohesion, such as responsible
governments to work with, are learning to work with the media. It is
becoming clear that the media can alter social and political behaviour
to help resolve conflicts almost as effectively as they can enflame
conflict, Howard said. 
Obviously this kind of thinking goes beyond conventional journalism.
The focus is on the effect of media rather than the mere presence of news
media outlets and their practice. The intention here is to communicate
information, which turns public sentiment towards resolution of conflict.
This is what Howard called intended-outcome programming. The media
becomes a facilitator of positive social change, rather than a professional,
disinterested observer. The programming format for this kind of media
usage can vary from conventional news-casts with a different focus, to
popular music or soap operas, or children’s entertainment which attracts
audiences to the conciliatory message, and to unconventional media
such as street theatre or posters, and to new technologies like the internet
and the web. Overall, the intention is to achieve a synergy between the
communications skills of media professionals and the people-centred
approaches of conflict resolution. Under no circumstances, however, is the
promotion of biased or knowingly inaccurate information, or viewpoints
masquerading as objective journalism, a valid approach. 
Howard mentioned a few successful examples of intended outcome
programming. In the first place the BBC World Service broadcasts into
Afghanistan. In the last 8 years until September 11 the BBC beamed
programmes on subjects ranging from conflict reduction to mine safety
to child nutrition to reducing violence against women, into Afghanistan
from transmitters in Pakistan. All the messages and themes were
developed within entertaining soap operas featuring family-life dramas
scripted for radio. The BBC programmers found that the Afghani people
were starved for entertainment, and through entertainment they
received life-saving and behaviour-changing information. In Macedonia
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the American NGO Search for Common Ground used a television
format. Working with the producers of Sesame Street, film and animation
are mixed to craft messages intended to reduce social tension and
strengthen inter-ethnic relations. The story line involves five children
from different ethnic backgrounds, living in the same apartment block.
Howard explained briefly the spectrum of five types of media, which
can contribute to conflict resolution, as developed in the Framework
study. At the one end of the spectrum are initiatives to overcome
journalism crippled by its lack of competency, diversity, freedom and
technology. This rudimentary journalism training (type 1) addresses
unskilled, inaccurate, conflict-obsessed, or highly partisan media. A second
type of media intervention focuses on more responsible journalism
(type 2) which goes beyond basic journalism, and focuses on skills such
as developing investigative, explanatory and specialist reporting, as well
as well-informed analytical reporting. The intention here is to create a
media sector that serves society by stimulating conflict resolution
processes and upholding democratic governance. Type three is located
between traditional journalism and pro-active uses of the media. Journal-
ists are encouraged to consciously examine their role to recognize
conflict resolution as part of that role. In this transitional journalism
(type 3) development, journalists redefine whom and what is newsworthy,
to better inform and encourage reconciliation. Sensitised media pro-
fessionals may actively seek to put two conflicting sides together to
stimulate dialogue.
Distinct from conventional journalism is the pro-active media-based
intervention (type 4), designed for a specific audience and purpose. It is
often the product of a peacekeeping force or a non-governmental
organisation, often in a conflict or post-conflict environment. It can be
media intended to counter hate propaganda, or to provide practical
information such as election and voting practices, refugee reunification
and information on health services. At the other end of the spectrum
Howard situated intended outcome programming (type 5). Unlike
conventional journalism this type of media is often produced by non-
governmental organisations and involves content with a specific purpose.
The content is determined by its appropriateness to stimulate dialogue
and foster reconciliation and peace. The programming and delivery can
be adaptations of a popular culture such as radio and television soap
operas and dramas, street theatre, wall posters, and more. The
initiative and programming may be closely allied with other actors and
projects.
Howard concluded by countering critics who argue that advocacy
journalism is sometimes going too far. He strongly underscored a quotation
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by Robert Karl Manoff, the director of the Centre for War, Peace and
the News Media at New York University, who said: «Those who profess
so-called objective journalism insist they cannot intervene in events
they are covering, nor take any responsibility for what happens. But
does anyone really believe that the professional norms of journalism
rate higher than fundamental human, moral obligations to end conflict?» 
V. Working Group Findings / Recommendations
Middle East
The working group opened with a short presentation by Jan Keulen,
a media consultant with a long experience in the Middle East. He explained
that the Arab world is probably the region where democracy and press
freedom have made least progress. People often do not believe what
the media say because they expect it to be government propaganda. Al
Jazeera provides more accurate information than nationally controlled
networks, which explains why it is so widely watched. The BBC with its
extensive Arabic service also has a substantial audience. An interesting
by-product of the many foreign television reporters operating in Arab
countries is that they provide an opportunity for local people to get on
the job training in basic technical skills.
The situation in the Arab countries varies from zero press freedom
in Iraq and very little freedom in Syria to various shapes and shades of
partial press freedom in countries like Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, the Palestinian
territories and Morocco. Yemen has very liberal press laws but the local
culture emphasizes clan allegiance and does not favour press freedom.
In the Palestinian territories television is far more important than
newspapers, which only have a limited circulation. The official television
network of the Palestinian Authority was regarded by most participants
in the working group as a failure, despite the extensive funding from
Western sources (programmes have a low quality and corruption is
rampant). But there are also about 30 smaller private broadcasting
stations in the West bank and Gaza. Some of them also relay Al Jazeera
programmes. Hamas does not have its own TV-network but some of
the smaller private broadcasters sympathise with Hamas.
Paradoxically in a country with a moderate, pro Western regime
such as Egypt the tone of the press is everything but moderate. As
analysed in a recent article in the International Spectator (February),
Egyptian newspapers are rife with conspiracy theories and regularly
blame Zionism, the CIA and the West for almost all the ills that befall
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the Arab world. Thus the media in that country tend to reflect and
reinforce misconceptions that seem to be prevalent amongst the public
(despite the fact that the media are to a large extent controlled by
a state with a moderate and modernistic outlook). While in most parts
of the world (like for instance Zimbabwe) the lack of fair and objective
media is directly related to a lack of democracy and freedom, the
relationship between these factors appears to be more complex in
Arab countries.
Concerning the impact of media on tension and conflict, the working
group identified mainly examples of an inflammatory role in the Middle
East. One of the few examples of a more positive role by media was
the Palestinian Voice of Love and Peace broadcasting to both a Palestinian
and an Israeli audience. The way media dealt with the emerging conflict
between the Copts and the Muslims in Ethiopia and helped defuse
tensions between these two groups was also a positive example. It was
furthermore noted that Internet access is far less controlled in the Middle
East than in a country like China. Although some Middle Eastern govern-
ments attempt to control access, there are usually ways around this. Thus
Internet is increasingly providing an alternative and more open source
of information. Poverty does of course limit the availability of computers.
So Internet is not yet a mass phenomenon in that part of the world.
FINDINGS / RECOMMENDATIONS:
—Supporting local initiatives is one of the better —and cheaper—
ways of setting up media projects. There are interesting private,
local initiatives in a number of countries of the Middle East,
including the Palestinian territories, which deserve support.
—Enhancing professional standards among journalists should
lessen the inflammatory role played by the media in the Middle
East. Schools of journalism play an import role in this respect.
Western countries could offer to give students of such schools
an additional training of, say, two months. 
—More in general it was considered important to give special
emphasis to the training of young people (journalists, editors,
program makers etc.) as they often have a more open mind
towards new concepts and ideas. Training courses for young
journalists need not necessarily take place abroad. Courses could
also be organised within the region.
—With regard to the training of more seasoned journalists and
editors, it was recommended to remove them from their local
setting and organise the training course in a Western country.
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This makes it easier for the participants to view local problems
and conflicts from a different perspective.
—Training which is not followed by job opportunities can however
lead to frustrations. Where possible training should therefore be
combined or followed up by actual production of media content. 
—Entertaining programs like children’s programs, soap opera’s and
drama productions that carry a reconciliatory message (edutainment)
were regarded as one of the best vehicles to increase mutual
understanding between communities and ease tensions. It was
noted that there is great demand for such programmes. This
approach is also less likely to encounter problems with censorship.
—In view of the escalating violence between Israeli and the
Palestinians there is no point in trying to set up dialogue projects
at this moment, but certain types of media projects continue to
be useful. Examples are the organisation of meetings between
journalists from the two sides and projects aimed at showing
Israeli journalist the predicament of ordinary Palestinian people
and vice versa. 
The Balkans
The Balkans working group started with a presentation by Rudi van
Meurs, a free-lance journalist and journalism trainer for Eastern Europe
and the Balkans. Mr. van Meurs criticized NGO representatives and
diplomats trying to force extra roles, like fighting corruption, stimulating
inter-ethnic relation and preventing conflicts, on journalists. In his
opinion all these subjects are in the first place in the interest of NGOs
who secure extra money with these kinds of projects. According to Mr.
van Meurs this discussion is actually a pleonasm, as all these different
goals should be automatically served by good journalism. In his function
as a journalism trainer in the Balkans Mr. van Meurs experienced how
disruptive an excessive NGO presence can be. High NGO salaries
disrupt the local economy and attract journalists who are much needed
by the local media. Furthermore promising journalists are leaving
almost every week to follow training programs abroad, mostly in the
U.S.
FINDINGS / RECOMMENDATIONS:
—There should be more priority for the training of the best (young)
journalists in the region, preferably by local trainers. These master
classes could establish groups of young, dedicated and critical
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journalists who can serve the difficult development of the newly
formed states in the Balkan. 
—Concerning the problem of sustainability of media support projects
it was noted that the viability of media projects can be improved
by focussing on the same editors / journalists for an extended
period. Another important recommendation regarding sustainability
was to make sure that the trained journalists and editors can
find employment in the local media sector before implementing
training programs.
—When executing media support projects it is important to take a
holistic approach; attention should also be given to the legal /
political context and the institutional environment of the media
sector in the pertinent country (e.g. journalists’ associations, media
institutes and press codes).
—In societies with a segregated media sector like the Balkans, joint
publication projects like those of Search for Common Ground in
Macedonia and IMPACS in South Asia (see the “Examples of
Media and Peace Building Projects” section in the seminar reader),
may sometimes yield positive results. It is crucial, however, that
the specific cultural (ethnic, religious and otherwise) conditions
are taken into account.
—More research should be done on the role of the media in conflicts.
Indonesia / The Moluccas
The discussion in the Indonesia working group was preceded by
two short presentations on the media situation in Indonesia and the
Moluccas. Kenneth van Tol from CAF/SCO (a Dutch NGO which supports
independent media in the South) explained that the Indonesian media
sector is characterised by four main elements. The first is indirect speech.
As a result of years of restriction of the press freedom, Indonesian
journalists are used to disguise their messages with culturally desirable
information. The second is Bapakism (paternalism). Indonesia is an
extremely authoritarian society. Journalists find it very difficult to question
the authorities. Corruption is widespread in Indonesia. In the media sector
this is known as envelope journalism. Journalists often receive money
to report (or not report) on certain subjects. The last element is a culture
of violence. Probably as a result of the transmigration politics of Suharto
Indonesia has a culture of ethnic violence. The spreading of rumours
through the press often fuels this violence. 
Victor Joseph and Rocky Tuhuteru, two Dutch journalists with a
Moluccan background, plan to execute a project on the Moluccas which
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will support both the Christian as the Moslem press on the Island. With
support from CAS /SCO Mr. Joseph visited to the Mollucas to asses the
current media situation. Mr. Joseph and Mr. Tuhuteru explained that
the most important factor on the Moluccas is the complete division of
the society, the land and also the media along religious lines. This is
worsened by the fact that most people including journalists have lost
friends or relatives. This causes mutual hate and suspicion and makes it
extremely difficult to start reconciliatory processes through the media. 
The Indonesia working group focussed on two questions. The first was:
Is there a role for infotainment in peace journalism?
First of all the word journalism was changed to media because the
term journalism would probably have started a long argument about
what journalism exactly is and which roles it should play in a society.
Overall the answer to the first question was answered positively and
consequent discussion was aimed at defining that role.
FINDINGS / RECOMMENDATIONS:
—Emphasis should be put on common (local) human values.
(Common to all Moluccans.)
—There is a role for «infotainment» in providing factual information.
—The use of local heroes, mythical heroes and musicians is sometime
problematic because they tend to belong to the culture of only
one of the conflicting parties.
—Meeting points of a divided society (markets, hospitals etc.) could
feature as locations for drama/soaps dealing with the interaction
between the two groups.
—A long-term commitment is a prerequisite! Temporary initiatives
almost always lead to nothing.
—Extensive research is needed before executing projects (formative
and summative research). 
—Foreign organisations should work with local people: Local contend,
local input and local appeal are of prime importance.
—Standard journalism stays important next to more innovative
usages of media.
The second question guiding the discussion was:
Do foreign media have a role to play in the way the Moluccan
media deal with the conflict? 
The participants noted that a distinction should be made between
foreign media organisations like IMPACS or CAF/SCO and foreign news
media.
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FINDINGS / RECOMMENDATIONS:
—Listen carefully what local journalists want.
—Don’t impose western concepts and journalism models. 
—Terminology used in media projects should carefully acknowledge
local conditions and sensitivities.
—For media assistance to the Moluccas the group proposed two
key words: Simple and Sustainable
—Simple: focus on basic communication infrastructure, for example
new tapes for the state television network, setting up an Internet
provider etc.
—Sustainable: not completely depending on support from outside
the Moluccas.
—A media centre can be especially useful for a completely segregated
society like the Moluccas. Journalists from different sides can
meet each other physically and talk. This is not possible in any
other place on the Moluccas. A media centre could also function
as a meeting point between Moluccan journalists and colleagues
from the rest of the world (i.e. Indonesia). Thereby providing a
source of information for foreign journalists on the Moluccan
situation and vice versa.
VI. Key Issues and Points of Debate
Discussion on journalism
A major point of debate, which took a lot of time in the working
groups on the Balkans and the Middle East, was the question whether
journalists have a responsibility vis-à-vis society when reporting on conflicts.
There seemed to be a difference of opinion between NGO-representatives,
civil servants and journalists as to whether the media can play a role in
decreasing or even preventing the outbreak of violent conflict. In this
context a distinction was made between media in general and conven-
tional journalism in particular. The following points where made in the
plenary discussion:
—It was felt that the discussion should focus more on the role
media perform rather than on the role of journalism as a profession. 
—Most participants seemed to endorse a more pragmatic approach
by supporting local initiatives using communication to empower
vulnerable groups in a society, rather than going for a highly
standardized type of journalism.
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—It was noted that the media continuum, which was introduced in
the speech of Ross Howard, could serve as a tool guiding the
discussion on the responsibilities of journalists covering conflict.
This continuum reflects a choice that a journalist has to make. 
—There is nothing wrong with journalists who choose to stick to
the first two stages (preferably the second!). But different journalists
make different choices. This should not be a problem as long as
journalists can choose for themselves and are not pressed by NGOs
to make a certain choice. 
—There is a possibility that the reports of journalists have an impact
on the society. But conflict resolution practitioners, NGO workers
and diplomats are asking journalists to be good citizens. This is
the problem. Journalists can decide for themselves whether they
are «good citizens». They are not going to preach civil rights or
anti corruption on the instruction of others. They should decide
for themselves when they take up this role.
—Diplomats and NGO representatives often ask journalists to get
their message, often aiming at reconciliation and dialogue, across.
But you cannot force people to act in a certain way, especially in a
difficult situation as the Israeli Palestinian conflict, through the
media
In searching for a bridging point between these two contending views
the following points were made
—It was recommended to clearly distinguish between what is
conventional journalism and what is not. What can you ask from
conventional journalists: report on all matters, don’t listen to the
spin-doctors. To guarantee these freedoms journalists should be
protected when they are threatened in executing their profession.
On the other hand, you can’t ask conventional journalists to
prevent or solve conflicts. This is something they cannot do.
—Western media and media organisations generally have the
resources to assist their colleagues in other regions, less-developed
countries in the first place. In this way the western media perform
two roles: on the one side they cover the conflicts of the world
in a conventional way outlining the ‘hard facts’ of war. On the
other side they sometimes support their colleagues who often
have a delicate relation with the local political leadership. 
—Journalists have the responsibility to report evenly on conflicts
and to take a position to increase the understanding of the global
situation by presenting many aspects of this situation. In this way
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they can decrease the stereotyping and increase the understanding
of the issues. This on itself goes a long way in reducing tensions
in conflict. We should not go on stressing the dichotomy between
good news journalism and peace building initiatives. There is an
obvious link between the two. This does not mean that all
journalists have to be mediators. But the ethics of good journalism
do not prevent them to take these responsibilities.
Other issues
—There are a lot of examples of the negative influence journalism can
have on a conflict. These «lessons learned» should be disseminated
among all parties concerned, i.e. NGO and media workers and
national and international bureaucrats.
—It was noted that the sustainability of media projects financed by
Western organisations is often problematic. A lot of money is
wasted on projects which can never survive without foreign
financial support. 
—The overkill of violent conflict being reported on in the inter-
national news media causes a kind of acquiescence towards the
occurrence of war. Among other things this causes a standardisation
in the way conflicts are being reported on. There is a need for
reporting on conflict from a different perspective. More attention
should be paid to the horrible effects violent conflicts have on
the populations involved.
—One crucial aspect which is often missing in conflict analysis and
prevention is the reason why people really fight and kill each
other. There is not enough attention for the structural, material
conditions and causes that play a role in conflicts. The media
should take up the responsibility to get this message through.
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